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What, on realising disagreement, is an agent justified in believing when it comes to the substance 
of that disagreement? What significance ought we to afford disagreement in the practices by which 
we came to hold the beliefs over which we disagree? What do we do when the disagreement 
reaches down to the norms that determine the kinds of things we see as reasons for belief? 
In this thesis I employ the methodological lens of ‘peer disagreement’ to develop a response to 
these questions that I call the ‘Higher-Order Trust’ approach to disagreement.  
There are two important aspects to this position: 
First, I suggest that a satisfactory theory of disagreement must consider both ‘The Problem of 
Ordinary Disagreement’ – roughly, the question of how epistemic peers ought to respond when 
they disagree in so far as they hold conflicting beliefs – and ‘The Normative Problem of Deep 
Disagreement’ – roughly, the question of how peers ought to respond when a disagreement in 
beliefs is explained by the disputants following conflicting epistemic norms.  
Secondly, I suggest that the realisation of disagreement affords one higher-order evidence about the 
epistemic practices by which one came to hold the relevant beliefs. Thus, the question of how one 
ought to respond to the realisation of disagreement depends upon whether one has available some 
form of epistemic self-trust in the practices drawn into question. To understand the normative 
significance of disagreement, then, we first have to understand what it means to have epistemic 
self-trust. In this light, I suggest that there is a form of affective self-trust that can be available in cases 
of ordinary disagreement and realised deep disagreement between peers. When such trust is 
available, it may be rational to stay steadfast in the face of disagreement. Where it is not, one should 
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Disagreement, why care? 
Disagreement is ubiquitous in our social lives. We disagree with people about matters mundane 
and world-shaking. We disagree with people about everyday problems and problems that have 
nothing to do with our everyday lives. We disagree about literature, films, philosophy, politics, 
science, and everything else under the sun. Disagreements can be illuminating, interesting, and 
stimulating. At times, disagreements can even be fun. At other times, disagreements can be 
frustrating, annoying, and lead to nothing but an unhelpful impasse. Disagreements can be 
conducted with consideration and sensitivity and lead to respect, admiration, even friendship. 
Equally so, we can be rude, abusive, and threatening when we disagree with others; breeding 
nothing but anger, fear, hurt and pain, destroying lives and relationships in the process. If 
communication binds people together in social relations, disagreement can be both the glue and 
the solvent for those relations. 
Perhaps most fundamentally of all, though, disagreement is a source of information. It is through 
disagreement that we find out that others believe differently to us and it is through disagreement 
that we find out why others believe differently to us. Indeed, at times, it is only through 
disagreement that we learn that others can believe differently to us. Everything else that 
disagreement is and leads to, follows from its role as a source of information. And, it is in this 
informational capacity that disagreement is interesting to epistemologists. Disagreement can only 
play this role, however, when we realise (or at least are in a position to realise) that others disagree 
with us. Thus, since epistemologists are interested in disagreement in its informational capacity, 
what we are interested in is ‘realised disagreement’. 
Just as the non-epistemological dimensions of disagreement can lead to boon or bust, so it is that 
the information gained from ‘realised disagreement’ can be beneficial or detrimental to our 
epistemic endeavours. When the people we disagree with are in the right, or have good reasons 
for their beliefs, we might improve the accuracy of our beliefs or learn something new and 
important that relates to those beliefs if only we listen to what they have to say. When the people 
we disagree with are in the wrong, or have based their beliefs on faulty reasoning, being too open 
to their viewpoints can put at risk beliefs that are already in good standing.  
2 
 
Unless we are totally dogmatic or spineless when it comes to our beliefs, of course, none of us will 
respond to disagreement in the same way in all instances. Sometimes we will respond by steadfastly 
sticking to our own opinions, at other times we will be more conciliatory, lowering our confidence 
that we are right and at times even acceding the matter entirely to our interlocutors. At still other 
times disagreement can lead us to conclude that none of us have a clue what we are talking about. 
These are ways that we can – and do – respond to disagreement and the information that we 
acquire through realising disagreement. But, for any instance in which someone sticks to their 
guns, accedes to their opponent, suspends belief, or even withholds judgement entirely, they can 
also ask whether they should have responded to that disagreement in that way, or whether they 
should have responded differently.  More generally, then, we can ask: How ought one to respond 
to disagreement when one realises that one disagrees with others? 
There are two ways in which we might understand this question. One way – as per the points 
above – is in terms of the content of our responses to disagreement. In this sense, we might 
rephrase the question to ask: What, on realising disagreement, is an agent justified in believing 
when it comes to the substance of that disagreement?  
As far as any actual disagreement goes, and as far as those party to that disagreement might be 
interested in its epistemological dimensions, we might suppose that it is this question that 
motivates that interest. So, any satisfactory account of disagreement ought to say something 
informative – and offer some guidance – as to what we are justified in believing in the face of 
disagreement. Just as we can ask ‘what an agent is justified in believing’, however, any answer we 
give to that question raises a more fundamental one: why is that attitude justified?  
Thus, the second question at the heart of the epistemology of disagreement is what significance 
we ought to afford disagreement in the practices by which we come to hold the disputed beliefs. 
It is only by answering this question that we will be able to explain why one response or other to 
disagreement is justified, and so have any hope of providing anything more than piecemeal 
guidance on how we ought to respond to disagreement. A satisfactory theory of disagreement, 
then, must also offer an explanation of the epistemic nature of disagreement, its normative 
significance, and its place in our epistemic practices. In other words, what we are after is a 
‘normative theory of disagreement’. 
In this thesis, I approach these questions through the methodological lens of peer disagreement. 
Roughly, peer disagreements occur when, justificatorily speaking, no particular response to 
disagreement is clearly favoured. In such cases there is a genuine puzzle as to how disputants 
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should respond to the realisation of disagreement. So, the thought goes, consideration of such 
cases can give us a unique vantage point when it comes to theorising the normative significance of 
realised disagreement. Discussion of peer disagreement’has formed the backbone of the literature 
on the epistemology of disagreement, and I follow that trend in this thesis. 
There are two important aspects to the account of disagreement I develop through doing so. 
First, I suggest that a satisfactory account of disagreement needs to consider both ‘The Problem 
of Ordinary Disagreement’ – roughly, the question of how epistemic peers ought to respond when 
they disagree in so far as they hold conflicting beliefs – and, what we might call, ‘The Normative 
Problem of Deep Disagreement’ – roughly, the question of how peers ought to respond when a 
disagreement in beliefs is explained by the disputants following conflicting epistemic norms.  
Secondly, I suggest that the realisation of disagreement affords one higher-order evidence about the 
epistemic practices by which one came to hold the relevant beliefs. Thus, the question of how one 
ought to respond to the realisation of disagreement depends upon whether one has available some 
form of epistemic self-trust in the practices drawn into question. To understand the normative 
significance of disagreement, we first have to understand what it means to have epistemic self-
trust. 
In this introductory chapter, I shall consider what is a suitable methodology for theorising the 
normative and epistemological dimensions of disagreement, roughly characterise the core 
theoretical issues at play, and discuss a few further theoretical assumptions pertinent to the thesis 
proper. Then, I provide a chapter-by-chapter breakdown of the contents of this thesis. 
Methodology and theoretical background 
Why peer disagreement? 
To address the question of how we ought to respond to disagreement it will be necessary to analyse 
some cases of disagreement – actual or hypothetical. From a methodological perspective, then, it 
is important to consider what sort of cases might inform discussion of the epistemology of 
disagreement. 
The difficulty facing any attempt to theorise disagreement informed by cases is that the justificatory 
structure of any given disagreement will be multi-dimensional. Relevant to what an agent is justified 
in believing in the face of disagreement, for instance, will be information that they have about their 
interlocutor’s competence,  about their own competence, the evidence on which their interlocutor 
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based their opinion, the agent’s access to that evidence, the evidence on which the agent based 
their original opinion, and any information they might have about the state of their and their 
interlocutor’s intellectual and cognitive capacities in the particular context. These dimensions of 
justification, of course, are not specific to the context of disagreement but are the kinds of 
consideration that influence what we are justified in believing in just about any social-epistemic 
interaction. What this means, though, is that for any disagreement in which there appears to be a 
clear and relatively un-controversial answer to the question of what doxastic response is justified, 
these more general dimensions of the justificatory context will provide sufficient explanation of 
that. Consideration of such cases, then, will not get us far in ascertaining what role and significance 
the realisation of disagreement itself ought to have in our epistemic practices. 
To illustrate, this point, consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose that I believe that 
there are no negative consequences to rising global temperatures, but then come to realise that the 
vast majority of climate-scientists disagree with me.  In such a situation, I clearly ought to accede to 
the expert consensus. However, we hardly need an account of the significance of my realisation of 
disagreement itself to explain that. For one thing, as I am not an expert and not qualified to assess 
the relevant evidence, I am entirely dependent upon climate-change experts for having an informed 
opinion on climate change. For another, the collective of climate-change experts is sure to be far 
more reliable on the issue at hand than me and I should realise that. Either of these features of the 
disagreement sufficiently explain why I am justified in (and only justified in) acceding to the expert 
consensus. Thus, whilst it is not necessarily so that my realisation of the disagreement has no 
normative significance in its own right, consideration of how I ought to respond in this case provides 
no clear evidence that it does have any such significance, nor of what kind of significance it might 
have if it does. 
Consideration of cases of disagreement in which general features of the justificatory context favour 
one response or other, then, will not be informative when it comes to developing a proper 
understanding of the significance of disagreement – either in the cases at hand, or more generally. 
In so far as any inquiry into disagreement should be informed by the consideration of cases, then, 
we want to identify a class of disagreements in which, justificatorily speaking, there is nothing 
about the context of the disagreement that clearly favours one response over another. In this kind 
of case, there will be a genuine puzzle as to how disputants ought to respond to the realisation of 
disagreement. As such, considering the question of what disputants are justified in believing in the 
context can also inform our theorisation of the significance that the realisation of disagreement 
ought to have in our epistemic practices more generally. It is from this methodological perspective 
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that I suggest we should view the overwhelming focus in the literature on disagreement upon cases 
of disagreement between epistemic peers. Indeed, it is along similar lines that Jennifer Lackey 
suggests that: 
In order to truly assess the significance of disagreement itself, there cannot be any relevant 
epistemic asymmetries between the parties to the dispute to shoulder the explanatory 
burden, in other words, such parties should be epistemic peers… (Lackey 2010: 208-09). 
And Jon Matheson that: 
We have seen that we cannot derive true interesting and universal principles about […] 
everyday disagreements, but how much conciliation should be made in everyday 
disagreements will depend on what the correct story is about idealized disagreements 
coupled with how the asymmetrical reasons add up (Matheson 2014: 327). 
I shall follow this approach in this thesis. It is, however, worth reiterating that the aim here is not 
to develop an account of peer disagreement only – but, rather, to develop an account of the 
normative significance of disagreement more generally through a methodological focus upon peer 
disagreement. Whilst I shall primarily be discussing cases of disagreement between peers, then, the 
hope is that by discussing these cases we will have a better grasp of the significance and role that 
disagreement ought to play in our practices in all cases.1 
On that note, we can recognise a second consideration important to this methodological approach. 
Just as we might suspect that a consideration of everyday cases will not help us to isolate the 
significance of disagreement itself, so we might worry that an analysis of heavily idealised cases 
will fail to generalise to everyday cases in any interesting or informative way. An account of 
disagreement that is built solely on heavily idealised cases may, to borrow some jargon from the 
sciences, be ‘internally valid’ – yet, in so far as these cases are sufficiently dissimilar to any we 
encounter in our actual social engagements, fail to be ‘externally valid’. Where, as Clarke et. al. put 
it: ‘‘External validity’, or extrapolation, refers to the problem of exporting the results or methods 
of one study to a different population or setting (Clarke et al. 2014: 346).’ Given the practical 
outlook of the interest in disagreement, an account of disagreement that fails the problem of 
external validity would hardly be a satisfying one. For that reason it will be important to identify a 
conception of epistemic peerhood that is suitable both for theorisation of the significance of 
disagreement and that we might hope to be somewhat representative of the disagreements we are 
 
1 That is not to say, of course, that a satisfactory theory of disagreement would have to provide an answer to the 
‘response’ question in all cases of disagreement. That would seem to be an entirely unrealistic goal. 
6 
 
likely to encounter in experience. I address these methodological issues in more detail in Chapter 
1.    
Justification 
Given that the aim of this thesis is to answer questions about what agents are justified in believing 
in response to disagreement it is important to clarify the conception of justification that is relevant 
to these questions. 
As I put it above, the underlying philosophical question that a normative account of disagreement 
needs to address is the question of what significance an agent ought to afford the realisation of 
disagreement in their epistemic practices. Presuming ‘ought implies can’ any normative significance 
attributed to the realisation of disagreement must be of a kind that the agent can afford that 
realisation.2 Correspondingly, any doxastic response that an account of disagreement recommends 
in response to realisation of a particular disagreement must be one that the agent can come to – 
specifically – by affording that realisation the role and significance described.  
From an epistemological perspective, this means that a viable account of disagreement cannot 
recommend responses or ways of responding to disagreement that depend entirely upon facts to 
which the agent does not have access. For, generally, if an agent does not have some kind of access 
to some fact X, then, that agent cannot afford X any kind of significance in their epistemic 
practices. In which case, it cannot be so that that agent ought to afford X any kind of significance 
when responding to disagreement. 
 
2 There is debate over whether the epistemic ought implies can, the locus classicum of which is Alston’s (1988) influential 
argument against deontic conceptions of justification. Alston’s argument presents us with a dilemma: either, he claims, 
we accept that we have voluntary control over our beliefs or we reject deontic conceptions of justification. Given that 
it seems we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs, so the argument goes, we ought to reject deontic 
conceptions of justification (see Feldman (1988a, 2001) and Wolterstorff (Wolterstorff 2010) for responses to this 
argument on its own terms; see Neta (2014) and Chuard and Southwood (2009) for useful summaries of the debate.) 
As Chuard and Southwood point out, Alston’s presentation of the argument appears to presuppose that ‘ought implies 
can’ should be read as saying that ‘an agent cannot , unless that agent has voluntary control over ’ing’. We might refer 
to this reading of ‘ought implies can’ as the principle that ‘ought implies voluntary control’. But as Chuard and 
Southwood, I think correctly, argue there are alternative formulations of the ought implies can principle that we might 
prefer, e.g. ‘ought implies logically possible’ or ‘ought implies can do otherwise’. And, if we accept one of these weaker 
formulations, the conflict between deontic conceptions of justification and doxastic involuntarism dissolves. As far as 
the current discussion goes, then, it is worth pointing out that the argument in the main text does not presuppose that 
‘ought implies voluntary control’, but works just as well if we presume that ‘ought implies logical possibility’ or ‘ought 
implies can do otherwise’. Thus, and in so far as much of the motivation for denying that the epistemic ‘ought implies 
can’ stems from attempts to respond to Alston’s argument, I take it that this suffices for us to sidestep further debate 




In light of this, I would suggest that questions of how we ought to respond to disagreement are not 
questions about what we are justified in believing when justification is understood in a simple 
externalist or objective sense – i.e. as determined solely by facts about reliability, or as determined 
solely by facts about the objective relations between propositions. Instead, questions of how we 
ought to respond to disagreement pertain to justification conceived in a narrow internalist sense. By 
this, I mean the form of epistemic support we have for our beliefs that, as Richard Foley puts it, 
is ‘closely connected to internally defensible’ believing (Foley 2001: 13) and, in Tyler Burge’s words, 
corresponds to the idea of having available a justification for one’s belief. To quote Burge: 
[J]ustifications in the narrow sense, involve reasons that people have and have access to. 
These may include self-sufficient premises or more discursive justifications. But they must 
be available in the cognitive repertoire of the subject. (Burge 2013b: 230). 
Justification in this narrow sense is determined by the content of the beliefs and other attitudes 
that the agent holds and the relations between these beliefs and other attitudes. Since these are 
facts that an agent, in principle, can access – they are also facts in respect to which it can be so that 
an agent ought to believe, or act epistemically, one way or another.  
Following Burge (2003, 2013b), then, let us use ‘warrant’ as a generic term to refer to any species 
of epistemic support and ‘justification’ to refer to the kind of warrant that an agent has for their 
beliefs when that agent has access, on reflection, to an argument with the content of the relevant 
belief as its conclusion.3 If we use the term reason to refer to the kinds of consideration that provide 
the content of such arguments, we can also say that justification is the kind of warrant that 
corresponds to an agent’s having epistemic reasons for what they believe. In that light, let us describe 
the relationship between epistemic reasons and justification such that: if P is an epistemic reason for 
S to believe Q, then, in lieu of defeaters, were S to believe Q and that belief be properly based 
upon P, S would be justified in believing Q.4 
Justification used in this way might also be described as subjective justification. I.e. It depends upon 
the relations between agent’s reasons for belief and the content of their beliefs as the agent takes 
those relations to be, not (at least directly) as they objectively are.5 Thus, whatever role an agent ought 
to afford the realisation of disagreement will depend upon the normative significance of that 
 
3 See McDowell (1993: 196) for a description of justification along very similar lines. 
4 Unless otherwise specified, talk of ‘reasons for belief’ in this thesis should be understood as talk of epistemic reasons 
for belief 
5 For good discussions of the distinction between objective and subjective justification/theories of justification, see 
Kvanvig (1984) and Feldman (1988b) 
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realisation vis-à-vis what they are subjectively justified in believing. Likewise, what they ought to 
believe in response to disagreement will be a matter of what they are subjectively justified in 
believing in the face of disagreement. 
Given this suggestion, it is important to note a further feature of justification so conceived. As I 
understand it, an agent’s beliefs will not be justified if they doubt/deny or ought to doubt/deny 
that their beliefs are objectively justified. We can state this as the following condition on 
justification: 
An objective attitude condition on justification (OAC):  
If S believes Q on the basis of P and S doubts/denies, or ought to doubt/deny, that P is 
objectively good reason to believe Q, S is not subjectively justified in believing Q.6 
Thus, if S ought to believe that P is objectively not reason to believe Q, given OAC, S could not 
bootstrap her way into justification for believing Q by supposing that ‘P is nonetheless reason for 
me to believe Q’. What motivates OAC is the fact that subjective justification is still epistemic 
justification. And, as such, the kinds of argument that underwrite any justification that an agent 
has for their beliefs must be arguments to the truth of those beliefs. An argument that includes only 
the premises ‘P’, ‘P is a reason for me to believe Q’, and ‘P is not objectively a reason to believe 
Q’, on the other hand, will not be an argument to the truth of Q – for just the reason that to doubt 
or deny that ‘P is objectively a reason to believe Q’ is to doubt or deny that P and Q are connected 
in such a way that the truth of P indicates the likely truth of Q.7 
Whilst subjective justification is not determined (at least directly) by facts about reliability or the 
objective relations between an agent’s evidence and their beliefs, then, it is conditional on the 
attitudes an agent has or the attitudes that they ought to have about the relevant facts of reliability 
and objective relations between their evidence and their beliefs. As we shall see later in the thesis, 
 
6 Compare Feldman’s description of what he calls ‘moderate subjective justification (MSJ)’: ‘S is subjective epistemically 
justified in believing p iff S has good reasons to think that S is objectively epistemically justified in believing p’(Feldman 
1988b: 414). As per OAC, ‘subjective justification’ so conceived is determined by the reasons one has available 
pertaining to the objective status of one’s beliefs. Feldman’s definition, however, is a positive condition – in contrast 
to the negative nature of OAC. With some additional caveats, this allows Feldman to ground the claim that MSJ 
implies objective justification. Without going into detail on Feldman’s argument, we can simply note that, since OAC 
does not require having reasons to believe one’s beliefs are objectively justified – only an absence of reasons to 
doubt/deny that – this entailment does not follow on OAC. 
7 Following this, we might note, it is natural to think of the kinds of consideration that count as epistemic reasons for 




this caveat to how we understand justification – and so questions about how we ought to respond 
to disagreement is an important one.  
Scepticism 
As discussed so far, discussion of the normative dimensions of disagreement concerns the question 
of what one would be justified in believing in the face of disagreement. We might note, then, that 
this discussion rests on the assumption that justified belief is not only possible, but, at least in our 
world, a common state of affairs. Or, to put it otherwise, the debate about the normative 
significance of disagreement presupposes that global or near-global scepticism about justification 
is wrong. At the same time, since certain of the responses that we might have to disagreement are 
of a sort with scepticism – i.e. suspending belief or withholding judgement altogether – the 
possibility for a normative account of disagreement that has significant sceptical consequences is 
on the table from the get go. Given how ubiquitous disagreement is, however, significant sceptical 
consequences within the context of disagreement may threaten global or near-global scepticism. 
Granted, since it would depend upon the contingent facts about the prevalence of disagreement 
within society, this would be a kind of ‘empirical’ rather than ‘philosophical’ scepticism. Crucially, 
though, it would undermine the working assumption that justified belief is both possible and a 
typical state of affairs nonetheless. For this reason, I assume throughout this thesis that any 
significant sceptical consequences that follow from a given account of disagreement, or other 
relevant theoretical concept, are at least prima facie evidence against that account. As we shall see at 
various points, this assumption is not without importance to the debate. 
Belief, confidence, and doubt 
As noted, the epistemology of disagreement is to a large degree concerned with the question of 
what an agent is justified believing when it comes to the substance of that disagreement.  
One way in which we might discuss this question is in terms of the tri-partite schema of ‘belief’, 
‘disbelief’, and ‘suspension of judgement’. Another approach is to parse talk of belief as talk of the 
rational confidence or credence an agent has or ought to have in the truth of the target propositions.  
I discuss these two ways of modelling the possible responses to disagreement in detail in Chapter 
2. For the moment, though, it is enough to note that this thesis will for the most part follow the 
language of belief. Where it serves the argument best or better reflects the literature, however, I 
shall at times talk of cases in terms of credences or rational confidence. 
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Throughout the thesis much reference is also made to ‘doubt’, ‘doubts’ and ‘reasons to doubt’. 
The term ‘doubt’ can be and is used in a range of ways, in everyday language and in philosophical 
literature. One might without contradiction say something like 'I am confident that the bill will 
have the votes to pass, but I must admit I have my doubts'. Here ‘doubt’ is used merely to express 
the fact that the speaker’s confidence in the truth of the relevant proposition is not at the level of 
certainty. One might also say something like ‘Do I think the bill has the votes to pass? I doubt it.’ 
Here ‘doubt’ has stronger connotations and is used, not just to qualify the speaker’s confidence, 
but to express the absence of confidence. Used in the first weaker sense, we might say, doubt does 
not preclude belief, or other attitudes, such as trust, faith, or optimism, that in some way entail a 
presumption of truth (or likely truth). ‘Doubt’ used in the latter stronger sense does. In normal 
usage, context is usually enough to make clear which of these senses of doubt is in use. 
Nonetheless, it is worth clarifying that in this thesis I use the term doubt strictly in the stronger 
sense.8 Thus, let us say that an agent can be said to doubt Q when they have, in some sense, taken 
Q under consideration, yet have taken no attitude toward Q that would involve the presumption 
that Q is, or is likely to be, true. Where I offer principles such as OAC that include a ‘doubt’ 
condition or where I refer to ‘reasons to doubt’, the reader should have this technical sense of 
doubt in mind. 
Uniqueness and reasonable disagreement 
A theoretical issue that runs somewhat orthogonal to the question of ‘how we ought to respond 
to disagreement’ is the question of whether there can be such a thing as ‘reasonable disagreement 
under full disclosure’ – whereby reasonable disagreement would occur when disputants realise they 
disagree, share all of their evidence, and are equally justified in maintaining their original positions. 
I will not be engaging with this debate in any detail in the main thesis, but it is worth taking some 
space to explain why. 
Much of the discussion around the possibility of reasonable disagreement is framed around the 
plausibility of a thesis that Richard Feldman refers to as the Uniqueness thesis (Feldman 2007; 
Sosa 2010; White 2005). As Feldman describes it: 
This is the idea that a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing 
set of propositions (e.g., one theory out of a bunch of exclusive alternatives) and that it 
justifies at most one attitude toward any particular proposition. As I think of things, our 
options with respect to any proposition are believing, disbelieving, and suspending 
 
8 Though I hope the reader will bear with me if I do slip on occasion. I am confident that I have not, but in the 
tradition of the preface paradox, I must admit I have some doubts! 
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judgment. The Uniqueness Thesis says that, given a body of evidence, one of these 
attitudes is the rationally justified one. (Feldman 2007: 205). 
As Feldman, I think rightly, points out, if ‘Uniqueness’ is true, then, reasonable disagreement will 
not be possible. Equally so, we might suppose, if reasonable disagreement is not possible, that will 
tell us something about the normative significance of disagreement. I.e. No matter what the 
disputants were justified in believing before they realised their disagreement, at least one of those 
party to a disagreement ought to revise their beliefs once they have realised that. By and large, this 
seems correct. Thus, it is also tempting to suppose that the opposite is equally true. I.e. If 
Uniqueness is false, then, reasonable disagreement is possible, and so it can be so that none of 
those party to disagreement ought to revise their beliefs, even under full disclosure. Hence, so the 
thought goes, the falsity of Uniqueness would also tell us something important about the normative 
significance of disagreement.  
It is something like this second line of thinking, I think, that motivates a good deal of the attention 
on the Uniqueness thesis, not only in relation to reasonable disagreement but also in relation to 
the normative significance of disagreement (for instance Ballantyne and Coffman 2012; 
Christensen 2016a). Given that, it may seem something of an omission from this thesis that I do 
not discuss Uniqueness or reasonable disagreement (beyond this section). My reason for not doing 
so is that I do not think this line of argument is correct. Whilst the questions about reasonable 
disagreement and Uniqueness are interesting in their own right, and not entirely unrelated to the 
concerns of this thesis, they are not of central concern to the questions about disagreement’s 
normative significance and I shall not take a stand on either. Let me explain why. 
Most plausibly, Uniqueness is true on an account of justification that leans strongly into the idea 
of objective justification, it is less compelling once we move further away from such a picture to 
place greater emphasis upon the subjective features of an agent’s epistemic standing.9 Whilst I have 
not suggested that we necessarily need to choose between objective and subjective conceptions of 
justification,10 I have suggested that the form of justification relevant to the current discussion is 
 
9 I include the ‘leans strongly into’ caveat since defences of Uniqueness have primarily been forwarded by those who 
endorse ‘Evidentialist’ theories of justification – which are internalist theories of justification. What seems to be 
common to those who offer these defences, however, is the inclusion of some caveat to suggest that the relationships 
of evidential fit on which justification depends hold independently of the agent’s perspective on those relations. So, 
for instance, Roger White suggests that ‘evidential support relations hold necessarily. If E supports P, then necessarily 
E supports P.’ (White 2013: 313) and Jon Matheson that he assumes that ‘justification is both objective and real. By 
‘objective’ I mean that there are objective standards regarding what epistemic reasons there are and how good various 
epistemic reasons are.’ (Matheson 2015: 9). 




subjective justification. At the least, then, I would suggest that any account of the significance of 
disagreement that rests solely upon Uniqueness will need to do some heavy lifting to defend that 
foundation. Let’s suppose for now, then, that Uniqueness is not true in the way that would count 
towards the current discussion. Even on this supposition, as I argue below, the falsity of 
Uniqueness would not yet entail that reasonable disagreement under full disclosure is possible. 
And, as such, it does not settle any questions about the normative implications of realised 
disagreement. 
Following White (2005), lets refer to any view that rejects uniqueness as a ‘Permissivist’ view. There 
are a number of forms of Permissivism we might entertain. We might, for instance, allow that two 
people could be justified in having different levels of confidence in a proposition Q in respect to a 
single body of evidence P, but not justified in outright differences in belief. Alternatively, we might 
allow that one person be justified in believing Q, and the other justifiably suspend judgement on 
Q – but not that one justifiably believes Q and the other ~Q. We can refer to these views 
respectively as ‘Weak’ and ‘Moderate Permissivism’. Alternatively, we might go further and allow 
that one person could be justified in believing Q on the basis of P and another justified in believing 
~Q. Call this last position ‘Strong Permissivism’. If the possibility of reasonable disagreement is 
entailed by any of these views, it will be entailed by ‘Strong Permissivism’. So, let us consider 
whether that is the case. Suppose the following can be true: 
Strongly Permissive Case (SPC): S1 justifiably believes Q on the basis of P; S2 justifiably 
believes ~Q on the basis of P. 
At the least, the possibility of cases like SPC will entail that cases like the following are possible: 
Reasonable Unrealised Disagreement (RUD): At t1, S1 justifiably believes Q on the basis 
of P; S2 justifiably believes ~Q on the basis of P; S1 and S2 are not aware of the other’s 
beliefs about Q. 
RUD describes a situation in which individuals do not realise that they disagree. As we are using 
the term, however, it is a condition of reasonable disagreement that those involved realise that they 
disagree and have fully disclosed to each other the evidence upon which they based their 
conflicting beliefs. If the falsity of Uniqueness entails that reasonable disagreement is possible, 
then, the possibility of SPC will entail also that the following is possible: 
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Reasonable Realised Disagreement (RRD): At t2, S1 justifiably believes Q on the basis of 
P and realises that ‘S2 believes ~Q on the basis of P’; S2 justifiably believes ~Q on the basis 
of P and realises that ‘S1 believes Q on the basis of P’. 
Presumably, RRD will only be true in cases where RUD could also be true11 – but, that being so, 
SPC will only entail the possibility of RRD, if there can be no cases in which RUD is true but RRD 
is not possible. However, and irrespective of what the other is justified in believing, for each of S1 
and S2, RRD is informationally distinct from their position in RUD. I.e. in RUD the disputants do 
not have any information about what the other believes, in RRD they do. Thus, if SPC entails the 
possibility of RRD, it will only do so if it is not the case that the kind of information that is acquired 
in realised disagreement under full disclosure always has normative significance. To say that it does 
always have such significance, of course, would be to take a substantive position on the normative 
significance of disagreement. The important point in the current context, though, is that to deny 
that such information always has significance is also to take a substantive position on the normative 
significance of disagreement. Whilst ‘Strong Permissivism’ clearly does entail the possibility that 
individuals could be justified in holding conflicting beliefs on the same evidence when they do not 
realise that they disagree, whether or not it entails the possibility of reasonable disagreement as 
understood here will crucially depend upon what is the correct account of the normative 
significance of disagreement. Similarly, for any weaker permissivist views. Thus, far from it being 
so that establishing the falsity of Uniqueness would settle questions about the normative 
significance of disagreement – it is the other way around. It is only by answering questions about 
the normative significance of realised disagreement that we can settle the question of whether the 
falsity of Uniqueness entails the possibility of reasonable disagreement. 
The quasi-modal form of this argument also helps us to recognise the parallel point. Just as the 
falsity of Uniqueness need not entail that reasonable disagreement is possible, so, establishing the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement would not entirely settle the questions about the normative 
significance of disagreement. For, even so, the key philosophical question would be why is 
reasonable disagreement possible? Would it be possible because, in all cases of disagreement under 
full disclosure, disputants are permitted to presume that their opponent’s beliefs are not justified? 
Or would reasonable disagreement only be possible in some cases – where disputants had some 
 
11 To say otherwise would effectively be to say that the realisation of disagreement could justify S1 and S2 in holding 
conflicting beliefs on the basis of the same evidence when they were not justified in doing so prior to realising their 
disagreement. If disagreement is significant in anyway it is not in that way! 
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form of positive support for favouring their own views? Reasonable disagreement could be 
possible, yet these questions remain. 
In summary, settling the questions about reasonable disagreement and Uniqueness will not get us 
far in developing a satisfactory normative theory of disagreement. Interesting as these debates are, 
I shall not engage with them further in this thesis. 
That covers the main theoretical and methodological assumptions in this thesis. With that done, I 
provide a summary of the chapters. 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 1: Peers and Problems 
In this chapter, I consider how we should understand epistemic peerhood to suit the 
methodological aims of the thesis and what are the key questions that an epistemological theory 
of disagreement should address. 
In section 1.1, I introduce three conceptions of peerhood: ideal peers, justificatory peers and effective 
peers and consider the merits of employing each of these as a methodological starting point for 
theorising disagreement. Those party to a disagreement will be peers in the ideal sense if none have 
the relative epistemic advantage vis-a-vis the substance of their disagreement, justificatory peers if 
they have reason to believe that that is so. Disputants will be effective peers when none have 
reason to believe that any specific parties have the relative epistemic advantage, where those 
reasons are independent of the substance of the disagreement. I suggest that the concept of 
effective peerhood should be the methodological starting point from which to develop a normative 
theory of disagreement. Thus, the first issue that an epistemology of disagreement needs to address 
is the problem of determining how disputants should respond to the realisation of disagreement 
when they disagree with their effective peers. Call this ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. 
I elaborate on these claims in section 1.1 
In section 1.2, I introduce the notion of deep disagreement, discuss the different ways in which we 
might characterize such disagreements, and explain why we should see ‘The Normative Problem 
of Deep Disagreement’ – how to respond to deep disagreement with an effective peer when that 
disagreement is deep – as distinct from ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. 
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Chapter 2: The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement – 
Conciliationism  
In the first section of this chapter, I offer a simple taxonomy of the possible accounts of 
disagreement one might offer in response to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. 
‘Conciliationism’ says that one ought always to revise one’s beliefs in the face of disagreement with 
an effective peer. ‘Steadfast Views’ say that one is always permitted to maintain one’s beliefs. ‘Non-
Uniform’ views say that the appropriate response will vary from case to case. Having introduced 
this taxonomy, the rest of the chapter considers the case for and against the Conciliationist view 
of ordinary disagreement. 
In section 2.2, I consider two ways in which we might understand the requirement on 
Conciliationism to revise one’s beliefs – in terms of categorical belief states, or in terms of 
subjective credences. In section 2.3, I discuss and develop what I take to be the two core arguments 
for Conciliationism: the ‘Truthometer Analogy’ and the ‘Independence’ argument. The 
Truthometer Analogy suggests that disagreement with an effective peer is analogous to finding 
oneself faced by conflicting readings from equally reliable thermometers. If the analogy holds, 
Conciliationism is the correct response to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. The 
Independence argument attempts to ground the intuitions behind the Truthometer Analogy in a 
more substantive principle of rationality. The principle of ‘Independence’ states, roughly, that it is 
not permissible to rely on considerations that are not independent of the substance of 
disagreement to justify favouring one's own position in that disagreement. The main motivation 
for this principle is that it rules out dogmatic responses to disagreement. Since, effective peers 
have no independent reason to favour one view or other, Conciliationism follows as a matter of 
course. 
In section 2.4 I consider the suggestion that Conciliationism leads to unpalatable sceptical 
consequences. Having developed this line of argument I suggest that we have motivation to 
consider the feasibility of a steadfast or non-uniform view of disagreement. 
Chapter 3: The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement – steadfast 
and non-uniform views 
In this chapter, I consider three alternatives to Conciliationism: the ‘Default Self-Trust View’ 
variations of which have been forwarded in defence of steadfastness by David Enoch and Karl 
Schafer; Jennifer Lackey's non-uniform 'Justificationist View’; and Thomas Kelly’s non-uniform 
‘Total Evidence View’. 
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The Default Self-Trust View claims that, given a general entitlement to trust my epistemic practices, 
I can count the fact that another person disagrees with me as evidence against their competence. 
I agree that self-trust is of central importance to the epistemology of disagreement and return to 
the topic in Chapter 5. I suggest, though, that since entitlements are defeasible, the question 
remains whether that entitlement is defeated by the realisation of peer disagreement. If it is, then, 
the ‘Default Self-Trust View fails. 
On Lackey’s 'Justificationist View’, the steadfast response to disagreement may be justified in cases 
where an agent has personal information that can ground an argument to the conclusion that the other 
party to the disagreement was subject to some kind of performance error. In other cases, 
conciliation is required. I point out that the conditions under which this argument will be available 
will be met in only a small range of possible disagreements. As such, the main shortcoming of this 
account is that it appears to be vulnerable to the unwelcome sceptical consequences of 
Conciliationism.   
Kelly's ‘Total Evidence View’ rest on two ideas: that we ought to reject the principle of 
Independence if there is a way of accommodating its anti-dogmatic motivations within a more 
general epistemic framework; and that we can do so by differentiating between first-order and 
higher-order evidence. I agree with Kelly on both points but suggest that Kelly’s conception of 
higher-order evidence fails to rule out dogmatic responses to disagreement. To develop a 
satisfactory account of disagreement around the concept of higher-order evidence, we need to 
consider more generally the question of how such evidence functions and how the higher-order 
evidence acquired in case of disagreement with an effective peer fits within that more general 
picture. I do this in Chapter 4 
Chapter 4: Higher-order evidence and defeaters 
In this chapter, I consider how best to understand the normative significance of higher-order 
evidence.  
In section 4.1, I offer examples of negative higher-order evidence outside of the context of 
disagreement and suggest that the key to understanding the normative significance of higher-order 
evidence lies in understanding how, and if, it can be accommodated within a more general schema 
of defeaters and justification. In section 4.2, I lean upon John Pollock’s influential account of 
defeasible reasoning to introduce the relevant kinds of defeater: rebutting and undercutting. In 
addition, I suggest that Pollock’s definition of undercutting is insensitive to an important 
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distinction and offer a further distinction between contextual undercutting defeaters and general 
undercutting defeaters. As a result, three kinds of defeater need to be recognized.  
In section 4.3, I consider whether any of the higher-order evidence cases can be explained in terms 
of rebutting, contextual undercutting, or general undercutting.  I suggest they can and that higher-
order defeaters of all three kinds are possible, thus, whether a conciliatory or steadfast response to 
disagreement is required will depend simply on whether the agent in question has a defeater-
defeater for the higher-order evidence. 
Chapter 5: Higher-order evidence, defeater-defeaters, and 
epistemic self-trust 
In this chapter, I turn to consider the kinds of consideration that might count as defeater-defeaters 
in cases of defeat from higher-order evidence, including cases of ordinary disagreement between 
effective peers. Echoing the distinction between first-order and higher-order forms of defeater 
forwarded in the previous chapter, I suggest in section 5.1 that, that where one has independent 
evidence that rebuts or undercuts the defeating higher-order evidence, one will have a first-order 
defeater-defeater for that higher-order evidence. In cases of disagreement between effective peers no 
such evidence is available. Thus, I suggest that, unless there can also be higher-order defeater-defeaters, 
conciliation will always be the appropriate response to the realisation of such disagreement. In the 
rest of the chapter I address the question of whether there can be higher-order defeater-defeaters. 
Following the suggestion that defeating higher-order works by preventing one from trusting one’s 
epistemic practices, I do so by exploring what we might mean by epistemic self-trust, what role it 
has to play in the structure of justification and reasons, and what forms self-trust might take. I 
conclude by introducing what I call the ‘Higher-Order Trust’ approach to disagreement the core 
claim of which are that there is a form of affective self-trust that can be available in case of 
disagreement with an effective peer. When it is steadfastness is a possibility, when it is not, the 
conciliatory response to disagreement will be appropriate. 
Chapter 6: The Higher-Order Trust approach and deep 
disagreement 
In the final chapter of the thesis, I extend the Higher-Order Trust approach to disagreement 
developed in Chapter 4 and 5 to ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. In sections 6.1 
and 6.2, I re-introduce ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’ and discuss the possible 
theoretical responses to that problem. In 6.3, I situate the notion of epistemic norms within the 
broader understanding of epistemic practices and self-trust forwarded in the previous chapter. In 
the final section of the chapter, I consider in more detail what the Higher-Order Trust account 
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has to say about how those party to deep disagreement between effective peers ought to respond 
in two types of case: cases in which disputants are not in a position to recognise the nature of their 
disagreement, and cases in which disputants are in a position to recognise the nature of their 
disagreement.   
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 Peers and Problems 
Introduction 
What role and significance ought we to afford disagreement in the way that we come to form and 
hold beliefs, and why? 
In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that we can address this question through 
consideration of cases in which, justificatorily speaking, no one side or the other has a clear 
epistemic advantage in respect to the substance of the disagreement. In the vernacular of the 
debate, these are disagreements between epistemic peers.  
In section 1.1, I introduce three conceptions of peerhood: ideal peers, justificatory peers and effective peers 
and consider the merits of employing each of these as a methodological starting point for 
theorising disagreement. I argue that we should use the notion of effective peers as our methodological 
starting point. Thus, the first issue that an epistemology of disagreement needs to address is the 
problem of determining how disputants should respond to the realisation of disagreement when 
they disagree with their effective peers. Call this ‘The Problem of Ordinary Peer Disagreement’.  
In section 1.2, I introduce the notion of deep disagreement, discuss the different ways in which we 
might characterize such disagreements, and explain why we should see ‘The Normative Problem 
of Deep Disagreement’ – how to respond to deep disagreement with an effective peer when that 
disagreement is a deep disagreement – as distinct from ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. 
1.1 Peerhood and Ordinary Disagreement 
 What is ordinary disagreement? 
Consider the following two cases, the first a slightly modified version of a much discussed example 
from David Christensen (2007), the second a somewhat higher-stakes case: 
DINERS-1 
Jack and Jill go to dinner with a group of friends. At the end of the dinner, the group agree 
to split the bill evenly, including a 20% tip. They leave it to Jill to work out what each owes. 
Having calculated the share of the bill in her head, Jill states that ‘Each of us owes $45’. 
To her surprise, Jack responds to this, claiming ‘That isn’t right. Each of us owes $43’. Jack 
and Jill have dined together many times in the past and always split the bill. In the majority 
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of past cases they have agreed on the total, and in the cases where they have not, neither 
has a better track-record than the other.   
DOCTORS-1 
Doctor Quinn is treating a patient, X, with Condition-C. Quinn is trained and experienced 
in the relevant field and has assessed the available case evidence – including patient history 
and test results. Quinn has also checked and doublechecked the relevant medical 
guidelines. Following her assessment of the case-evidence and guidelines, Quinn believes 
that the patient is most likely to recover under treatment option-A. Quinn then comes to 
realise that a second doctor on the case, Doctor Zaius, having considered the same case-
evidence and guidelines, believes that the patient is most likely to recover under treatment 
option-B. Quinn has every reason to believe that Zaius is as well trained and experienced 
as she. 
Despite the clear and significant differences between these two cases, both practically and 
epistemically, there are a number of similarities relevant to the current discussion. 
Firstly, Diners-1 and Doctors-1 are alike in so far as, epistemically speaking, they are both quite 
ordinary disagreements. In each case, what is at issue is a non-normative matter of fact, and the 
substance of the disagreement over that matter can be well characterised in terms of the disputants 
holding conflicting beliefs on that issue. Secondly, they are alike in so far as neither member of the 
two pairs appears to have any epistemic advantage over the other of the kind that would allow them 
to settle the disagreement without controversy. In neither case does one of other of the pair appear 
to have better evidence than the other (indeed, in both cases they share at least a significant part 
of their evidence) or be more competent when it comes to assessing that evidence, and in neither 
case is there any evidence that one party or other was subject to any specific kind of performance 
impairment or enhancement. 
In respect to these points, we might say that these are cases of disagreement between epistemic peers. 
And so, more specifically that these are cases of ordinary peer disagreement. In this kind of case, there 
is a genuine puzzle about how disputants ought to respond to realisation of the disagreement. 
Ought they to retain their original beliefs – even whilst it seems that the only evidence any of them 
might have to justify doing so is itself a matter of contention? Or, ought they to revise the beliefs 
– even whilst it seems that if they could be confident that they competently assessed the evidence 
they share, they could also be confident that their opponent had not?   
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This gives us a general idea of the puzzle presented by peer disagreement. As we shall see in the 
following discussion, however, there are a number of different relationships between those party 
to disagreement that we might describe in terms of epistemic peerhood – and determining which 
of these generate this puzzle and which are apt for the methodological focus on peer disagreement 
is crucial to the general discussion of this thesis. I turn to discuss these different relationships in 
the next section. 
 Kinds and contours of epistemic peerhood 
As I have characterized them so far, peer disagreements arise when none of those party to 
disagreement have the kind of epistemic advantage that would allow them to determine without 
controversy which of the respective positions is more likely to be correct than the others. Given 
this characterization, perhaps the most straightforward way to conceive of the peerhood relation 
is by reference to the likely truth of the beliefs held by the various parties to the disagreement, 
conditional on the substance of that disagreement. Amongst those who suggest that we think of 
the peerhood relation in this way are Adam Elga and David Enoch. So Elga states that:  
[Y]ou count your friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-to-be judged claim 
if and only if you think that, conditional on the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the 
two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. (Elga 2007: 500). 
And Enoch:   
[B]y your “peer” I will understand someone who is, somewhat roughly, antecedently as 
likely as you are to get things right (on matters of the relevant kind) (Enoch 2010: 956). 
Let’s say that those party to a disagreement who are peers in this sense are Ideal Peers, and define 
what it is for disputants to be such as follows: 
Ideal Peers  
IF S1 and S2 disagree and, independent of the substance of the disagreement, neither have the relative 
epistemic advantage when it comes to determining the likely truth of the disputed 
propositions, S1 and S2 are Ideal Peers.
12 
Epistemic peerhood, understood this way, is a relationship determined by the facts about the 
context of the disagreement as they are and irrespective of any information that the disputants 
 
12 To be clear, neither Elga nor Enoch suggest that this relationship is sufficient to generate the characteristic problems 
of peer disagreement. As the above quote makes clear, Elga is interested in situations in which one believes that one’s 
interlocutor to be one’s ideal peer. Enoch, elsewhere, is explicit that he takes what I call later in this discussion 
Justificatory Peerhood to be the relevant notion (see Enoch 2010: 476).  
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might have about those facts. Given this, we might note, we do not need to specify what kind of 
epistemic advantages disputants might have. As Elga makes the point: 
In defense of my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of you disagreeing 
about a claim, your friend is more likely than you to be mistaken. Then however intelligent, 
perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and unbiased you may think your friend 
is, it would seem odd to count her as an epistemic peer with respect to that claim, at least 
on that occasion. You think that on the supposition that there is disagreement, she is more 
likely to get things wrong (Elga 2007: 500). 
Whilst, then, there are a variety of factors that determine the relative likelihood that beliefs held 
by those party to a disagreement will be true, all that matters in respect to their status as Ideal 
Epistemic Peers is that those probabilities come out as equal. Thus, for example, given all the facts 
about how they came to hold their respective beliefs and conditional on the disagreement, if Quinn 
was in any way more likely to correctly judge the bearing of hers and Zaius’s shared evidence, 
Quinn and Zaius would not be ideal peers. Crucially, this would be so, even if neither Quinn nor 
Zaius had reason to believe that Quinn had any such advantage. Likewise, if Quinn has evidence 
that justifies her in believing that she does have the relative epistemic advantage in respect to the 
disputed propositions, they would still be peers in this idealised sense if that evidence is misleading.  
Echoing Elga’s point above, I think this way of conceiving the peerhood relation is a natural 
starting point for discussion. After all, what those party to the disagreement are interested in is 
determining which, if any, of the disputed propositions are true, or likely to be true. And knowing 
the antecedent probabilities that any beliefs held by the disputants will be true seems like a fair way 
of doing that. If those party to a disagreement somehow knew that they were ideal peers, on the 
other hand, that route would not be available – and so they would clearly face the puzzle described 
in the previous section (for example, the puzzle of what to think about the restaurant bill). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, questions about how we ought to respond to 
disagreement concern what we are justified in believing in the face of disagreement. And, as such, 
the normative significance of disagreement cannot be determined solely by facts to which those 
party to disagreement do not have direct access. The facts that determine whether disputants are 
ideal peers, though, are facts to which the disputants do not have direct access. Thus, even if it is 
so that disputants are ideal peers, that alone cannot determine how they ought to respond to 
disagreement.  
The possibility that disputants be ideal peers whilst being justified in believing that they are not, 
well illustrates this point. Equally significant is the parallel observation – that disputants might, in 
principle, be justified in believing that they are ideal peers even whilst they are not in fact ideal 
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peers. Thus, not only will it not be sufficient for it to be so that disputants ought to respond to 
their disagreement as if they ideal peers that they are ideal peers, neither is it necessary that they 
are ideal peers. This suggests a second conception of the peerhood relationship – framed not in 
terms of the facts about disputants relative standing vis-à-vis the disputed propositions as they are, 
but in terms of what disputants are justified in believing those facts are. In that light, let’s say that 
disputants are Justificatory Peers when the following condition is met: 
Justificatory Peers 
If, S1 and S2 disagree and independent of the substance of their disagreement S1 is justified in 
believing that S2 is her Ideal Peer, then, S2 is S1’s Justificatory Peer 
So defined, and reflecting the earlier points, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that disputants be 
ideal peers for them to be justificatory peers, nor for such cases to create a dilemma for those 
involved. Since the appropriate response to disagreement is a matter of what disputants are 
justified in believing and that is determined by an agent’s mental states and intellectual/cognitive 
make-up, if disputants are justified in believing that they are ideal peers they ought to respond to 
that disagreement as if they are ideal peers, whatever their relative epistemic standing actually is. 
Philosophically, then, disagreements between justificatory peers appear to be a methodologically 
suitable starting point from which to develop an account of disagreement. The problem with a 
focus on justificatory peers, however, is not so much philosophical, as practical. In short, the 
condition that disputants be justified in believing they are ideal peers is one that is likely to be met 
in the real-world rarely at best. Thus, there is some concern that an account of disagreement 
grounded in analysis of cases of disagreement between justificatory peers will not well generalize 
to the kinds of disagreement we encounter in our everyday lives. Or, to put it in the terms used in 
the Introduction, any theory of disagreement based only on consideration of cases of Justificatory 
Peer Disagreement will run into problems with External Validity. 
The important point here is that the definition of justificatory peers is derivative of that of ideal 
peers. Thus, since those party to disagreement will only be ideal peers if they are epistemic equals 
in respect to that disagreement, they will only be justificatory peers if they are justified in believing 
that they are epistemic equals in respect to that disagreement. However, as noted before, we do 
not have direct access to facts about our relative epistemic standing in respect to propositions over 
which we disagree. As such, and in contrast to ideal peerhood, the status of those party to a 
disagreement as justificatory peers depends upon the information that they have about the context 
of the disagreement. Given this, it becomes important to consider the different dimensions of 
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evaluation on which we might judge that those we disagree with are our epistemic equals. As we 
shall see, there are problems on all fronts. 
In general, there are two kinds of information by which disputants might judge each other’s relative 
epistemic standing vis-à-vis the disputed propositions: 
1. Information about the evidence on which each party has based their beliefs (Evidence) 
2. Information about how competently each party has assessed their evidence, or otherwise 
come to hold the relevant beliefs (Evidence of Competence) 
Of course, all sorts of information can provide us with evidence of how competently another 
person has formed their beliefs. Broadly speaking, though, these can be split into two further 
categories: 
2.a.  Information about each party’s general competence in the relevant domain of inquiry 
(General Evidence of Competence) 
2.b.  Information about features of the specific context that improve or worsen the various 
party’s performance in that context (Contextual Evidence of Competence) 
Crucially, for those party to a disagreement to qualify as justificatory peers, the information that 
they have about the context of disagreement will only afford them reason to believe that they are 
ideal peers if (i) it is sufficient evidence to justify believing that they are equals on each dimension 
or (ii) it is sufficient evidence for them to determine that any specific advantages/disadvantages 
disputants might have along those dimensions balance out overall. I take it that establishing that 
one’s interlocutors are one’s epistemic equals when there is evidence of significant disparity along 
particular dimensions of evaluation will be yet more difficult than when it does not. For that 
reason, I shall focus only upon the difficulties with establishing equality on each dimension. If 
establishing equality in this way is prohibitively difficult, then, doing so in the latter way will only 
be yet more so. 
With that said, let us consider the four dimensions of evaluation in turn. First, the demand that 
disputants have reason to believe that their evidence is equally good.  
One way that disputants might have reason to believe that they have equally good evidence is if they 
have reason to believe that they have the same evidence. On the face of it, Diners-1 and Doctors-
1 would appear to be good examples of disagreement over the same-evidence. One important 
condition on same-evidence disagreements between justificatory peers, however, is that disputants 
will typically only be justified in believing that they have the same-evidence after, what Richard 
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Feldman calls, full disclosure. Full disclosure, as Feldman explains, is the stage of in which disputants: 
‘have thoroughly discussed the issues. They know each other’s reasons and arguments, and that 
the other person has come to a competing conclusion after examining the same information’ 
(Feldman 2006: 220). Disputants who are otherwise justified in believing that they are epistemic 
equals but who are not at this stage, however, ought not to believe that they have the same 
evidence. Why? Because, typically, when two equally competent people disagree, we would expect 
them to have based their opinions on different bodies of evidence. And so, unless that can be 
ruled out, I would suggest, disputants will not be justified in believing that they have the same 
evidence. Same-evidence disagreements between justificatory peers, thus, should be understood as 
disagreements that persist after full-disclosure. 
Given that same-evidence disagreement between justificatory peers require full disclosure, 
however, it follows that such disagreement will only be possible if the disputants’ evidence consists 
solely of, as Nathan King puts it: ‘the sort of thing that is discursive and shareable through 
articulation, and is such that it can in principle provide one with a dialectical advantage over one’s 
dissenters’ (King 2012: 254) King refers to this as a dialectical conception of evidence. We can describe 
considerations that count as evidence in the context of disagreement on the dialectical conception 
as being considerations of a sort such that, where P is the potential evidence to be shared:  
On realising that S2 based their belief Q on P, S1 could, in principle, judge the bearing of 
P on Q without additional information about S2’s reliability, or somehow relying upon S2’s 
being reliable. 
On this conception, considerations such as intuitions, seemings, perceptual experiences, and so 
on, would not count as evidence.13 For instance, I could communicate to you that, when I was in 
the living room ‘I had the perceptual experience of a white table’. But you could not treat that 
information as evidence that there is a white table without having some reason to believe that my 
perceptual experiences are reliable, or else simply ‘trusting’ that my perceptual experiences are 
reliable. Put aside the question of whether this is a good conception of evidence. Since all evidence 
on a dialectical conception can in principle be shared, this conception allows that disputants could 
 
13 As it happens, the way that justification is conceived in this thesis suggests a more ecumenical conception of 
evidence than this – i.e. my perceptual experience that Q can count as evidence for you that Q, just if you have access 
to an argument from ‘S had perceptual experience Q’ to the conclusion that Q. For sure, I could not base my beliefs 
directly upon your perceptual experiences and in that sense your perceptual experiences could not literally be my 




fully disclose to each other what evidence they considered. Thus, they could come to be justified 
in believing that they have the same evidence. If, in such a situation, the disagreement persists, 
then, the disputants will be justified in believing that they disagree despite having equally good 
evidence. 
Being justified in believing that a person you disagree with has the same-evidence as you, however, 
is not sufficient justification for believing that they are your ideal peers. Thus, being in this position 
would not be sufficient for disputants to be justificatory peers. Whether we classify them as evidence, 
however, intuitions, seemings, perceptual experiences, or any other ‘evidence-like’ considerations 
still play a role in determining how reliably we hold true beliefs. And, indeed, if we do not classify 
these as being a part of an agent’s evidence, it seems natural to group them under the range of 
considerations that determine how competently an agent assesses the evidence that they do have. 
E.g. If my rational insight into what my evidence supports is reliably off-base, then, I am less likely 
to competently assess the bearing of any evidence I have. Restricting the conception of evidence 
to exclude these types of consideration may allow us to maintain that disputants can have literally 
the same-evidence, then, but only by making the other dimensions of evaluation more significant 
when it comes to the disputants’ status as justificatory peers. 
So much for ‘same-evidence’ disagreements. What about cases where disputants do not share their 
evidence? 
 As noted, it will typically be possible for disputants to be justified in believing that they have the 
same-evidence only if full-disclosure is possible. In contrast, where, for theoretical or practical 
reasons, full-disclosure is not possible, I have suggested that it will typically be reasonable to believe 
that someone that you do not enjoy some other clear advantage over, yet disagree with, has 
different evidence to you. The second way in which disputants might be justified in believing they 
are evidential equals, then, is if they have reason to believe that they have different but equally 
good evidence. To illustrate the possibility of ‘different-evidence’ peer disagreement, consider the 
following example: 
SPIES 
Agent-M is an analyst working for a US intelligence agency. Agent-M has collected a large 
body of data pertaining to the interference of a foreign agent G in the recent US election, 
on which basis she has concluded that ‘G interfered’. Agent-M liaises with Agent-S, a 
British analyst investigating the same issue, who informs Agent-M that he has concluded 
that ‘G did not interfere’. Agent-M and Agent-S know each other both to be exceptionally 
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competent analysts and know that they can trust each other. However, both Agent-M’s 
and Agent-S’s evidence is constituted by information that is classified by their respective 
governments. Though they might like to, neither are in a position to share all of their 
evidence with the other. As it happens, Agent-M’s belief that ‘G interfered’ is justified by 
her evidence. 
In this case, it seems reasonable for Agent-M to suppose that Agent-S has different evidence. What 
is more, since Agent-M is an exceptionally competent and trustworthy analyst, it seems reasonable 
for Agent-M to believe that B has evidence that justifies believing ‘G did not interfere’. However, 
given the practical features of the case, it is not possible for Agent-M and B Agent-S to fully 
disclose to each other the evidence that they have. Thus, whilst Agent-M can draw conclusions 
about the bearing of Agent-S’s evidence, she does not have access to the specific content of that 
evidence. As a result of this, a parallel puzzle arises as in the same-evidence cases. Should Agent-
M continue to believe that ‘G interfered’ – even though she is aware of evidence that may defeat 
the support she has for that? Or should Agent-M somehow revise her beliefs – even though the 
only evidence to which she has direct access supports her belief?14  
The key point here, and one which is general of different-evidence cases, is that what Agent-M is 
justified in believing about Agent-S’s evidence depends entirely upon what she is justified in 
believing about Agent-S’s competence. Just as restricting the conception of evidence to allow 
‘same-evidence’ cases places greater significance upon the competence dimension of evaluation 
when it comes to assessing whether disputants are justificatory peers; so, anyway, it is the 
competence dimension that has primary significance in different-evidence cases.  
When it comes to determining whether someone is your ideal peer – and so whether you and they 
are justificatory peers – then, much of the action and perhaps more than we might have first 
thought is on the competence dimension. How likely, then, is it that those party to a disagreement 
could be justified in believing that they are equals on this dimension? I would suggest not at all 
likely. Or, at least not if the requirement is that disputants be justified in believing that no party to 
disagreement has any advantage at all.  
The reason for thinking this is simply that the range of factors that can affect how competently a 
person assesses their evidence, or otherwise comes to believe something or other, is so wide as for 
exact parity in a particular case to be extremely unlikely. Quinn and Zaius might well be similarly 
 
14 For the most part this is treated as less of a puzzle in the literature than the puzzle in the same-evidence cases. 
However, I shall suggest in Chapter 4 that these two kinds of case are more alike than they first may seem. 
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competent in general ways. Indeed, given the details of their educational backgrounds, career 
positions, and track-record in practice, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that they are similarly 
competent in general ways. But, any number of factors are likely to prevent them from being equally 
competent. Perhaps Zaius is slightly more careful when it comes to checking all of the details of 
their patient histories, perhaps Quinn is slightly better at the purely probabilistic aspects of medical 
reasoning, or maybe she is better at the abductive side of medical reasoning – just a little more 
sensitive to the particular and peculiar features of individual cases than Zaius. And so on. The 
problem here is not that Quinn and Zaius could not have exactly the same degree of competence 
when it comes to the relevant domain of inquiry (thought that seems unlikely) – but rather that, 
given the range of ways in which they could differ in competence, it is hard to see how they could 
have evidence that justifies believing that neither of them have even the slightest advantage on this 
dimension.  
Even if disputants did have evidence that none was even slightly more competent than each other 
generally, however, they would still not be justificatory peers on the competence dimension unless 
they were also justified in believing that none performed any better or worse to their abilities in 
the case at hand. Jack and Jill might be generally as reliable as one another when it comes to simple 
mathematics, for instance, but that doesn’t count for much if Jill has reason to believe that Jack 
has gotten completely blathered on tequila over dinner.  It is important to keep in mind, then, that 
what I have called ‘general evidence of competence’ is only significant in so far as it is evidence of 
the disputant’s competence in the case at hand. After all, those party to disagreement are interested 
in who is right – not who is more reliable. If it is difficult to see what evidence disputants could 
have to justify belief that none are in the slightest bit more competent generally, however, it is even 
more difficult to see how they could be justified in believing that they all performed just as well to 
their abilities in the particular context. Simply consider the sheer number of factors that can impair 
or enhance one’s performance in a given moment, including: tiredness, what food you last ate, 
when you last ate, coffee, alcohol, headaches, circadian rhythms, sunlight, and any number of other 
factors. Or consider the number of factors that might affect the care with which one considers a 
question and the evidence bearing on that question – lack of interest, enthusiasm, unrelated joys 
and traumas, related joys and traumas, the need to pick the kids up from school, or to put out the 
rubbish… and so on. To be justified in believing that no party has even the slightest advantage on 
this dimension, one would presumably need to be justified in believing that no relevant factors of 
this sort were at play. But, given how many such factors are relevant, I’m not sure that we could 
ever be justified in believing that. 
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Common to all of the problems I am pointing to, is that they follow on the assumption that 
disputants’ status as justificatory peers depends upon their being able to determine precise 
probabilities as to how likely each is to be right. Precise probabilistic expressions of the reliability 
of epistemic agents may be a useful theoretical tool in epistemology, however, but they are a 
convenient fiction. In the real world, we do not and typically cannot determine each other’s 
reliability (especially in a particular context) with any degree of precision. Perhaps, then, we should 
simply loosen the conditions on peerhood, such that justificatory peers need only be justified in 
believing that they are ‘close to being ideal peers.’ So, for instance, Lackey suggests disputants 
might be still face the familiar puzzles of peer disagreement if:  
(1) [they] are aware that they hold differing doxastic attitudes, and (2) prior to recognizing 
that this is so, [they] take themselves to be roughly epistemic peers with respect to this 
question (Lackey 2010: 305).  
We might refer to this looser notion of justificatory peerhood as approximate peerhood. Approximate 
peers need not be justified in believing that they are epistemic equals – only that they are 
approximately so. 15 
Intuitively, the epistemic conditions on approximate peerhood will be significantly less demanding, 
and so more significantly more likely to be realised, than those on justificatory peerhood. For this 
to be so, however, we need to be careful in how we understand what it means to say that disputants 
are approximately equals. One way we might parse this is to retain the focus upon relative 
probabilities from the ideal and justificatory peer relationships. Thus, we would say that approximate 
peerhood requires that disputants are justified in believing that the antecedent probabilities that 
each party is right are approximately the same. If we think of approximate peerhood in this way, 
however, it is hard to see how we could avoid drawing upon the same convenient fiction of how 
we reason as does the notion of justificatory peerhood. For, however we might specify what 
difference in supposed antecedent probabilities might still count as ‘approximately the same’ – any 
difference that falls outside of that range will prevent disputants from being approximate peers 
(just as any difference at all prevents them from being justificatory peers in the more ideal sense). 
But if disputants are to establish that the relative likelihoods that their respective beliefs are true 
fall within the threshold of different – and not, say, just slightly outside of that – they will need to 
be just as precise with those probabilities as if they were to establish that none of them is just 
slightly more likely to be correct than the other. Just as we might say that justificatory peerhood as 
 
15 Lackey refers to this kind of situation as ‘Ordinary Disagreement’ – I should be clear that this is not how I use that 
term. As I use it, whether a disagreement is ‘ordinary’ is a matter of the content of the disagreement; for Lackey it is 
a matter of the disputants’ relative epistemic standing. 
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a methodological starting point has problems with external validity – so approximate peerhood 
understood this way would too.  
More plausibly, we might think of the relationship of approximate peerhood as a matter of having 
evidence that there are only slight material differences in the disputants’ respective epistemic positions. 
So, for instance, if Jill had evidence that Jack had drunk more wine than her at the dinner table, 
she would not need to calculate the difference that his consumption of wine made to the 
comparative probabilities that each was right to determine whether or not he was her approximate 
peer. Instead, it would be enough for Jill to consider how much more wine he had consumed than 
her. If Jack had consumed a lot more, then she should not think that they are approximate peers. 
If Jack had consumed only a little more than Jill and was not showing any signs of being significantly 
more inebriated, depending on her other evidence of the context of the disagreement, Jill would 
be justified in thinking that she and Jack are approximate peers. Approximate peerhood 
understood this way would seem more easily realised than understood probabilistically. The 
problem with this from a methodological perspective, however, is that even slight material 
differences can have significant epistemic consequences. Suppose that Quinn and Zaius are both 
careful in checking all of the details of patient histories, but Zaius was just slightly less careful this 
time around. Quite conceivably, Zaius’ comparative lack of care may have led to him missing some 
subtle aspect of the patient’s history that the more careful Quinn had not missed. Even a subtle 
point about the patient’s history, however, could have significant consequences when it comes to 
determining which treatment option is best. Evidence of a slight difference in care taken when 
assessing the evidence, thus, might well afford both Quinn and Zaius a compelling reason to favour 
Quinn’s opinion (at least until they can recheck the patient history) – even whilst their evidence 
would be such that they could justifiably believe they were somewhat ‘close to being ideal peers’.  
Thus, approximate peerhood understood this way is not subject to the worries about external 
validity I have suggested we might have about justificatory peerhood. Yet, it will have problems 
with what we could call internal validity. For, if there can be slight material differences in the 
epistemic standing of approximate peers vis-à-vis the substance of their disagreement – then it is 
quite possible that disputants could be approximate peers whilst still having sufficient reason to 
favour one side or other in the disagreement. If that is the case, we could not be sure that any 
conclusions we draw about how disputants ought to respond to those cases are best explained by 
the significance of the disagreement itself and not those other material differences. 
The problems with the concepts of justificatory and approximate peerhood, we might observe, 
come around because each requires satisfaction of a positive epistemic condition on peerhood. 
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Whilst, however, any methodologically interesting conception of peerhood has to include some 
epistemic condition, it need not be a positive condition. Indeed, in at least two of the cases we 
have considered so far, the problems with determining how to respond to the disagreement arise 
despite the disputants not being in a position to determine that they are peers in the ideal sense. 
In SPIES, for instance, the fact that Agent-M has no access to Agent-S’s evidence makes it difficult 
for Agent-M to ascertain whether or not Agent-S’s evidence is literally as good as her evidence. 
Indeed, it is probably safe to assume that one of them will have better evidence than the other, 
even if separately each body of evidence is sufficient to justify their respective beliefs. Nonetheless, 
even knowing that one body of evidence is likely to be better than the other will not help Agent-
M determine how to respond to the disagreement unless she also has an idea which of those bodies 
of evidence is better. Similarly, it is probably safe for Jill to assume that if she wasn’t somehow 
impaired when calculating the restaurant bill, Jack probably was. After all, it is a relatively simple 
calculation of the kind that both have been reliable on in the past and so they are not particularly 
likely to disagree unless something is up with one of them. Nonetheless, given that she has no 
evidence of impairment other than the fact that they disagree, Jill cannot conclude on that basis 
alone that it was specifically Jack who was impaired, or indeed that it was she. And that being so 
she still has no way of resolving the disagreement that would not require her to rely on her original 
– and contested – reasoning to do so. The point here, then, is that the ‘puzzle of disagreement’ is 
not generated so much by the evidence that the disputants have – but rather by evidence they lack 
– i.e. evidence that justifies believing a specific party has the epistemic advantage. So long as 
disputants have no evidence of this kind, or at least none that is independent of the disagreement, 
then, they will face a puzzle – even if they are otherwise justified in believing that they are not 
peers in the ideal sense. 
As we might put it, then, what is significant is not that disputants are justified in believing they 
actually are peers, indeed they may rarely be, but that the context of the disagreement is such that 
– justificatorily speaking – they are effectively peers. Along these lines, then, let us introduce the 
concept of an Effective Peer, defined as follows: 
Effective Peers 
If, S1 and S2 disagree and independent of the substance of their disagreement S1 is not justified in 
believing specifically that S1 or S2 holds the relative epistemic advantage vis-à-vis the 
disputed propositions, then, S2 is S1’s Effective Peer. 
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Given the connection I made in the Introduction between reasons and justification, this definition 
is equivalent to the following: 
If, S1 and S2 disagree and S1 has no undefeated reason independent of the substance of the 
disagreement to believe specifically that S1 or S2 holds the relative epistemic advantage vis-à-
vis the disputed propositions, then, S2 is S1’s Effective Peer.
16 
There is an important caveat to this definition. Though the conditions of effective peerhood so 
defined are negative, for the sake of discussion we can take these to entail that S1 is justified in 
believing that S2 is generally competent in the relevant domains.
17 This is because if S1 can deny 
S2's competence, either S1 will have independent reason to believe that she has the relative 
advantage vis-a-vis the disagreement or S1 should deny that she is competent. In the latter case the 
negative conditions of effective peerhood will be satisfied, but to coin a phrase, disagreements 
between incompetent peers are not the disagreements we are looking for. In light of this caveat, 
we can stipulate ahead of time that all cases of ordinary disagreement discussed in this thesis are 
cases in which, independently of the substance of the disagreement, disputants would be justified 
in believing the other parties to that disagreement are generally competent in the relevant domains. 
As per the comments above, disagreements between effective peers generate the familiar puzzles 
in respect to how disputants ought to respond to the realisations of disagreement. For that reason, 
a focus on disagreement between effective peers is internally valid in a way that we saw a focus on 
those between the material differences interpretation of approximate peers is not. At the same 
time, the conditions of effective peerhood are relatively undemanding. For certain, most 
disagreements that we encounter will not satisfy these conditions, but I see no reason to think that 
the kinds of disagreement in which those conditions are met would be particularly uncommon. 
Hence, I would suggest we need not have the worries about generalising from cases of 
disagreement between justificatory peers when that is understood in the strict sense. Indeed, and 
on this same point, I would suggest that very many of the disagreements that motivate the 
epistemology of disagreement – i.e. disagreements about science, medicine, philosophy, and so on 
– are good candidates for effective peerhood. A hypothetical case like Diners-1, for instance, whilst as 
likely as any to be a case of ideal peer disagreement, might strike us as slightly artificial, just because 
 
16 Of course, if one were justified in believing no party to a disagreement had the advantage, one would also lack 
reason to believe that any specific party had the advantage – so the class of disagreements between effective peers 
includes any cases of disagreement between justificatory peers however rare they might be. 
17 Or, at least that S1 could not justifiably deny that S2 is competent independently of the substance of the disagreement. 
I won’t dwell on the point, but it might help to keep this caveat in mind when we come to discuss deep disagreement. 
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we would usually expect there to be clear evidence of error one way or the other when people 
disagree on such a simple issue. On the other hand, as a problem increases in complexity and 
difficulty, requiring the assessment of large and complex bodies of evidence and high levels of 
expertise to do so, the chances that differences in access to that evidence, general competence, or 
situational factors will lead to error on the part of one party or other would seem to increase 
drastically. Yet, at the same time, the sheer range of possible sources of error inevitably makes it 
more difficult to identify any particular factor as making the difference. Just as we might expect 
those party to the kinds of disagreement that motivate discussion not to be peers in the ideal sense, 
then, I would argue that there is a good chance that they will often be effective peers. Not only, 
does the concept of effective peerhood better suit our methodological purposes, so too, I think, it 
better captures the intuitive appeal of the idea of epistemic peerhood to start with. 
With this conception of peerhood in mind, then, we can better specify the question that lies at the 
heart of the epistemology of disagreement. Simply put: 
How ought one to respond to disagreement with an effective peer or peers?  
In so far as we are currently concerned with cases of ordinary disagreement, call this ‘The Problem 
of Ordinary Disagreement’. In the second half of this chapter, I shall suggest that there is a second 
and parallel problem that an epistemological theory of disagreement must address: ‘The Normative 
Problem of Deep Disagreement’. 
1.2 The Normative Problem of Deep 
Disagreement 
In the previous section we saw that ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ arises in cases of 
disagreement between effective peers. Effective peerhood does not require that disputants be 
justified in believing that no party to the disagreement has any dispute-independent advantage 
when it comes to the disputed propositions. Indeed, disputants can be effective peers even whilst 
they would be justified in believing that one party has a quite significant advantage, just so long as 
they are unable to independently determine which specific party that is. In this section, I shall argue 
that recognising that the puzzles of disagreement arise in case of disagreement with an effective 
peer also allows us to recognise a second problem that a normative theory of disagreement ought 
to address. That is the problem of how to respond to the realisation of disagreement when the 
other parties to that disagreement are one's effective peers and that disagreement is a deep 
disagreement. Deep disagreements we can characterize as disagreements that are explained by the 
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disputants following conflicting epistemic norms. As we shall see, there is some pull to the idea 
that those party to a deep disagreement cannot be peers in the ideal sense – and so also cannot be 
justificatory peers. They can, however, be effective peers. Thus, if the starting point for a 
satisfactory normative theory of disagreement is to consider cases of disagreement between 
effective peers – it seems pursuant on us to also consider the normative implications of deep 
disagreement. 
 What is Deep Disagreement? 
Consider the following case: 
POLITICIANS 
Fax and Prudence are politicians belonging to rival political parties. Recently, a glut of polls 
from reputable pollsters have indicated that the public have an extremely low level of trust 
in the political class. Both Fax and Prudence have sincerely professed that they think a 
crucial aspect of politics is to act so as to engender just the kind of public trust the polls 
refer to. Additionally, both Fax and Prudence recognise that, were they not personally 
trusted by the public, engendering such trust would require considerable effort and 
expenditure on their behalf. Shortly after the release of yet another poll indicating the 
dearth of public trust, Fax asks Prudence what she thinks about the public-trust problem. 
Prudence replies ‘What problem?’ Surprised, Fax asks Prudence if Prudence has seen the 
recent polls. Surely, Fax says, given the poll results ‘It is quite clear that the public do not 
trust either of us.’ Prudence responds: ‘Of course I’ve seen the polls and they definitely 
spell trouble for you. Fortunately for me, the public trust me implicitly,’ before adding, 
with no apparent irony or insincerity, ‘I mean, if they didn’t, I would have to change the 
whole way I go about doing politics!’ 
As it happens, Fax based her beliefs about who the public trust on the polls alone; 
Prudence treats both polls and practical considerations as relevant to determining who the 
public do and don’t trust. Since Prudence would incur a greater cost were she to act as if 
the public do not trust her, Prudence determined that the poll results must not be evidence 
of how the public feel about Prudence. What is more, the difference in how the pair came 
to their beliefs in this case represents a quite general feature of their epistemic practices – 
Prudence sees practical considerations as generally relevant to determining what is true, 
Fax does not. 
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In this case there is a disagreement at the surface level about the propositions ‘the public do not 
trust Prudence’ and so also ‘the public do not trust either of us’. At this level the disagreement 
resembles a case of ordinary disagreement’ I.e. the disputants hold conflicting beliefs toward some 
non-normative factual proposition or set thereof. Unlike ordinary disagreement, however, the 
substance of the disagreement is not confined to the level of belief. There is also an underlying 
difference in terms of the kinds of consideration that each recognises as reasons to believe as they 
do. Thus, we might say, Fax distinguishes between the ‘epistemic’ and ‘practical reasons’. Prudence, 
on the other hand, does not make such a distinction. For all intents and purposes, Prudence treats 
the ‘practical reasons’ for belief as ‘epistemic reasons’ for belief. It is this underlying difference that 
explains how the pair have come to disagree. 
Disagreements like this have come to be known in the literature as deep disagreements. Typical 
examples of deep disagreement include: disagreements between practitioners of alternative and 
conventional medicine (Kappel 2018); those who follow scientific principles of inquiry and those 
who follow the authority of religious texts (Lynch, 2010; also discussed in Kappel 2012; Matheson 
2018; Pritchard 2018); and disagreements between people on opposite sides of the political 
spectrum (Pritchard 2018). 
Deep disagreements have been characterized as arising when disputants disagree over 
‘fundamental epistemic principles’ (Kappel 2012; Lynch 2010; Matheson 2018), and—influenced 
by remarks in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty – when disputants are committed to different hinge or 
framework propositions (Fogelin 1985; Pritchard 2018). Let’s call the first approach the 'Principle' 
model and the second the 'Wittgensteinian' model.18 Before moving on to discuss the problems 
that the possibility of deep disagreement poses it will be worth considering the differences and 
points of contact between these two models. By doing so, we might best identify the features of 
deep disagreement most relevant to its distinctiveness in respect to questions of epistemic 
normativity. 
Let’s start with the Wittgensteinian model. As noted, discussion of the place of hinge commitments 
in epistemology is inspired by comments from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty such as: 
 
18 The terms hinge commitment and framework proposition are both used in the literature to refer to the same strand 
of thought in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and can be treated as synonymous. Since hinge commitment is the more 
prevalent term in the contemporary literature, I shall follow that trend in my own usage. (Wittgenstein himself does 
not explicitly refer to either ‘hinge commitments’ or ‘framework propositions’ – but, as is his wont, employs the terms 
‘hinge’ and ‘framework’ at various point as metaphors to elucidate his wider discussion.)  
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That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.  
(Wittgenstein 2013: §343. Italics added). 
The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially been given the stamp of 
incontestability. I.e.: “Dispute about other things; this is immovable—it is a hinge on which 
your dispute can turn (Wittgenstein 2013: §655. Italics added). 
There is ongoing debate about the meaning of passages such as these, as well as what conception 
of a hinge commitment is relevant to epistemology irrespective of the exegetical questions. Still, 
Ranalli succinctly explains the general idea here: 
As a rough and ready characterization […] hinge commitments are the background 
presuppositions of our world views and general areas of inquiry, such as physics, history, 
or geology. In particular, hinge commitments are given a certain epistemic role within our 
world views and inquiries (Ranalli 2018b: 4). 
Standard examples of hinge commitments include propositions such as ‘there is an external world’; 
‘I exist’; ‘my sense faculties are reliable’. Amongst many other examples, Wittgenstein himself 
includes ‘my hands don’t disappear when I am not paying attention to them’ (Wittgenstein 2013: 
§153), ‘no one ever was on the moon or could come there’ (Wittgenstein 2013: §171), and ‘the earth 
[is] a ball floating free in space and not altering essentially in a hundred years’ (Wittgenstein 2013: 
§146). As these examples make clear, hinge commitments need not have any epistemic or 
normative content to class as such. Instead, the status and significance of any hinge is determined 
by the nature of the agent’s commitment to the proposition in question and the role that that 
commitment plays in their epistemic practices. What that entails precisely will depend upon one’s 
preferred account of hinge commitments (for discussion, see Ranalli 2018a; Coliva 2016). 19 
Nonetheless, in line with the Ranalli quote above, we can roughly characterize this role as the 
agent’s presumption of the certainty of the relevant hinge propositions across their epistemic 
practices. Moreover, it is common to the various accounts that hinge commitments are not arrived 
at by way of rational inquiry as we might expect of an agent’s beliefs, but rather form its underlying 
framework. Thus, to say that S has ‘God exists’ amongst her hinge commitments, is to say that, 
though she did not arrive at that position by way of rational inquiry, S holds it as certain that ‘God 
exists’ across her epistemic affairs and rejects whatever she feels to be inconsistent with that 
certainty (at least in ordinary circumstances). Importantly, hinge commitments have this role 
 
19 As Ranalli (2018b: 16) notes it is also a matter of debate as to whether there are such things as hinge commitments. 
For the purposes of this discussion I shall presume that we do have hinge commitments – the question is then, given 




without necessarily corresponding to any explicit attitudes held by the agent toward the relevant 
hinge propositions. As Pritchard explains: 
[O]ur hinge commitments are ordinarily tacit, in that they are rarely made explicit in our 
normal rational activities, much less do we become of aware of them qua hinge 
commitments. As Wittgenstein puts it, “they lie apart from the route travelled by inquiry” 
(OC, § 88). Relatedly, our hinge commitments manifest themselves most fundamentally 
not in what we say but rather in what we do. That is, it is our manner of acting that 
manifests the certainty that constitutes our hinge commitments (Pritchard 2018: 2). 
What I have called the Wittgensteinian model, then, delineates the class of deep disagreements as 
those involving – whether explicitly or at the level of tacit presupposition – a clash of these hinge 
commitments. As Pritchard and Fogelin point out, given the nature of hinge commitments it is 
reasonable to suppose that such disagreements will be inherently intransigent if not, indeed, 
rationally irresolvable. So Fogelin (who uses the alternative term framework proposition) writes: 
What I have called deep disagreements are generated by conflicts between framework 
propositions. They remain recalcitrant to adjudication because the sources of the 
disagreement—the framework propositions—are allowed to lie in the background, 
working at a distance. The way to put the debate on a rational basis is [to] surface these 
background propositions and then discuss them directly (Fogelin 1985: 8). 
And, more pessimistically, Pritchard suggests that: 
[S]ince one’s hinge commitments are essentially arationally held, it appears to follow that 
deep disagreements of this kind cannot be rationally resolved. Indeed, since it is one’s 
hinge commitments that determine the nature of one’s rational evaluations, we also seem 
to get the epistemic incommensurability claim noted above by default (Pritchard 2018: 3).20 
Given this inherent intransigence and the fundamental role that hinge commitments are purported 
to have in our epistemic practices, deep disagreements so conceived are undoubtedly a theoretically 
interesting class of disagreement. At the very least they raise hard questions about how, practically 
speaking, we might best respond to such disagreements so as to avoid unconstructive aporia in 
contexts that require epistemic coordination between different people and groups. What is left 
somewhat mysterious, however, is how and whether this model picks out a class of disagreement 
that is normatively distinct from ordinary disagreement. After all, that a disagreement is 
intransigent is not in itself a matter of normative significance. If an expert finds themselves in 
disagreement with an abidingly stubborn dilettante, that disagreement will be intransigent, 
moreover in such a way that any argument that the expert might forward for the view in question 
 
20  Pritchard, to be clear, questions and ultimately rejects the suggestion that deep disagreements are rationally 
irresolvable. So long as there is enough sufficient ground between disputants, he suggests, disputants can work a 
change in their commitments through rational discourse, albeit only indirectly (Pritchard 2018: 7). Nonetheless, I take 
it that Pritchard would endorse the weaker claim that they are inherently intransigent. 
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the dilettante will reject, but there is nothing especially normatively puzzling about this case. 
Despite the intransigence, the expert clearly need not give any weight to the dilletante’s views. So, 
if deep disagreements are to be a more interesting class of disagreements than disagreements with 
the abidingly stubborn, there must be more to them than their inherent intransigency. In that light, 
I would suggest, deep disagreements must manifest not just the commitment to upholding the 
certainty of the relevant propositions, they must stem from the disputant’s commitment to a 
certain epistemic-normative way of doing things in light of those propositions. Which, neatly enough, 
brings us to the epistemic principle model.  
The locus classicum for describing deep disagreements in terms of epistemic principles is offered by 
Lynch in his 2010 paper ‘Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability’. It is worth 
quoting this at length: 
[S]ometimes we move still further up what we might call the epistemic ladder: we begin to 
disagree over how we ought to support our views of the facts, about the sort of evidence 
that should be admitted, and whose methods more accurately track the truth. When we do 
that, we are engaged in a truly epistemic disagreement: a disagreement over epistemic 
principles. […] I’ll say [an epistemic] disagreement is deep when it meets the following 
conditions: 
Commonality: The parties to the disagreement share common epistemic goal(s).  
Competition: If the parties affirm distinct principles with regard to a given domain, those 
principles (a) pronounce different methods to be the most reliable in a given domain; and 
(b) these methods are capable of producing incompatible beliefs about that domain.  
Non‐arbitration: There is no further epistemic principle, accepted by both parties, which 
would settle the disagreement.  
Mutual Circularity: The epistemic principle(s) in question can be justified only by means of 
an epistemically circular argument. (Lynch 2010: 264-65).21  
 
21 Reflecting points later, I take it that the first of these conditions does not stipulate that disputants must share the 
same epistemic goals, but that whatever goals that they do have must be ‘epistemic goals’. Lynch’s illustration of the 
principle fits with this reading, as he suggests: ‘Finally, in some cases, the disputants are simply talking past one 
another—one is aiming at truth, for example, the other at practical success or some such.’ (Lynch 2010: 265) See also 
the definition of deep disagreement Lynch and Silva offer in a more recent paper, which drops the need for the 
conditions in the previous definition by focusing on the individual agent’s position in respect to the disagreement. 
Thus, they state:  
‘(DED) S1 is in a deep epistemic disagreement with S2 just in case: (i) S1 employs an epistemic principle, 
EP, to arrive at true beliefs in some domain of inquiry, (ii) S2 rejects that epistemic principle as a reliable 




I shall return to each of Lynch’s four conditions in due course during the discussion in this chapter 
and Chapter 6. For the moment, however, it is worth noting that Lynch’s concern is with a 
primarily meta-epistemological question: Should the possibility of disagreements that are 
irresolvable on account of their metaphysical nature lead us to accept some form of relativism 
about epistemic justification? These four conditions, and specifically the fourth, thus, can be seen 
as intended just so as to delineate the class of disagreements relevant to that question. Whilst the 
meta-epistemological implications of deep disagreement are undoubtedly worthy of discussion, 
however, these issues run somewhat orthogonal to discussion of the normative implications of 
deep disagreement. For that reason, whilst Lynch’s conditions capture much of what is important 
about deep disagreement – and I shall flag up their importance where relevant – I shall not adhere 
to them entirely through this thesis.  
For the moment, I want to focus at the more basic level on the question of what the Principle 
model of deep disagreement might add to the Wittgensteinian model. 
Previously we saw that hinge commitments can correspond to propositions without normative-
epistemic content. In contrast, we might understand epistemic principles, at least as treated in the 
disagreement literature, as theoretical statements that define or describe the application conditions 
of some normative epistemic concept – e.g. justification, knowledge, evidence, and so on. So, 
Lynch and Matheson, respectively, describe the notion: ‘By an epistemic principle, I mean a 
normative principle to the effect that some source or way of forming beliefs has some valuable 
epistemic status.’ (Lynch 2010: 262) and ‘An epistemic principle claims that some epistemic 
property (justification, knowledge, warrant, etc.) obtains whenever some descriptive property 
obtains.’ (Matheson 2018: 3) Since, then, deep disagreements on this model are limited to those 
concerning, or involving, epistemic principles – and epistemic principles encode the application 
conditions for normative epistemic properties – it is clear why deep disagreements as the class of 
disagreements over epistemic principles might present normative issues distinct from ordinary 
disagreement.  
Where the principle model is less clear, is upon the question off what standing those party to deep 
disagreement have to the respective principles. Or to put it otherwise, we might ask what it means 
to disagree over epistemic principles. One thought that we might have is that those party to deep 
 
not rely on or presuppose the reliability of EP with which he can show that EP is in fact a reliable means of 
arriving at true beliefs.’ (Lynch and Silva 2016: 43) 
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disagreement simply believe the relevant principles to be true. And, indeed, at times those discussing 
the principle model do lean on this way of describing things. Thus, Matheson suggests that: 
Fundamental epistemic principles are (epistemically) justified when they meet their own 
standards for justification. […] when one’s belief that one’s epistemic principle is correct 
meets the relevant descriptive properties, it is epistemically justified. On this account, I can 
be justified in believing [the epistemic principle] Seeming when it seems to me that Seeming 
is true, and that prima facie justification is not defeated (Matheson 2018: 4). 
Ranalli writes:  
[W]hat are the attitudes of the disagreeing parties to the relevant fundamental epistemic 
principles? In the case of direct deep disagreement, it seems to be belief. So too, we might 
claim, it is belief in the indirect case, albeit dispositional belief (Ranalli 2018b: 11). 
And Lynch: 
Let us say that A disagrees with B over some epistemic principle just when A does not 
believe EP and B does. Thus one disagrees with someone over an EP in this sense when 
one either disbelieves the EP or withholds belief in it (e.g. when one doubts that it is true). 
A overtly disagrees with B over some EP just when A explicitly withholds assent from an 
EP B asserts (Lynch 2010: 265). 
Despite quotes such as these, however, I think that it would be uncharitable to view the principles 
model strictly in terms of belief. Rather we might see such language as a matter of convenience. 
Why? Because most people do not explicitly believe the kinds of statement that would class as 
epistemic principles. Nor I would suggest, aside from epistemologists and some theoreticians of 
other stripes, do most people have the theoretical resources such that we might expect them to be 
disposed to believe such statements. Thus, were the principle model to require that those party to 
deep disagreement believe conflicting principles, we might expect vanishingly few disagreements to 
count as deep disagreements – including many of those that are taken to be paradigmatic of the 
kind. A more charitable reading of the principles model, then, is that those party to deep 
disagreement do not have to believe the principles in question. Instead, I would suggest, we can 
lean on the notion of hinge commitments to make good on this explanatory lacuna. I.e. We might 
describe deep disagreement as disagreements that arise when disputants have amongst their hinge 
commitments commitments to conflicting epistemic principles and it is that underlying conflict 
that explains the disagreement. On this understanding, those party to a disagreement could be 
committed to conflicting epistemic principles as hinges, whilst having no explicit attitudes to those 
principles. What matters is that the agent act as if those principles are true, not that they believe 
that those principles are true. Interestingly, Lynch echoes this thought when he writes: 
The underlying issue isn't a matter of what we know or don't know, but of what we should 
or shouldn't do. It is not even best conceived as a problem about which principles we 
41 
 
‘ought’ to believe (because one might say we ought to believe what we know to be true). 
After all, the root issue at the heart of an epistemic disagreement—that which makes the 
dispute an ‘epistemic’ one—is the question of which methods we ought to employ. What 
we want is a reason for employing one method over another. That's a practical matter. 
(Lynch 2010: 274). 
By treating the Wittgensteinian and Principle models as complimentary, not conflicting, then, we 
can accommodate both the idea that deep disagreements are normatively distinct from ordinary 
disagreement and the idea that such disagreements need not require explicit beliefs.  The Principles 
model captures the first, the Wittgensteinian model the second. What I want to suggest now, is 
that a natural way of expressing this synthesis of the two models is if we describe deep 
disagreements in terms of the epistemic norms that the disputants follow. 
In general, following Littlejohn and Turri (2014) and Boghossian (2008a), we might gloss epistemic 
norms as rule-like statements of the following form: 
Where  designates some normative epistemic act such as believing, inferring, trusting, and so on, 
Under condition C, one ought to/ought not to/is permitted to  
Or, imperatives of the form: 
If C, ! / don’t ! 
In the most basic sense, to say that someone ‘follows an epistemic norm’ is to say that they 
somehow regulate the relevant epistemic actions in accordance with what they perceive to be the 
prescriptions of that norm in different circumstances. I shall say more on what this amounts to in 
Chapter 6. For the moment, however, the important point is that ‘following an epistemic norm’ is 
intuitively (i) something an agent does, not necessarily a matter of what they believe, and (ii) 
constitutively connected to what an agent treats as epistemic reasons. The former I take to be self-
explanatory (at least for the moment, I return to this in Chapter 6). The latter follows from the 
suggestion in the Introduction that questions about what we ought to believe are questions about 
what we have reason to believe. Thus, to say that someone perceives the situation they are in as one 
in which an epistemic norm that they follow prescribes revising their beliefs is just to say that that 
person perceives that situation as one in which they have reason to revise their beliefs.  
With this much said, let us say that two or more people are involved in a deep disagreement about 
Q when they hold conflicting beliefs about Q and that disagreement is explained by their having 
followed different epistemic norms in coming to hold those beliefs. 
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This characterization of deep disagreement captures the key aspects of each of the principle and 
Wittgensteinian models.  (Incidentally, it also entails that deep disagreements satisfy Lynch’s 
competition condition). Since epistemic norms are closely related to epistemic reasons and 
justification, similarly to the principle model, it is readily apparent that such disagreements might 
be normatively significant in a way distinct from ordinary disagreement. Since, following an 
epistemic norm is a matter of what we do, and not necessarily what we believe, as per the 
Wittgensteinian model, a characterization in terms of norms captures the thought that the source 
of deep disagreements is something below the level of belief – and, thus, does not require that 
disputants hold explicit attitudes about theoretical epistemological issues. 
Now that we have some idea of what deep disagreements are, we are well positioned to consider 
how they represent a problem that is distinct from the problem of ordinary peer disagreement. 
The key question is whether those party to such disagreements can in some sense be epistemic 
peers.  
If those party to deep disagreement cannot, in principle, be peers in any sense – then, it will always 
be clear from the justificatory context of deep disagreement which side or other to favour. In 
which case we need not consider whether deep disagreement has any special normative 
significance. If those party to deep disagreement can be epistemic peers in some sense, cases of 
deep disagreement in which it is not clear which side or other to favour may be possible. If so, it 
will be important to consider whether the fact that a disagreement is deep has any special normative 
significance over and above the significance of the fact that there is a disagreement in beliefs. 
In the final section of this chapter, then, I consider whether or not those party to ‘deep 
disagreements’ can in some sense of the term be epistemic peers. 
 Deep Disagreement and Epistemic Peerhood 
Let’s return to POLITICIANS. Following the discussion in the previous section we might describe 
the disagreement as one in which Fax and Prudence disagree about which politicians the public do 
and do not trust because they have come to hold the relevant beliefs by way of following the 
conflicting norms: 
Fax’s-norm: If the only considerations that support one’s believing Q are practical 
considerations, then, for the sake of acquiring true beliefs, one ought not to believe Q.  
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Prudence’s-norm: If the only considerations that support one’s believing Q are practical 
considerations, then, for the sake of acquiring true beliefs, it is permissible for one to 
believe Q.22 
I take it that, given this difference in norms, Fax and Prudence could not be ideal peers, nor could 
they be justificatory peers – at least as far as being justificatory peers in respect to the deepness of 
the disagreement. For the pair to be ideal peers it would have to be so that their norms are equally 
good. Since the propositional statements of the two norms are inconsistent, however, it seems that 
this will not be the case. Either one of those norms is true and the other false, or both norms are 
false. In which case, the pair are either not peers in the ideal sense, or they are peers – but only in 
so far as neither of them are competent agents. Disagreements between incompetent agents are 
not normatively interesting. Given this reason for thinking the pair cannot be ideal peers, it follows 
immediately that they cannot be justificatory peers either. Or, at least in the relevant sense.  
The relevant sense of justificatory peerhood would be such that disputants are justified 
simultaneously in believing that they are ideal epistemic peers and that they are party to a deep 
disagreement.  (If disputants are justified in believing they are ideal peers qua ordinary disagreement 
– I take it, they ought to respond the disagreement as if it is an ordinary disagreement). Reflecting 
the point about ideal peers, however, those party to deep disagreement could only justifiably 
believe that they are peers in the ideal sense and involved in a deep disagreement, if they believe 
that each of their norms is false. For, given that the norms are, by definition, inconsistent – they 
could not justifiably believe that their norms are both true. And, if they were justified in believing 
that one was true and the other not, they would not be justified in believing that they are ideal 
peers. If the disputants are justified in believing that all of their norms are false, however, they are 
also justified in believing that none of them are competent to determine the truth of the disputed 
propositions. In which case, they clearly ought to withhold judgement on the truth of those 
propositions. (Again, disagreements between incompetent peers are not the disagreements we are 
looking for.) 
If those party to a deep disagreement are to be peers in any sense at all, then, it will be if they are 
effective peers.  As it happens, and as I shall explain below, Fax and Prudence are effective peers. 
Thus, it is possible in general that those party to deep disagreement can be effective peers. There 
 
22 As per the comments about Lynch’s commonality condition at fn. 18 it is important to include the ‘for the sake of’ 
caveat in these norms. The point of the example is not that Prudence forms beliefs in spite of what Prudence perceives 
to be ‘epistemic reasons for belief’ – but rather that Prudence does not distinguish between epistemic and practical 
reasons. For all intents and purposes, Prudence perceives practical reasons as epistemic reasons. (As it happens, I don’t 
think that this is an entirely uncommon epistemic position for people to take, but that is a different discussion.) 
44 
 
are two important considerations that make this possible. First, as defined earlier, one’s 
interlocutors are one’s effective peers when one does not have reason to believe that any specific 
party to the disagreement has the relative epistemic advantage, where that reason is independent of 
the substance of the disagreement. Second, since the norms that one follows are constitutive of what one 
treats as reasons for belief, the norms that those party to a deep disagreement follow also define 
what counts as a reason for belief that is independent of the substance of the disagreement. That 
being so, one will have a dispute-independent reason to believe that some party or other has the 
relative epistemic advantage in the case of deep disagreement if and only if one has a reason to 
believe as such that would, either: (i) count as an epistemic reason on any of the norms in play in 
the disagreement, or (ii) count as an epistemic reason on some further norm that both parties share 
and accept has authority in the situation. If neither of those things is the case, however, then those 
party to the disagreement will be effective peers. 
Again, can illustrate this by way of POLITICIANS. 
Fax is Prudence’s effective peer if Fax has no reason to believe that she has the epistemic advantage 
over Prudence that is independent of the substance of the disagreement. As the case goes, the 
disagreement between Fax and Prudence is explicitly over the question of who the public do and 
do not trust. Moreover, whilst that disagreement is explained by their following different norms, 
it is not necessary that they hold any beliefs in respect to those norms. (Indeed, we might think it 
implausible that they would. They are politicians, not philosophers, after all.) Nonetheless, Fax’s 
and Prudence’s respective norms determine the kind of consideration each sees as providing 
reasons for belief. Thus, though their norms are, so to speak, hidden from view, the difference in 
norms cannot be separated from the substance of the disagreement. That being so, any reason that 
Fax might have to believe that she has the epistemic advantage over Prudence will fail to be 
independent of the substance of the disagreement unless it also counts as a reason to believe the 
same on the norms that Prudence follows. Now, as the case goes, Prudence as close to admits to 
Fax that she factored the practical considerations into her assessment of who the public do or do 
not trust. And, on Fax’s norms, that admission would count as reason for Fax to believe that 
Prudence has made a significant error in her reasoning. However, the appropriateness of taking 
into account practical considerations in one’s epistemic deliberations is precisely the matter on 
which Fax’s and Prudence’s norms differ. And, as such, Prudence’s admission is not a dispute-
independent reason for Fax to believe that she has the relative advantage. Since, then, as described, 




Notice, however, that Prudence is Fax’s effective peer only because the brute facts about the norms 
they follow make her so. For, were this an ordinary disagreement, Prudence would not be Fax’s 
effective peer. After all, were this an ordinary disagreement Fax and Prudence would share 
epistemic norms. Yet, we have already seen that on Fax’s norms, the evidence Fax has that 
Prudence factored the practical considerations into her judgement is evidence of a significant error 
on the part of Prudence. Similarly, if the pair were to share Prudence’s norms – the evidence Fax 
has that Prudence factored the practical considerations would be evidence for Fax of a significant 
error on her part – i.e. she failed to take the practical considerations into account in her reasoning. 
In either case, then, were the pair to share norms, Fax would have independent reason to believe 
one of the pair had a significant advantage – and so Prudence would not be her effective peer. 
Though Prudence would not be Fax’s effective peer if they share the same norms, then, the fact 
that they do not – i.e. the fact that it is a deep disagreement – is sufficient to make her so. 
This points to an important and more general feature of deep disagreement. For if the other parties 
to deep disagreement can be one’s effective peers merely as a result of the brute facts about the 
norms they follow, it follows also that one cannot recognise that the other parties are one’s 
effective peers by reflection alone. Instead, to recognise that the other parties are one’s effective 
peers in this kind of case, one will have to acquire additional evidence – either sufficient to establish 
that any consideration one might suppose to be in one’s favour will be disputed, without 
establishing that the disagreement is deep. Which, in a case like POLITICIANS, would appear to 
require Fax to subject a vast range of her background beliefs to the scrutiny of Prudence – 
something that is likely to be practically impossible. Or, one would have to acquire evidence 
sufficient to establish that the disagreement is deep. Again this may be difficult to achieve in a 
practical sense. More significantly, though, it would require that one be capable of thinking about 
epistemic norms – i.e. conceptualising behaviour in terms of them and recognising behaviour as 
following them — and, as we have already discussed, most of us do not have the theoretical 
resources at hand to do that.  
Given these various points, then, we can recognise three important feature of deep disagreement 
and epistemic peerhood: (i) those party to deep disagreement can be effective peers, (ii) those party 
to deep disagreement can be effective peers when they would not be, were the disagreement an 
ordinary disagreement, and (iii) those party to deep disagreement can be effective peers when they 
are not in a position to recognise that they are effective peers. Given these last two points, I would 
suggest that we should recognise that effective peerhood in the case of deep disagreement is 
metaphysically distinct from effective peerhood in the case of ordinary disagreement. If what we have 
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learned from ordinary disagreement is that effective peers cannot simply dismiss each other on 
realising disagreement, then, we need to consider what this difference in the nature of epistemic 
peerhood reveals about the normative significance of deep disagreement. 
For that, reason I take it that any satisfactory normative theory of disagreement should also 
consider what we might call ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’ i.e. How ought one 
to respond to realising disagreement, when that disagreement is a deep disagreement and those 
one disagrees with are one’s effective peers. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that there are two normative problems of disagreement: ‘The Problem 
of Ordinary Peer Disagreement’ and ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. I have 
suggested that a satisfactory normative theory of disagreement ought to address both problems. I 
shall do that in the following chapters.  In Chapters 2 and 3, I survey the literature on ordinary 
peer disagreement and consider the merits of the various extant accounts of that. In Chapters 4 
and 5 I offer my own account of ordinary disagreement. In Chapter 6, I extend this account to 
deep disagreement.  
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In the previous chapter, we encountered two problems central to the epistemology of 
disagreement: ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ and ‘The Normative Problem of Deep 
Disagreement’. In this chapter and the next, I shall look at the various accounts of ordinary 
disagreement offered in the literature. 
In the first section of this chapter, I offer a simple taxonomy of the possible accounts of 
disagreement one might offer in response to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’, 
distinguishing between: ‘Conciliationism’, ‘Steadfast Views’, and ‘Non-Uniform Views’ of ordinary 
disagreement. Having introduced this taxonomy, the rest of the chapter considers the case for and 
against the Conciliationism. 
Conciliationism stipulates that, in the face of ordinary disagreement with an effective peer, one 
ought always to revise those of one’s beliefs that are under dispute. In the second short section of 
the chapter, I consider two ways in which we might understand the requirement to revise one’s 
beliefs. In the third and fourth sections of the chapter I discuss and develop what I take to be the 
two core arguments for Conciliationism: the ‘Truthometer Analogy’ and the ‘Independence’ 
argument. In the final sections of the chapter, I consider and develop what I consider to be the 
principal objection to Conciliationism: the problem of ‘Spinelessness’ and the sceptical 
consequences associated with that.  
2.1 Framing the debate 
‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ raises the question: how ought one to respond to 
disagreement with one’s effective peer? Broadly speaking there are two ways in which one might 
respond in such situations. One might continue to believe what one originally believed, or one 
might revise one’s beliefs. Those who argue that one ought to revise one’s beliefs in the face of 
disagreement with an effective peer we can label ‘Conciliationists’. They have included in their 
number David Christensen (2007, 2011, 2013, 2009), Adam Elga (2007), Richard Feldman  
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(Feldman 2006, 2007), and Jon Matheson (2015). The view that one is justified in retaining one’s 
original beliefs in the face of disagreement with an effective peer we can label the ‘Steadfast View’. 
Arguments in favour of Steadfast View have been offered by David Enoch (2010) and Karl Schafer 
(2015) 
Both Conciliationist and Steadfast views are best understood as making claims about the default 
response to finding oneself in disagreement with an effective peer. A third approach to the 
problem of ordinary peer disagreement is to deny that there is a default response to the problem. 
Echoing Lackey (2010), we can call views of this kind ‘Non-Uniform’ views. According to non-
uniform views, how one ought to respond to disagreement with an effective peer or peers can 
differ between cases. In some cases, the appropriate response will be to revise one’s beliefs, in 
others one may be justified in retaining one’s original beliefs. Which is the appropriate response in 
any given case will depend upon the precise details of the non-uniform view in question. 
Arguments in favour of non-uniform views have been forwarded most notably by Thomas Kelly 
(2013, 2010) and Jennifer Lackey (2010), as well as by Richard Feldman (2009) and Paul Faulkner 
(2016). 
This rough schema, then, gives us three broad views on ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’: 
1. Conciliationism 
2. The Steadfast view  
3. Non-uniform views  
As Kelly points out (2013: 35), the debate around ordinary disagreement has tended to treat 
Conciliationism as ‘the view to beat’. In that light, Steadfast and non-uniform views have tended 
to be framed in terms of arguments against the key aspects of Conciliationism. I will follow that 
framing device in the following two chapters. In this chapter I look more closely at the 
conciliationist view and consider two arguments in its favour: the ‘Truthometer Analogy’ and the 
‘Independence’ argument. I then introduce and develop an objection to Conciliationism that 
follows directly from the consequences of the view: the ‘Spinelessness’ objection. In the next 
chapter, I look at the arguments against Conciliationism that have been forwarded in favour of 
Steadfast and non-uniform accounts. 
2.2 The content of Conciliationism 
Conciliationism has it that, upon realising that one disagrees with one’s effective peer one ought 
to revise one’s beliefs about the disputed propositions. Before engaging with the arguments for 
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this view, it will be useful to have some picture of what the requirement to revise one’s beliefs 
involves. It will also help to have some illustrative examples at hand. Our two core examples of 
ordinary peer disagreement from the previous chapter fit the bill nicely. Here is a quick refresher: 
Diners-1 – Jack and Jill are members of a party of diners in a restaurant. At the end of the 
meal the pair volunteer to work out what each diner owes. Jack concludes that each diner’s 
share is $45; Jill that it is $43. The correct figure is $43. 
Doctors-1 – Doctors Quinn and Zaius are treating Patient-X for Condition-C. Based on 
assessment of the relevant clinical and scientific evidence, Quinn believes that treatment 
option-A would offer the patient the best chance of recovery. Based on assessment of that 
same body of clinical and scientific evidence, Zaius believes that treatment option-B would 
be best.  
As the two cases were constructed, the disputants in each case are effective peers. That is to say, 
in neither case does either party have dispute-independent reason to believe that specifically, they 
or, specifically, their interlocutor has the relative epistemic advantage in respect to the disputed 
propositions. The conciliationist says that, given their status as effective peers, and whatever they 
were justified in believing beforehand, both parties in both cases ought to revise their beliefs upon 
realising the disagreement. Likewise, for any other case of ordinary disagreement between effective 
peers. There are two models of ‘belief’ that have been employed in the literature to describe this 
requirement: 
On a ‘coarse grained’ or ‘categorical’ model, beliefs and belief revision are modelled on the tri-
partite schema of ‘belief’, ‘disbelief’, and ‘suspension of judgement’. On a ‘fine-grained’ or 
‘credences’ model, talk of belief and belief revision can be parsed in terms of the confidence or credence 
an agent has, or ought to have, in the truth of the target propositions. Drawing on the language of 
subjective probabilities, one’s confidence/credence in the truth of a proposition can be described 
on a scale of 0 to 1. If one’s confidence in Q is 1, one is certain that Q is true; if one’s confidence 
is 0, one is sure that Q is false; if one’s confidence in Q is 0.5, one is no more confident that Q is 
true than it is false. 
As I will present them in the following two sections, the central arguments for Conciliationism 
commit its adherents to the specific claim that, upon realising that one disagrees with one’s 
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effective peer, one should give equal weight to one’s own and one’s interlocutor’s beliefs in 
determining what to believe in the face of the disagreement.23 
Thus, on the categorical model, Conciliationism says that Jack and Jill each ought to suspend 
judgement on both propositions ‘each diner owes $43’ and ‘each diners owes $45’; and Quinn and 
Zaius each ought to suspend judgement on both propositions ‘A is best’ and ‘B is best’. On the 
credence model, Conciliationism is most typically taken to require that the disputants ‘split the 
difference’ between their original degrees of confidence in each of the disputed proposition.24 That 
is, their credence in each proposition after realising the disagreement should equal the average of 
their credences prior to realising that they disagree. So, if Quinn and Zaius’s original credences 





A is best 0.7 0.1 
B is best 0.2 0.9 
Some other option is 
best 
0.1 0 
Then, the ‘split the difference’ rule would require that, on realising the disagreement, Quinn and 
Zaius both come to have credences: 
 Conciliated 
credences 
A is best 0.40 
B is best 0.55 




23 It is because of this commitment that the view of Conciliationism I refer to has also been labelled at times ‘The 
Equal Weight View’. The Equal Weight label is first employed by Kelly (2005) in arguments against Conciliationism, 
but has since been adopted by a number of conciliationists (for instance Elga 2007; Matheson 2015) as well as other 
critics of the view (for instance Schafer 2015). It is worth noting also that Matheson (2015) distinguishes between 
weak and strong variants of Conciliationism – where strong Conciliationism corresponds to what I simply call 
Conciliationism and Weak Conciliationism refers to any view that suggests some weight should be given to the 
opinions of one’s peers, if not equal weight to one’s own. On this distinction, most views in the literature would count 
as variants of Conciliationism. For that reason, I prefer the taxonomy offered in 2.1. (for an alternative use of the 
distinction between strong and weak conciliationism, see Kelly 2014) 
24 Talk of ‘splitting the difference’ appears to come from Christensen (2007), but the basic idea is endorsed by other 
conciliationists (see Elga 2007; Matheson 2015). It is worth noting that the notion of splitting the difference is typically 
presented as an informal approximation of how to follow Conciliationism. This approximation will do for present 
purposes, but for discussion of the problems with the split-the-difference approach see Jehle and Fitelson (2009), and 
for an attempt to better precisify the demands of Conciliationism, see the ‘The Variable Equal Weight View’ as 
presented in Rasmussen et al (2018). 
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In other words, after realising that they disagree, both Quinn and Zaius should be close to agnostic 
as to which option is better, though ever so slightly favouring B. 
Both ‘categorial’ and ‘credence’ models are employed on all sides of the debate. Feldman’s 
(Feldman 2006, 2007) conciliationist position is articulated in terms of categorical beliefs, as are 
Wedgwood’s arguments in favour of steadfastness (Wedgwood 2010), and Lackey’s (2010) and 
Faulkner’s (2016) in favour of non-uniform positions. Conciliationists such as Christensen (2007, 
2011, 2009), Elga (2007), and Matheson (2015), on the other hand, have tended to talk in terms of 
credences, as have critics of Conciliationism arguing in favour of both Steadfast (Enoch 2010; 
Schafer 2015) and non-uniform views (Kelly 2010). 
Ultimately, which is the better model will depend upon how the concepts of belief, credence and 
confidence relate to one another more generally. Unsurprisingly, there is a substantial body of 
literature and disagreement on questions concerning just that. So long as these metaphysical 
questions remain open, however, it seems to me that epistemologists working on disagreement 
should allow themselves the freedom to employ both models. Depending on the case or point 
being made, it may be more useful to talk of disputants having reason to reduce or increase their 
credences in the disputed propositions, or to talk about their having reason to switch from one 
categorical belief state to another. In some cases, it will make sense to call on both models. In line 
with this suggestion, for the most part in this thesis I employ the terminology of the categorical 
model but, where relevant, also lean upon the notion of rational confidence. (Following the worries 
about attributing overly sophisticated probabilistic reasoning to ordinary epistemic agents in 
ordinary circumstances that I expressed in the last chapter, however, I shall generally avoid 
describing cases in terms of precise subjective probabilities – as is typically done by those who 
employ the credences model.) 
So much for the substance of Conciliationism, let’s turn to consider the arguments in favour of 
the view. 
2.3 Arguments for Conciliationism 
 The ‘Truthometer’ Analogy 
The basic intuitions behind Conciliationism are, I think, quite natural: When one has no prior 
opinion on an issue, under the right conditions, learning what another person believes about that 
issue can justify one in believing as they do. Indeed, we are accustomed to treating speakers as 
authorities, this being our testimonial practice. Given this practice, it seems reasonable to suppose 
52 
 
also that learning what another person believes about an issue can have justificatory significance 
when one already has an opinion on that issue. After all, the conciliationist might point out, if I 
find out that you believe Q prior to considering the issue myself, I would quite possibly believe as 
you do, and quite possibly be justified in doing so. Why think, then, that the discovery of what you 
believe should cease to have justificatory significance just because that discovery happens at a 
different point of time in my epistemic practices? 
One way that conciliationists have attempted to draw out these intuitions and their purported 
revisionary consequences is by way of a simple argument from analogy.25 Consider the following 
series of cases: 
THERMOMETERS 
Baker does not trust her oven temperature gauge one bit. His baking often requires him to 
be able to measure the temperature within a couple of degrees Celsius whilst the built-in 
gauge seems to be entirely inconsistent. Based on past successes and failures, sometimes it 
does the job nicely, other times it may as well be off by twenty or thirty degrees. For that 
reason, Baker decided a while ago to invest in a good oven thermometer. Since there was 
a deal in the shop when he made the purchase, Baker bought himself two new 
thermometers. Since then, Baker has used each a number of times, and any time he has 
used either the bake has gone well. Baker’s current project is for the auditions of a once 
popular British TV programme and, in a fit of extra caution, he decides to put both 
thermometers in the oven. After allowing a few moments for the oven to heat up, Baker 
checks to see if it has reached 200C as specified in the recipe. He checks thermometer-1 
first. It reads 200C. He immediately checks thermometer-2. It reads 220C. 
Echoing ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’, we can ask about this case: how ought Baker 
to respond to the conflicting readings from her two thermometers? 
There are a few things that we might note about Baker’s situation that are relevant to how we 
answer this question. For one, it makes no difference at all what order Baker checked the 
thermometers in. If, say the actual oven temperature is 200C – then, other things being equal, the 
oven temperature would have been 200C if Baker had first checked thermometer-2 and then 1. 
Thus, we might say, there is (as the case goes) no evidential relationship between Baker’s beliefs 
 




about the temperature of the oven and the order in which he checks the two thermometers.26 For 
another, it does not matter whether one or other of the thermometers is telling the correct 
temperature. Baker does not have direct access to the facts about the oven temperature – indeed, 
at the kind of temperatures in question, he is entirely dependent upon his thermometers to 
ascertain what that temperature is. Thus, those facts make no difference to what he is justified in 
believing vis-à-vis the relative functioning of the two measuring instruments. Similarly, Baker can 
be sure that at least one of the thermometers is on the fritz. Yet, without independent evidence as 
to whether it is specifically thermometer-1, specifically 2, or indeed both thermometers 
malfunctioning, that feature of the case affords Baker no reason to be more confident in one 
reading over the other. 
In light of these considerations, then, it is quite clear that Baker ought to be significantly less 
confident that the oven is at the right temperature after having checked thermometer-2 than before 
having done so. How much less confident? Given that Baker has no access to information that 
would allow him to distinguish between the two thermometers, epistemically speaking, he should 
be no more confident that the oven is at the right temperature than that it is significantly too hot. 
Or, in other words, Baker should suspend judgement about the oven temperature. 
Now consider the following familiar sounding situation: 
PATIENT-X 
Patient-X is being treated for Condition-C by Doctors Quinn and Zaius. Patient-X has no 
specialist medical knowledge or training but does have all kinds of reason to think that her 
doctors are both highly competent and trustworthy. Moreover, Patient-X has no reason to 
think that either Quinn or Zaius is any more competent or trustworthy than the other. 
Quinn and Zaius have just completed independent assessments of the clinical and scientific 
evidence pertaining to which of two treatment options would offer Patient-X the best 
chance of recovery. Quinn informs Patient-X that she believes ‘A is best’ and on that basis 
Patient-X comes to believe ‘A is best’. A few moments later, Zaius enters the room and 
informs Patient-X that he believes ‘B is best’. 
There are obvious and epistemically significant differences between this case and the last. For one 
thing, the question of which treatment option is best is significantly more complex than the 
 




question of whether the oven is at the right temperature for a successful bake. Correspondingly, 
determining the correct answer to the treatment question requires considerably more epistemic 
sophistication than does the temperature question. In this respect, we might suppose, the general 
conditions under which it might be appropriate for Patient-X to rely on her doctors’ medical 
opinions will be significantly more demanding than those under which it is appropriate for Baker 
to rely on his thermometers.27 For another, where the thermometers upon which Baker relies upon 
for information about the temperature of his oven are inanimate measuring instruments, the 
testimony on which Patient-X relies for information about her treatment options comes from 
living breathing epistemic agents, with all of the flaws, foibles, and idiosyncrasies that come with 
that. Depending on one’s preferred account of the epistemology of testimony, the interpersonal 
nature of this kind of relationship may generate significant normative differences when it comes 
to the appropriateness of Baker’s reliance on his thermometers and Patient-X’s reliance on her 
doctors (e.g. Moran 2018). 
Though these differences are both significant from a broader epistemological perspective, 
however, it clearly doesn’t follow from either that Patient-X will necessarily have any better reason 
to believe one doctor over the over than Baker has to believe one thermometer reading over the 
other. Yet, or so the argument goes, it is that comparison between each of Baker and Patient-X’s 
respective sources of information that is crucial. In this respect, there are two important similarities 
between the cases.   
First, just as Baker does not have the sensitivity necessary to judge differences in temperature in 
the ranges at which he is baking without her thermometers, Patient-X does not have the expertise 
necessary to judge the bearing of the clinical and scientific evidence upon his treatment options. 
Thus, just as Baker is epistemically dependent on his thermometers when it comes to determining 
whether the oven is at the right temperature or not, so Patient-X depends upon her two doctors 
for her beliefs about the treatment options.28 So we might say, to borrow a term from David Enoch 
(2010), Quinn and Zaius are Patient-X’s ‘Truthometers’. 
 
27 Nonetheless, it is implicit in the statement that ‘X has all kinds of reason to think that his doctors are both highly 
competent and trustworthy’ that, whatever the conditions of justified testimonial reliance are, Patient-X has satisfied 
these with respect to both Quinn’s and Zaius’s testimony. 
28 Moreover, given his lack of expertise, this would be so even if Patient-X had informational access to the relevant 
evidence. Just because he has looked at his charts and figures, doesn’t mean he can justifiably draw any conclusions 
from that data. 
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Secondly, just as Baker is not in a position to distinguish between his two thermometers, 
epistemically speaking, as the case is described, Patient-X lacks any information that would allow 
her to determine whether either of her doctors has the epistemic advantage vis-à-vis the question 
of which treatment option is best. Correspondingly, even if it is so that one of Quinn or Zaius has 
done a better job of assessing the clinical and scientific evidence, since Patient-X has no way of 
gleaning this, that fact would have no significance for what Patient-X is justified in believing in the 
face of their disagreement – just as the facts about which, if either, thermometer is on-the-fritz 
have no significance upon what Baker is justified in believing about the temperature inside his 
oven.  
In light of these similarities, the conciliationist supposes that Patient-X ought to respond to the 
disagreement between her doctors in the same way as Baker responds to the conflict between his 
thermometers. I.e. Upon realising that Zaius disagrees with Quinn, Patient-X ought to reduce her 
confidence in the truth of Quinn’s testimony. How confident should Patient-X be? No more 
confident that Quinn is correct than she is that Zaius is correct. And vice-versa. 
It is easy to see where this is going.  
The two cases described so far are described from the third-person perspective. Our core cases of 
disagreement between effective peers are described from the first-person perspective. 
Nonetheless, the key similarity between Baker and Patient-X’s situations is that neither have access 
to the kind of evidence that would justify believing that the information from either source in 
particular is more likely to be accurate than the other. And, so the thought goes, two people are 
effective peers just when they have no evidence that would justify believing that either party in 
particular is more likely to be right than the other – or at least no evidence that is independent of 
the disagreement. The conciliationist suggests, then, that the evidential position one finds oneself 
in when one has a first-person perspective on effective peer disagreement is analogous to the 
evidential positions of Patient-X and Baker in the third-person cases. Consequently, Quinn and 
Zaius should respond to their disagreement in just the same way that Baker ought to respond to 
her thermometers, and Patient-X to his realisation that Quinn and Zaius disagree. That is, neither 
Doctor should be any more confident in their own assessments of the clinical and scientific 
evidence than they are in their colleague’s assessments – and they should revise their beliefs 
accordingly. In other words, they should do exactly what Conciliationism tells them to do.  
If the analogy between these cases holds, the conciliationist has a powerful argument in their 
favour. However, the non-conciliationist is likely to raise an eyebrow at the last step in the 
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argument. As noted, Patient-X is similarly dependent upon Quinn and Zaius’s judgement of the 
clinical and scientific evidence as is Baker on the reading of her two thermometers. Interpersonal 
views of testimony aside, then, it is easy to suppose that Patient-X views her two doctors in an 
analogous way to that in which Baker views her two thermometers. Neither Quinn, nor Zaius, 
though, are epistemically dependent on the other in the same fashion. Both are directly acquainted 
with the relevant evidence and both are competent and qualified to assess the bearing of that 
evidence upon Patient-X’s treatment options. As such, it is not that Quinn and Zaius have no 
evidence relevant to determining who is more likely right, but that – as effective peers – they don’t 
have any evidence relevant to that question that is independent of the substance of the 
disagreement. Of course, since neither Baker, nor Patient-X have direct access to any evidence 
relevant to determining which source of information is correct, they also lack any independent 
evidence of that kind. But still, the non-conciliationist might ask, why suppose that it is this feature 
of the various cases that counts, and not the contrast with Quinn and Zaius’ first-person 
perspective on their disagreement? Similarly, why suppose that it is not the dis-analogous features 
that count in cases of disagreement between effective peers more generally? 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Enoch (2010) and Schafer (2015) argue against the 
conciliationist on just this point. In principle – they claim – having a first-person perspective on 
the disagreement can ground justification for retaining one’s original beliefs. I shall turn to their 
arguments in the next chapter. What is clear, though, is that some further principle is required if 
the ‘Truthometer’ analogy is to hold. For that, we can turn to the second argument for 
Conciliationism – the ‘Independence’ argument. 
 The Independence argument 
David Christensen suggests that what separates Conciliationism from other views of disagreement 
is acceptance of a principle along the following lines: 
Independence: In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about 
P in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own beliefs about P, I should do 
so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P (Christensen 
2011: 3). 
In addition to Christensen, ‘Independence’ is explicitly endorsed by Jon Matheson (2015: 82-83, 
95-96) and is at least implicitly a part of Elga’s (2007) arguments for Conciliationism. So, for 
instance, Elga suggests that: ‘Even if in fact you have done a much better job than your friend at 
evaluating the claims, simply comparing your verdicts to those of your friend gives no evidence 
that this is so,’ (Elga 2007: 487) and ‘Upon finding out that an advisor disagrees, your probability 
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that you are right should equal your prior conditional probability that you would be right. Prior to 
what? Prior to your thinking through the disputed issue and finding out what the advisor thinks 
of it…’ (Elga 2007: 490). 
Given the focus on this principle, it will be useful to rephrase it in keeping with the terminology 
and language used in this thesis. Since I have suggested the debate concerns what disputants are 
justified in believing in the face of disagreement, we can do so by restating Independence as a 
principle of epistemic justification. Thus, we might restate it as follows:  
Independence 
If S1 realises that S2 disagrees with her about Q, S1’s attitude toward Q (whatever that 
attitude might be) will be justified only if it is based upon justification that is independent 
of the substance of the disagreement.  
Given this reformulation, it is clear how Independence might lead us to accept Conciliationism as 
the correct response to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. Consider: ‘The Problem of 
Ordinary Disagreement’ arises when disputants are effective peers. As the term was defined, if S2 
believes Q and S2 believes ~Q, S2 is S1’s effective peer if and only if S1 has no undefeated reason 
independent of the substance of the disagreement to believe that she or S2, in particular, holds the relative 
epistemic advantage vis-à-vis Q. That being so, the only reason that S1 could have for believing 
that she is more likely to be correct about Q than S2 is the disagreement itself. However, the use 
of this reason is ruled out by Independence on principle. Hence, if Independence is true, S1 cannot 
justifiably conclude that she is any more likely to be right about Q than S2. Consequently, S1 ought 
to revise her beliefs. How ought she to revise her beliefs? Given that she cannot justifiably 
conclude that she is any more likely to be right than S2, S1 ought to be no more confident that Q 
than she is that ~Q. I.e. She ought to respond just as Conciliationism suggests. 
Independence, then, appears to lead to Conciliationism as a matter of course. Additionally, this is 
precisely the kind of principle required to legitimize the move from the third- to the first-person 
cases in the ‘Truthometer Analogy’: For as DOCTORS-1 was described, Quinn and Zaius are 
effective peers. Thus, if Independence is true, Quinn and Zaius would be no more justified in 
deciding their disagreement one way or other via their having a first-person perspective on the 
substance of the disagreement, than Patient-X would be in deciding who to favour in that 
disagreement on the basis of which of his doctors entered the room first. Likewise, for any other 
case of disagreement between effective peers. 
58 
 
For what reason might we think that Independence is true? 
As Christensen sees it, the motivation behind the principle is ‘to prevent blatantly question-begging 
dismissals of the evidence provided by the disagreement of others.’ (Christensen 2011: 3) 
Arguments like this: 
Well so-and-so disagrees with me about P. But since P is true, she’s wrong about P. So 
however reliable she may generally be, I needn’t take her disagreement about P as any 
reason at all to question my belief (Christensen 2011: 3). 
That there are question marks over the legitimacy of an argument of this sort is undeniable. In 
particular, it is a clear parallel to so-called Dogmatism Paradox, described here by Gilbert Harman 
(who attributes the puzzle to Saul Kripke): 
If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something 
that is true; so I know that such evidence is misleading. But I should disregard evidence 
that I know is misleading. So, once I know that h is true, I am in a position to disregard 
any future evidence that seems to tell against h (Harman 1973: 148-9). 
This seems obviously problematic. For sure, if I know that Q, under certain circumstances my 
knowledge that Q can ground me in dismissing evidence that ~Q. For instance, I know that the 
Earth is round, and surely this knowledge is sufficient grounds for me to dismiss the evidence for 
believing that the Earth is flat that I acquire from watching the videos of conspiracy theorists on 
YouTube – even if I do not have available any means of responding to the specific conspiracy 
theories forwarded in those videos. But, if we embrace the dogmatism paradox, then we don’t just 
allow that there will be some situations in which my knowing Q can ground my dismissal of 
evidence against Q. We allow that my knowing Q can ground my dismissing any and all evidence 
against Q that I may encounter in the future. But, as Sorensen puts it, a policy of dismissing any 
and all evidence that might count against one’s beliefs is ‘a policy of close-mindedness that strikes 
us as ‘perniciously dogmatic’ (Sorensen 1988: 434) A policy that is ‘perniciously dogmatic’, though, 
is clearly a bad policy, hence, it is reasonable to suppose that there must be something wrong with 
the argument in the dogmatism paradox. Christensen’s further comments on the question-begging 
dismissal of disagreement that he describes, make it clear that he sees that response as flawed in 
just the same way. So, he writes:  
Used as a general tactic, [the question-begging response] would seem to allow a non-expert 
to dismiss even the disagreement of large numbers of those he took to be experts in the 
field.’ (Christensen 2011: 3).  
And, indeed, this seems entirely right. If it is permissible to argue from the fact of disagreement to 
the conclusion that the other parties to the disagreement are wrong no matter what other information 
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you have about their reliability, then, just like the dogmatism paradox, it will be permissible to dismiss 
any and all evidence one might acquire on learning of disagreement as misleading evidence. Thus, 
a theory of disagreement that allows the question-begging response to disagreement that 
Christensen describes, will be committed to the claim that one can justifiably stay steadfast in the 
face of any and all disagreement, no matter the context, or the people with whom one disagrees. 
Yet, to paraphrase Sorenson on the dogmatism paradox, such a broad policy of responding to 
disagreement would be perniciously dogmatic. As such, any theory of disagreement that permits 
this response will be an implausible theory of disagreement. 
Independence straightforwardly rules out this kind of response to disagreement. For, the question-
begging response to disagreement that Christensen describes is question-begging just because it 
involves one’s taking the substance of disagreement as sufficient reason to stay steadfast. Yet, this 
is precisely the kind of response that Independence rules out. Thus, in so far as it rules out a policy 
of dogmatism, Independence is well motivated. Moreover, since Independence leads to 
Conciliationism as a matter of course, so is Conciliationism.  Whether this is sufficient motivation 
for the view, however, will depend upon whether it is necessary to accept Independence to rule 
out such a policy of dogmatism in response to disagreement. And what is important to note here 
is that – whilst it does rule out such a policy – this is not the limit of the theoretical implications 
of Independence. In particular, there do appear to be cases in which it seems unproblematic to 
respond to disagreement via an argument of the form Christensen describes. The example of my 
summary dismissal of the flat-earth conspiracy theorists on YouTube, for instance, would appear 
to fit the bill. And Kripke offers another, when he writes: 
I myself have not read much defending astrology, necromancy, and the like (I remember 
Stephen Weinberg making the same remark). Even when confronted with specific alleged 
evidence, I have sometimes ignored it although I did not know how to refute it. I once 
read part of a piece of writing by a reasonably well-known person defending astrology… 
(Kripke 2011: 49). 
In both these examples, I would suggest, far from being dogmatic, it would be entirely reasonable 
to summarily dismiss the opinions of the opposing parties on the basis of the disagreement alone. 
After all, even if I do not base my response to the disagreement with the flat-earthers on 
independent considerations, someone who believes the Earth is flat is clearly not my peer, effective 
or otherwise, when it comes to that question. Similarly for Kripke’s response to astrologists, 
necromancers, and the like. Crucially, however, if Independence is true, then, these responses are 
just as problematic and just as dogmatic as it would be to respond this way in case of disagreement 
with an effective peer or, indeed, one’s epistemic superior. 
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As it happens, Christensen (2010) and Matheson (2009, 2015) do have more to say on the 
motivations for Independence. Specifically, both leverage the concept of higher-order evidence to make 
the case for the combination of Independence and Conciliationism. Since discussion of higher-
order evidence takes us into deeper waters than we are yet prepared for, however, I shall leave this 
discussion aside until Chapters 4 and 5. For the moment, the important point is that Independence 
implies a greater theoretical commitment than it first seems. The relevant question, then, is not 
whether such paradigmatically question-begging defences of one’s position as Christensen 
describes must always be permissible – they clearly cannot be – but whether anything as strong as 
Independence is required to rule them out. Unsurprisingly some non-conciliationists have staked 
a claim for their preferred view of disagreement on arguing that it is not. I shall consider Kelly’s 
(2010) arguments to this effect in the next chapter. 
Discussion of the wider implications of Independence brings us neatly to what I consider the 
principal criticism of Conciliationism on its own terms, the problem of ‘Spinelessness’. Having 
seen arguments in favour of Conciliationism in the preceding section, then, let us turn to this 
criticism of the view. 
2.4 Arguments against Conciliationism 
 The Problem of Spinelessness 
One worry that we might have about Conciliationism is that it appears to require, in Elga’s (2007) 
words, a certain kind of spinelessness. For any issue, when faced with disagreement with an effective 
peer, we should shrug our shoulders and roll over on what we believe. This may not bother us so 
much in bill-sharing cases – indeed, I suspect that few of us now encounter disagreements about 
restaurant bills that are not quickly resolved by whipping out a phone. But on many issues we 
deeply care about – philosophical, scientific, religious, and political issues for instance – we disagree 
both widely and persistently. If Conciliationism requires that we suspend judgement not just on 
dinner bills but on any controversial question, including those that concern issues we care deeply 
about, we may have some motivation for preferring an alternative account of disagreement. To 
see just how deeply Spinelessness cuts against Conciliationism, however, it will be useful to 
consider first how Conciliationism can be extended beyond the simple one-on-one cases we have 
seen so far to also include cases of disagreement between more than two people. As I argue in the 
next section, when Conciliationism is extended this way it is not only open to the charge that we 
ought to suspend judgement on many issues that we care deeply about, but, more insidiously, that 
we ought to forego judgement on many of those issues altogether. 
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2.4.1.1 Spinelessness and multi-party disagreements 
Conciliationism says that, whenever you disagree with a peer about some proposition or 
propositions, you ought to revise your attitudes toward those propositions so as they are in line 
with the middle ground between your and your interlocutor’s positions. Another way of putting 
this is that you ought to accept only those propositions on which there is consensus. To illustrate 
this thought, think back to Doctors-1. In that case, we might imagine that the pair had reached 
prior agreement that the best treatment option is one of A or B, even whilst coming to disagree 
on which of those two options is best. In categorical terms, Conciliationism advises that each 
continue to believe the proposition on which there is consensus, ‘A or B is best’, and suspend 
judgement on each of the component propositions ‘A is best’ and ‘B is best’. 
Of course, not all disagreements will involve an explicit pre-disagreement consensus of this sort, 
but one might often be extrapolated, nonetheless. So, we would certainly not expect Jack and Jill 
in Diners-1 to have reached a prior consensus that each diner’s share would be ‘$43 or $45’. 
Nonetheless, given the features of that case, it seems they might justifiably assent to that 
proposition upon realising the disagreement. After all, both are typically competent when it comes 
to simple bill-sharing calculations, thus, without evidence that both are prone to some kind of 
performance error, it seems reasonable for them to take it as unlikely that both have made a 
mistake (though that does remain a possibility). Thus, despite having no prior consensus on what 
answers might be in contention, Jack and Jill could justifiably come to believe that the answer to 
how much each diner owes is either $43 or $45. Thus, Conciliationism would prescribe that they 
each come to believe that proposition, but neither of the specific component propositions ‘Each 
diner owes $43’ or ‘Each diner owes $45’. 
This feature of Conciliationism is important in two respects. Firstly, it allows that in cases of this 
sort – where there are relatively few rival positions in play – the sceptical consequences of following 
the tenets of Conciliationism are limited in scope. For, whilst Conciliationism would preclude 
disputants justifiably believing any of the disputed propositions, under the right circumstances, it 
does not preclude their justifiably believing that at least one of a narrow range of positions is likely 
to be correct. That being so, those party to such cases can at least remain confident that they have 
some and (perhaps some good) grasp of the issue under dispute – even if they ought not to be so 
confident as to settle on one of the positions in play. At least in respect to isolated cases, then, 
perhaps it would be fair – as some conciliationists do – to suggest that the view calls not for a 




After all, I want my own beliefs to be those best supported by the evidence. So if the beliefs 
of other decent, yet imperfect, inquirers turn out to serve as partial checks against my 
falling short of this goal, that strikes me as being pretty good news (Christensen 2007: 
216).29 
Unfortunately for the conciliationist, however, the sceptical consequences of Conciliationism are 
not necessarily limited in this way. I shall explain why in short order. Before doing so, however, 
we need to consider the other aspect of Conciliationism that the point about consensus brings out.  
Secondly, then, the emphasis upon consensus helps us to see how Conciliationism neatly 
generalises from simple cases of one-on-one disagreement to cases in which an individual agent 
disagrees with a number of other parties. Call these multi-party disagreements.30  
Of course, very many of the disagreements we actually encounter are multi-party disagreements. 
Thus, it is a strength of Conciliationism that it extends to these cases quite straightforwardly. For, 
when we put its recommendations in terms of consensus, Conciliationism offers much the same 
advice in multi-party disagreements as for one-on-one disagreement: I.e. If you disagree with 
several peers/effective peers about some issue, you ought to accept the group’s consensus 
judgement on that issue.31 
In cases where there is a clear consensus this does not appear to be unreasonable advice. Imagine, 
for instance, that the rest of Jill and Jack’s party weigh in on the bill calculation, all ten of them 
agree with Jack, and each one of them is Jill’s effective peer. Call this Diners-2. In this case, 
whatever we think about the original case, I take it that the pressure on Jill to revise her belief is 
intuitively greater than in the simple one-on-one situation. In particular, if we presume that the 
various parties reach their positions independently, and given that, as her effective peers, Jill has 
reason to believe the other parties are all competent in the relevant ways, the fact that the other 
 
29 On similar lines, Feldman writes: ‘[P]erhaps the conclusion is not so distressing. It calls for a kind of humility in 
response to the hard questions about which people so often find themselves in disagreement […] When compared 
with the intolerant views with which we began, this is a refreshing outcome.’ (Feldman 2007: 213) and Matheson: 
‘[E]pistemic humility is an intellectual virtue as well. One thing that the existence of disagreement brings out is that 
we are limited and fallible epistemic agents […] Given that we are fallible epistemic agents, agnosticism in the face of 
controversy seems to be the appropriate response, and not simply the result of lacking convictions or courage.’ 
(Matheson 2015: 140). 
30 I call these multi-party rather than group disagreements since the latter term might also refer to disagreement between 
groups. Questions about how groups ought to respond to disagreement with other groups (or indeed with individuals) 
would appear to be entangled with questions about how we ought to view group agents from an ontological perspective. 
For that reason, I take group disagreements to fall outside the purview of ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ in a 
way that multi-party disagreements do not.  




diner’s all agree is powerful evidence in favour of their position. This is just a straightforward 
application of the results of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. That being so, the intuition that Jill is 
under considerable pressure to accede to the collective opinion is something that any plausible 
view of disagreement ought to accommodate and explain. Conciliationism, fares well on both 
fronts. For, what it says about this case is that, even if she is the only member of the group to have 
correctly calculated each diner’s share, since the consensus strongly favours Jack’s answer, Jill 
ought to accede to that majority view and revise her belief accordingly. 
Whilst this easy generalisation to multi-party cases is a strength of Conciliationism, however, it also 
presents problems. As noted, the humility-not-spinelessness defence does not seem entirely 
unwarranted if we are only concerned with cases in which the range of disputed positions is 
relatively narrow. Since Conciliationism so easily extends to multi-party disagreements, however, 
it also extends easily to cases in which the range of rival positions is anything but narrow. In these 
cases, however, I would suggest Conciliationism is committed to saying that one ought to take no 
stance at all upon the disputed issue. Or, in other words, in cases where there is no real consensus 
and none is likely to arise, Conciliationism will recommend that one foreswear judgement altogether 
on that issue. To illustrate, consider the following case. 
 A DIVIDED STATE 
Earlier in the evening of the dinner party from Diners-2, the group turn to discussing 
politics. By and large the group all agree that there are clear economic and social issues in 
the country that need to be addressed, for instance, they all agree that rising economic 
inequality is a problem and that something needs to be done to make society less divided 
than it has become. As it happens, there is an election coming up and there are six parties 
ranging across the political spectrum with a serious chance of winning seats. An avowedly 
socialist party and a less radical social-democratic party on the left. A left-of centre party 
espousing progressive social positions and light touch regulation on the market. A right of 
centre party endorsing de-regulated free-market economics and slowing moving further 
right on social issues. And on the far-right an ethno-nationalist free-market party. Finally, 
there is a party fronted by a popular comedian, with no policies but a slogan: ‘We can’t do 
any worse than that lot!’  
As far as Jill knows all of the diners are au fait on the relevant issues as well as the various 
party policies, characters, and manifestos. In other words, all of the other diners are Jill’s 
effective peers on the political stuff. Jill herself thinks that the party best suited to sorting 
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out the economic and social issues in the country is the social-democratic party. Somewhat 
to her surprise, however, opinion in the group is split evenly across the five parties. Jack 
agrees with Jill that the social democrats are the countries best bet. The other diners are 
split into pairs supporting the remaining five parties – including the far-right party and the 
comedians party.  
What does Conciliationism say about this case? 
Given that there are six parties and the group’s endorsements are split evenly amongst them, there 
is not even a sign of consensus that Jill might favour. Without any consensus to go by, then, and 
given that an equal number of her peers endorse each party, Conciliationism would appear to 
recommend that Jill have no more confidence that any party is better suited to addressing the 
economic and social issues than any of the other. There are significant and unpalatable 
consequences to this response. For one thing, given that there are six rival opinions in play, were 
Jill to have equal confidence in each of them, she ought to have very low confidence that any 
particular one of these opinions is correct. But, if Jill cannot be at all confident that any one of the 
possible opinions is right (there are after all only six parties with a chance of winning seats), Jill 
should admit to herself that she has no real clue which party has the best chance of sorting out the 
country’s problems. Perhaps more significant than this is the fact that the rival positions fall across 
such a wide spectrum of political positions. It is one thing to say that, faced with disagreement 
from her variously left-leaning friends, Jill should be open to the possibility that maybe one of the 
other parties on the left may be a better option than the social democrats. It is quite another, to 
say that someone who supports the social-democratic party ought to be equally open to the 
possibility that the far-right party (or indeed, the a-political party) is the solution to the country’s 
woes. Even if they are only considering the fact-based policy issues, it seems entirely reasonable 
that Jill could dismiss from consideration a party just because they are championing a vision of 
society so far removed from her own.  Conciliationism, however, expressly rules out this option. 
Given that all of Jill’s friends are her effective peers, Jill ought to give equal weight to each of their 
positions – whether to the left, or to the far-right of her (and whether in the realm of the absurd). 
I would argue, though, that were Jill to respond in this way, she would go far beyond showing a 
modicum of humility and well into the domain of spinelessness. 
In cases where we disagree with our effective peers and our peers take a wide range of positions, 
then, what Conciliationism recommends looks a lot more like spinelessness than humility. In these 
cases, encountering disagreement with others does not act as a partial check on hubristic over-
confidence, but is rather a barrier to having any justified opinion on the matter at all.  
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How problematic is this for Conciliationism? 
As Feldman (2006) and Matheson (Matheson 2015: 141) point out, the kind of scepticism that 
follows from Conciliationism is a ‘contingent’ scepticism. If one encounters no disagreement, or 
if is always clear that one has the relative advantage in those disagreements one does encounter, 
following the tenets of Conciliationism will lead to no sceptical consequences. Likewise, if we 
encounter no multi-party disagreements of the relevant kind, the sceptical consequences will at 
most be limited to suspension of judgement on disputed issues, and not the thoroughgoing loss 
of confidence that seems required in a case like Diners-2. These points are not without theoretical 
significance. As noted in the previous chapters, the debate about the epistemic significance of 
disagreement presupposes that justified belief is possible. Since the sceptical consequences of 
Conciliationism are contingent on the kinds of social epistemic interaction we find ourselves in, it 
remains possible on this view that justified beliefs are possible. Thus, the view is not, in principle, 
inconsistent with an important presupposition of the debate.  
However, this last observation is not enough to lead Conciliationism completely out of the woods. 
Given the consequences in multi-position disagreements it remains a real possibility on 
Conciliationism that the world we live in is one in which we ought to accept that we have very little 
idea about many issues we have formed beliefs upon. As per the above analysis, all that would be 
necessary for this to be so would be that such disagreements are in fact a common part of our 
social experience. To refer back to the previous points vis-à-vis humility vs spinelessness, though, 
it is one thing to conclude that the social world we live in requires a little more caution and humility 
in our epistemic endeavours than we might have realised, but quite another to conclude that people 
generally ought to accept that they have no clue about what they are doing in those endeavours. 
To borrow a Moorean strategy, the latter claim seems less plausible than the claim that it is the 
conciliationist who has gone wrong at some point. If the conciliationist does not have the resources 
to block that conclusion, then, I take it that there is a problem with the view. 
Importantly, and I think rightly so, conciliationists have not been of a bent to deny that we do 
encounter widespread and persistent disagreement, and particularly so on matters that are 
important to us (for instance  Christensen 2009; Elga 2007: 492-95; Matheson 2015: 141) Likewise, 
I take it, conciliationists would not deny that many of those disagreements will be ones involving 
multiple parties and a wide range of contested positions. That being so, for the conciliationist to 
satisfactorily contain the sceptical consequences of the view as they would apply in the world that 
we live in, the best defence will be to argue that such cases, though common enough, are unlikely 
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to be cases of peer disagreement. Adam Elga offers a response to Spinelessness on just these lines. 
In his own words: 
[W]ith respect to many controversial issues, the associates who one counts as peers tend 
to have views that are similar to one’s own. That is why – contrary to initial impressions – 
the equal weight view does not require one to suspend judgement on everything 
controversial (Elga 2007: 494). 
Whilst, then, Elga appears to accept that the Spinelessness objection would have teeth if scepticism 
in the world follows from Conciliationism, he denies that it does. This claim is not without some 
motivation. As Elga points out, controversies in the real world do not tend to be controversial in 
isolation but are ‘tangled in clusters of controversy’ (Elga 2007: 494). So, for instance, to borrow 
Elga’s own example – the claim that abortion is morally permissible is closely linked to other deeply 
controversial issues – ‘whether human beings have souls, whether it is permissible to withhold 
treatment from certain terminally ill infants, and whether rights figure prominently in a correct 
ethical theory’ (Elga 2007: 494). If, then, two people – Ann and Beth – disagree about the first 
claim, Elga suggests, they are likely to disagree also on a number of these related issues. That being 
so, he argues, they ought not to see each other as peers on the original issue. As Elga explains: 
[T]he accuracy of an advisor’s views on these allied issues indicates how accurate the 
advisor is likely to be, when it comes to abortion. The upshot is that Ann does not consider 
Beth an epistemic peer with respect to the abortion claim’ (Elga 2007: 493). 
To refer back to the previous chapter, this does not seem an unreasonable position to take when 
we are talking about justificatory peerhood. To be justificatory peers Ann would need to be justified in 
believing that Beth is her epistemic equal. Yet, as I think Elga is right to suggest, the more issues 
that two people disagree upon – especially if those issues are interconnected – the less likely that 
they would believe that they are epistemic equals and, so too, the less likely that they would be 
justified in believing that. So, Elga is probably right about such cases when it comes to justificatory 
peerhood. 
As we saw earlier, however, the crux of the conciliationist view is the principle of Independence. 
And the conciliatory force of Independence comes into effect – not only when disputants are 
justificatory peers – but also when they are effective peers. (Indeed, that is just why it counts as a 
response to the problem of ordinary peer disagreement!) An important feature of effective 
peerhood, though, is that two people – or indeed a number of people – can be effective peers even 
when they can be sure that one of them has the epistemic advantage, just so long as they cannot 
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independently determine which of them has that advantage.32 Thus, Ann may well justifiably 
believe on the basis of their wider disagreements that she and Beth are not justificatory peers with 
respect to the abortion claim. But she cannot conclude on that same basis that is it she who has 
the epistemic advantage. Or, more to the point, she cannot do so without contravening 
Independence. As such, if she has no other independent reason to believe she has the relative 
advantage, according to Conciliationism, Ann should be no more confident in the truth of her 
own opinion on any of the areas of controversy than she is in the truth of Beth’s opinions on those 
matters. 
Given that the sceptical consequences of Conciliationism apply to cases of disagreement between 
effective peers, the conciliationist cannot ward off Spinelessness through Elga’s containment 
strategy. This applies equally well to the more insidious version of that objection I have described 
in this section. Moreover, since these problems flow directly from the principle of Independence, 
it is hard to see how the conciliationist could resist them without otherwise stripping the view of 
much of its appeal. To deny Independence would be to undermine the core arguments behind 
Conciliationism. To deny that the relevant kinds of case are a common feature of our social world, 
given the relatively undemanding conditions of effective peerhood, would be to ground the view 
on a questionable empirical claim. One that appears to go against the experience of disagreement 
on many of the issues, e.g. philosophical, political, scientific, etc, that motivate the discussion of 
disagreement to start with. Either way, then, we have strong motivation to develop an alternative 
response to the problem of ordinary peer disagreement. 
In the next chapter, I shall take a closer look at the chief contenders. 
 
32 To be fair, Matheson makes a similar point in his discussion of how Conciliationism extends from idealised cases 
(effectively disagreements between justificatory peers) to everyday cases. (Matheson 2015: 116). 
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 The Problem of 
Ordinary Disagreement: Steadfast 
and Non-uniform views 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I considered the case for the conciliatory view of disagreement. In this 
chapter, I consider the case for Steadfast and non-uniform views of disagreement. I consider three 
positions: A defence of steadfastness that I refer to as the ‘Default Self-Trust View’, variations of 
which have been forwarded by David Enoch and Karl Schafer; Jennifer Lackey's non-uniform 
'Justificationist View’; and Thomas Kelly’s non-uniform ‘Total Evidence View’.  
3.1 Self-trust and Steadfastness 
As discussed in Chapter 1, at the heart of ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ is the question 
of how an agent ought to respond to the realisation that they disagree with their effective peer or 
peers. Importantly, this question concerns how the agent in question ought to respond when they 
are an active participant in that disagreement – not when they are a third-party to a disagreement between 
others. As we saw in the previous chapter, conciliationists argue that having this kind of first-
person perspective makes no difference to what one is justified in believing in response to the 
realisation of disagreement. Instead, for the conciliationist, the first and third person perspectives 
on peer disagreement are both analogous to encountering conflicting readings from apparently 
equally reliable inanimate measuring instruments. And, just as an agent in the latter situation clearly 
ought to suspend judgement on the matter of which instrument reading is correct, so the 
conciliationist claims, an agent who encounters a disagreement between effective peers ought to 
suspend judgement upon the substance of that dispute – whether they are a third-party to that 
disagreement, or one of the disputants themselves. One prominent strand of non-conciliationist 
thinking has been to reject this line of argument – and so too Conciliationism – through recourse 
to the idea of epistemic self-trust. In some way, so the thought goes, it is necessary to have a general 
kind of trust in the reliability of the practices by which one comes to form and hold beliefs. In 
contrast, it is not necessary that one place such trust in the practices by which any specific other 
comes to form and hold their beliefs. When one has a first-person perspective on disagreement, 
this disparity between the need for self-trust and the need (or lack thereof) for trust in one’s specific 
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interlocutors can license one’s staying steadfast in the face of disagreement – even when the other 
parties to the disagreement are one’s effective peers. 
Arguments of this kind have been offered by David Enoch and Karl Schaffer. Enoch and Schaffer 
both argue along the lines that, given a general epistemic entitlement to trust your own epistemic 
practices, it is rationally permissible to treat the fact of disagreement as evidence against the 
epistemic credentials of someone you disagree with.33 In cases where you disagree with an effective 
epistemic peer, this evidence can justify believing that you have the relative epistemic advantage 
over your interlocutor and so tilt the balance in favour of your original position on the disputed 
issue. This form of argument can be treated as a straightforward rebuttal of the ‘Truthometer’ 
argument for Conciliationism. In so far as this argument relies on the idea that we each have a 
default entitlement to trust our own epistemic practices – I shall refer to it as the ‘Default Self-
Trust View’. In the rest of this section I shall reconstruct this position, before assessing how well 
it fares as a defence of Steadfastness. 
 Default Self-Trust  
I will offer a more detailed account of the nature and normative significance of epistemic self-trust 
(as well as engagement with the literature on that) in Chapter 5. Since, though, neither Enoch nor 
Schaffer argue as such for the need for epistemic-self-trust themselves, it will be enough for our 
current purposes to offer a rough characterization of the thesis of self-trust as it appears in their 
arguments. To differentiate from the view I develop in Chapter 5, let us call this the thesis of 
‘Default Self-Trust’ (DST for short). There are two aspects to DST, a descriptive one, and a 
normative one. The descriptive aspect is clearly expressed by Enoch in the following passage: 
Whenever you try to decide how much trust to place in someone, or indeed, when deliberating 
epistemically about anything at all, your starting point is and cannot but be your own beliefs, 
degrees of beliefs, conditional probabilities, epistemic procedures and habits, and so on 
(Enoch 2010: 980. Italics Added). 
 
33 Ralph Wedgwood develops a similar view to Enoch’s and Schaffer’s in his 2010 paper ‘The Moral Evil Demons’. I 
leave Wedgwood’s account out of the current discussion mainly to avoid any complications that might come with 
extending discussion to also include the kinds of ‘moral disagreement’ that are Wedgwood’s main focus of attention. 
Linda Zagzebski and Robert Pasnau, meanwhile, offer defences of steadfastness via self-trust that are quite different 
in spirit to the approach described above. So, Zagzebski suggests that we resolve disagreement by considering ‘which 
beliefs are more likely to satisfy my future self-reflection’ (Zagzebski 2012) and that self-trust plays a crucial role in 
determining this. Robert Pasnau (2015) argues that self-trust has intrinsic non-epistemic value, in respect to which, 
one can have non-epistemic reasons to stay steadfast in the face of disagreement, even when one does not have 
epistemic reason to do so. Interesting though both of these accounts are in their own right, to do them full justice 




Schafer captures the normative aspect of the thesis, when he posits that: 
[I]t is also quite natural to think that there is a basic sense in which we are rationally entitled 
to rely on all our basic-belief forming faculties, whatever they are, provided that we do not 
have any positive evidence that they are not reliable (Schafer 2015: 28. Italics Added).34 
Following these comments, then, we might formulate the thesis of Default Self-Trust as it 
corresponds to the rest of Enoch’s and Schafer’s arguments as follows:  
 (DST)  
(i) For any proposition Q, S cannot determine the truth of Q without relying upon her 
own belief forming practices and faculties. 
(ii) S is entitled to rely on her own belief forming practices and faculties, when it comes to 
determining the truth of Q.35 
Since we are talking about relations of epistemic dependence, to say that S relies upon her own 
belief forming practices and faculties, roughly, is to say that S acts or reasons as if the deliverances of 
those faculties are reliable guides to the truth. To say that S is entitled to rely on those practices, 
following Burge (2003, 1993) and Wright (2004), is to say that S is rationally permitted to 
act/reason as if the deliverances of those faculties are reliable guides to the truth – even if S does 
not have independent justification for believing that they are. Importantly entitlements are 
defeasible. Thus, depending on the particular context, S’s entitlement to rely on her basic belief 
forming practices and faculties may not hold. 
I shall discuss these concepts in more detail in the fuller discussion of epistemic self-trust 
developed in Chapters 4 and 5.  For now, however, let’s grant that this thesis is true as described. 
How, then, does it support a steadfast view of disagreement? 
 
34 See also Enoch: [T]he underlying thought that we are not entitled to trust our own epistemic abilities to a degree 
greater than that their track-record calls for seems a close relative of the claim that we are not entitled to employ a 
belief-forming method without first having an independently justified belief in its reliability (Enoch 2010: 991). 
35 It is worth noting explicitly that this formulation drops Schafer’s reference to ‘basic belief forming faculties.’ As I 
shall discuss in more detail in chapter 5, one’s ‘basic’ faculties (or epistemic practices, as I prefer) are those which one 
could not justifiably believe to be reliable unless permitted to presuppose that those very same practices are reliable. 
Whilst Schafer’s formulation of the entitlement to self-trust in terms of ‘basic’ faculties is a fair representation of the 
wider literature on epistemic self-trust (e.g. Alston 2005; Foley 2001; Alston 1986; Fricker 2016; Zagzebski 2012), both 
he, and Enoch for that matter, construct their arguments in favour of steadfastness as if the entitlement to self-trust 
extends also to one’s non-basic practices. For the sake of simplicity, then, I shall proceed as if that is the case and as 
if that is a reasonable assumption to make.  
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 The Default Self-Trust View 
As noted, the arguments proffered by Enoch and Schafer can best be understood as arguments 
against the ‘Truthometer Analogy’. We have mentioned the central thought behind this analogy 
already, i.e. that it should not matter to how you respond to a disagreement that you are one of 
the disputants. Enoch and Schafer both reject this claim. At the same time, both appear to accept 
another presupposition of the ‘Truthometer Analogy’: That whatever one is justified in believing 
in response to the realisation of disagreement must be probabilistically coherent with whatever 
one is justified in believing about the respective epistemic credentials of the disputants. Call this 
presupposition ‘Credentials Only’. We can describe it more formally like so: 
Credentials-Only (CO): If S realises that S1 believes Q and S2 believes ~Q, S1 will be 
justified in believing that Q is more likely to be true than false iff S is justified in believing 
that S1 has the relative epistemic advantage over S2 vis-a-vis Q, and vice-versa. 
Importantly, neither Enoch, nor Schafer reject CO.36 Nor do they reject the idea, implicit in 
Conciliationism, that CO extends to all cases of disagreement – not just those where one is a third-
party to a disagreement between others. Given those two assumptions, however, Enoch and 
Schaffer would also appear to be committed to the following: 
No Advantages (NA): If, S1 believes Q, S1 realises that S2 believes ~Q, and S1 is not justified 
in believing specifically that S1, or S2 has the relative epistemic advantage vis-à-vis Q, S1 
should suspend judgement on Q. 
NA is a straightforward extension of CO to the first-person case under the condition that all 
questions about the normative significance of disagreement itself have been answered. Crucially, 
NA does not entail any particular answer to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ (even whilst 
it is clearly consistent with Conciliationism). For, ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ 
concerns the question of how you ought to respond to disagreement with your effective peer. And, 
as defined, someone is your effective peer in case of disagreement if and only if you have no 
undefeated and dispute-independent reason to believe that one of you (specifically) has the relative 
 
36 In Enoch’s words: ‘In such a case, then, it seems clear that you should treat [the disputants] as perfectly analogous 
to thermometers – as truthometers. Whatever  else  they  are  (and  whatever  else  they  are  to  you),  they  are each 
a mechanism with a certain probability of issuing a true ‘reading’ of  theoremhood  (or  whatever),  and  the  way  to  
take  their  views  into account – the  way,  that  is,  to  revise  your  own  views  given  the  evidence of theirs – is 
exactly the way to take the reading of thermometers    into    account.’ (Enoch 2010: 960).  
Schafer is less explicit on this point but frames his whole discussion in the language of probability and reliability 
judgements – thus, I take it that something like CO is part and parcel of his approach to disagreement. 
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epistemic advantage. Yet, CO and, consequently, NA say only that one’s response to the 
disagreement must be coherent with what one is justified in believing about the disputant’s 
comparative epistemic credentials. Neither principle, though, says anything about what kinds of 
reason – dispute-independent or otherwise – are relevant to determining that. Correspondingly, 
neither CO nor NA entails any particular answer to the question of how one ought to respond to 
disagreement with an effective peer.  
What Enoch and Schaffer both draw attention to, then, is that – even if we accept CO and NA – 
the real grist for the mill is the question of what effective peers are justified in believing about their 
respective credentials upon realising that they disagree. So, Schafer suggests: 
[M]uch of the action in the epistemology of disagreement relates, not to how one should 
treat those one regards as “epistemic peers” in the sense popular in the literature, but rather 
to whom one should treat as such. (Schafer 2015: 26).37 
And, in similar spirit, Enoch states: 
In the context of finding out how we should respond to peer disagreement, it is a key issue 
whether the disagreement itself can be sufficient reason to demote your interlocutor from 
the status of peer (Enoch 2010: 476). 
It is in respect to this question that each (in effect) argues that a default entitlement to self-trust can 
underwrite a steadfast response to disagreement with an effective peer. There are enough 
similarities between their accounts that I think we can reconstruct this line of argument in general 
form without doing disservice to either. So, let’s do that. 
As per the discussion so far, the starting point of this argument is CO, to reiterate: 
(1) If S realises that S1 believes Q and S2 believes ~Q, S will be justified in believing that 
Q is more likely to be true than false only if S is justified in believing that S1 has the 
relative epistemic advantage over S2 vis-a-vis Q, and vice-versa.  
Of course, any beliefs that S forms about the comparative credentials and standing of S1 and S2 
vis-à-vis Q will be ‘her’ beliefs, thus, given DST we can also add: 
 
37 Schaffer is using ‘peer’ to specify the situation in which one is justified in believing that the person one disagrees 
with is one’s epistemic equal (i.e. the situation described in NA) Echoing the points about effective peerhood above, 
this is a yet stronger conception of peerhood than what I referred to as Justificatory Peerhood in Chapter 1. 
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(2) S cannot determine whether either of S1 and S2 have the relative epistemic advantage 
without relying upon her own belief forming practices and faculties. 
(3) S is entitled to rely on S’s own basic belief forming practices and faculties when it comes 
to determining whether either of S1 and S2 have the relative epistemic advantage. 
Given (1) and (2), the relevant question in relation to the Truthometer Analogy is whether S’s 
entitlement to rely on her belief forming practices has any special significance upon what S is 
justified in believing vis-à-vis the credentials of S1 and S2 – and whether the answer to that question 
might differ depending on what S’s perspective on that disagreement is. 
To help us address this question, let’s suppose that we are discussing the disagreement between 
Quinn and Zaius over Patient-X’s treatment options described in DOCTORS-1 and PATIENT-
X from the previous chapters. As was stipulated in those cases, Quinn and Zaius are both highly 
qualified doctors who have independently assessed a significant body of clinical and scientific 
evidence relevant to the question of which of the treatment options is better; Patient-X on the 
other hand is entirely dependent upon Quinn and Zaius when it comes to that question. 
Furthermore, neither of Quinn and Zaius, nor Patient-X, have any evidence independent of the 
disagreement that indicates that Quinn or Zaius is more likely to be right on the question than the 
other. 
Now suppose we are looking at the case from the perspective of Patient-X. In this case, it seems 
clear Patient-X’s entitlement to rely on her own belief forming faculties has no special significance 
upon how she ought to respond to the disagreement between Quinn and Zaius. Crucially, Patient-
X’s epistemic dependence on Quinn and Zaius is no less after realising the disagreement than it 
was beforehand. Thus, whatever practice or practices Patient-X might employ in assessing the 
credentials of Quinn and Zaius, her continued entitlement rely on her own belief-forming practices 
after realising the disagreement will not grant Patient-X access to any information she did not have 
about the respective credentials of Quinn and Zaius beforehand. Since, then, Patient-X was not 
justified in believing that either Quinn or Zaius had the advantage beforehand, she is not justified 
in believing differently after realising that they disagree about those options. Thus, in line with NA, 
Patient-X, ought to suspend judgement on which of option-A or option-B is better. In other 
words, the analogy drawn by the conciliationist between the perspective of Baker in the 




Suppose now that one takes the perspective of Quinn and so, in doing so, takes a 1st person 
perspective on the disagreement. In this case, so long as the entitlement referred to in (3) holds, 
things would appear to play out quite differently. For, given that we are taking the perspective of 
Quinn, (2) and (3) can be transposed into: 
(4) Quinn cannot determine whether she or Zaius have the relative epistemic advantage 
without relying upon her basic belief forming practices and faculties. 
And, crucially: 
(5) Quinn is entitled to rely on her basic belief forming practices and faculties when it comes 
to determining whether she or Zaius have the relative epistemic advantage. 
In other words, as a first-person participant in the disagreement, Quinn is entitled to rely on her 
own belief forming practices and faculties when it comes to determining whether she or Zaius 
have the relative epistemic advantage vis-à-vis the treatment options. And, if that is the case, or so 
the argument goes, Quinn would seem to have a bias in her favour built into her first-person 
perspective on the disagreement. 
How so? 
Schafer (2015: 31-34) illustrates by way of a simple analogy. Imagine that we have the papers of 
two students who have taken an exam consisting of 100 yes/no questions. For any given question, 
we know the first paper is 95% likely to have the right answer. We don’t know how reliable the 
answers on the second paper are, but we know that 95 of the answers on the paper are the same 
as the first, and 5 are different. In this case, Schaffer argues, since we have no other way of judging 
paper-2 and since we know that the answers on paper-1 are reliable guides to the truth, we are 
entitled to rely on the answers on paper-1 in judging the answer on paper-2. Thus, where paper-2 
agrees with paper-1, we can take it that there is a 95% chance the answer on paper-2 is right; and 
where paper-2 differs, we can take it that there is a 5% chance the answer is right. And so, by 
summing the probabilities, we can conclude that, for any given answer on paper-2, that answer is 
90.5% likely to be right. I.e. Slightly less likely to be right than any given answer on the paper-1. 
On Schafer’s account, cases such as Quinn’s – i.e. cases where one realises that one disagrees with 
an effective peer – are no different. Quinn is entitled to believe that her basic belief forming 
practices and faculties are reliable, and she can have no standard by which to judge Zaius’s 
epistemic credentials other than the deliverances of those practices. Just as in the exam case, so 
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the argument goes, Quinn can and should count any deviation from that standard on Zaius’s part 
as evidence against his reliability. Or, at least she should do if she does not acquire any defeaters 
for her entitlement to rely on her own basic practices and faculties.  
Thus, given that: 
(6) Zaius’s beliefs about the treatment options deviate from the deliverances of Quinn’s 
basic belief forming faculties and practices. 
And, if we assume that the entitlement to rely on one’s practices does hold, it follows that: 
(7) Quinn has evidence that Zaius is less reliable than she is. 
And so, 
(8) Quinn has evidence that she has the relative epistemic advantage over Zaius. 
In which case, even on the presumption that CO is correct, Quinn would not be in contravention 
of that principle were she to continue to think that it is more likely that ‘A is best’ than that ‘B is 
best’.   
Along these lines, Schafer endorses the following view of disagreement: 
Rational Symmetry View*: Two individuals who are equally aware of each other’s evidence, 
and neither of whom have any special reason to treat themselves as less (or more) reliable 
than the other, have a disagreement about some issue, both should give more weight to 
their own opinion that they do to the others. (Schafer 2015: 38). 
And Enoch, echoing the thought, claims: 
Often, then, in cases of peer disagreement your way of maintaining (or retaining) 
probabilistic coherence will be by simultaneously reducing your confidence in the 
controversial claim and in the reliability of both you and your (supposed) peer, though 
reducing it more sharply regarding your (supposed) peer... (Enoch 2010: 993. Italics Added). 
Whether or not the evidence that the realisation of disagreement (on this argument) affords S is 
sufficient to justify outright steadfastness remains an open question on this argument. So long, 
though, as the disagreement is between effective peers, that evidence will at least tilt the balance 
in S’s favour – even if only a little. And, in that respect, it seems fair to treat this argument as a 
defence of the steadfast view of disagreement in spirit, if not entirely in substance. 
How good is this defence? 
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Most obviously in its favour, by allowing that by default one has reason to favour one’s original 
position in the case of disagreement with an effective peer, the upshot of the Default Self-Trust 
View is that in the core case – single disagreement with effective peer – one can be steadfast. Thus, 
this approach avoids the dispiriting sceptical consequences that we saw in the last chapter to beset 
Conciliationism. Notably, and although it was proffered as an argument against the Truthometer 
Analogy, the Default Self-Trust View is directly opposed to the principle of Independence. 
Nonetheless, as described this approach avoids licensing the kind of dogmatism that we saw in the 
previous chapter to motivate Independence. As we saw, the conciliationists concern was that any 
view permitting one to treat the disagreement itself as evidence against one’s interlocutor’s 
position, will license steadfastness in all cases of disagreement – not just those with an effective 
peer. At least as it is stated here, however, the Default Self-Trust View does not have this 
consequence. As noted, the conclusion of the argument is only that the fact of disagreement can 
be counted as evidence against the reliability of one’s interlocutor – not that that evidence is 
necessarily sufficient to justify steadfastness. But if that is all the argument entails, then, it remains 
possible that one may have other evidence about the disagreement such that, on balance, one 
ought to give equal – or indeed greater – weight to one’s interlocutor’s views when responding to 
the disagreement. Cases where we might expect this to be so, include, when one disagrees with a 
number of one’s peers and has evidence that they reached their views independently of one 
another; and when one has evidence, independently of the disagreement, that the person one 
disagrees with is one’s epistemic superior. (I.e. Just the kind of cases that were invoked to motivate 
Independence.) 
Despite these upshots, I think that there are two core problems with the Default Self-Trust View. 
Firstly, as I noted earlier, entitlements – including any entitlement to self-trust – are defeasible. 
The relevant question, then, is not whether the argument at the heart of the Default Self-Trust 
View is valid – but whether the entitlement that underwrites one’s access to that argument still 
holds in the context of disagreement. If it does not, then, clearly one cannot acquire any evidence 
against one’s interlocutor by way of that entitlement. 
In this respect, it is reasonable to suppose that an agent’s entitlement to rely on their belief-forming 
practices will hold on realising that they disagree with someone they have no reason to believe is 
competent on the matter. For instance, if Doctor Quinn were on a train giving emergency 
treatment to the driver, and a random passenger were to exclaim that he disagreed with her 
diagnosis, it hardly seems that she would need to reduce her confidence in her judgement at that 
moment. But that is just because the kinds of background assumption one might make about a 
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random stranger on a train will not be sufficient to justify believing that they have the kind of 
medical expertise required in the situation. For that, to borrow Schafer’s phrase, Quinn would 
have to have special reason to believe that the random passenger was competent in the relevant ways. 
But, that being so, someone who disagrees with Quinn about medical matters will not be Quinn’s 
effective peer unless Quinn has special reason to believe that they have the relevant kinds of medical 
expertise. What is true about the train-case is illustrative of a general feature of effective peerhood. 
For whilst effective peerhood does not entail that one is justified in believing that one’s 
interlocutors are one’s epistemic equals – it does entail that one is justified in believing that the 
other parties to the disagreement are generally competent in the relevant ways.38   
The problem that this presents for the Default Self-Trust View can be illustrated by returning to 
Schafer’s exam analogy. As far as it goes, Schafer’s assessment of the exam case as presented seems 
to be spot-on. However, what drives that intuition, it seems to me, is the thought that paper-1’s 
95% chance of being right on any question is exceptional. For, if it is appropriate to presume that 
paper-1 is exceptional, then, it would clearly be apt to rely upon the answers on that paper when 
judging the answers on paper-2 – at least in lieu of any evidence that paper-2 is also exceptional. 
The exam case, thus, is analogous to the situation described in the case of Quinn and the stranger 
on the train. The analogy does not hold, though, when the person that Quinn disagrees with is not 
a random stranger but, as in DOCTORS-1, a highly respected colleague. Instead, an exam case 
that would be analogous to DOCTORS-1 would be one in which: 
A. We know that any given answer on either paper is more likely to be correct than not. 
B. We have no reason to suppose that a 95% chance of being right on any given question is 
particularly low or high for the sample group. 
C. We have no other reason to think that the answers on paper-1 are any more likely to be 
right than the answers on paper-2 
But, in this kind of case it seems to me that it would be entirely inappropriate to assess paper-2 on 
the basis of the answers on paper-1 – even knowing that any give answer on paper-1 is 95% likely 
to be right. Rather, once we have dropped the presumption that paper-1 is an exceptional exam 
script, and without other evidence that the answers on paper-1 are likely to be any better than 
 
38 Presuming, that is, that the agent in question ought not to believe that they are also incompetent in the relevant ways. 
Presuming also that we are discussing cases of ordinary disagreement. As discussed in Chapter 1, the conditions of 
effective peerhood in case of deep disagreement differ in significant ways. 
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those on paper-2, we ought to be no more confident that paper-1 has the correct answer on any 
given question than we are that paper-2 has the correct answer. This, of course, is analogous to 
what the conciliationist says about the irrelevance of the first-person perspective on disagreement. 
Thus, if I am right that this revised case is a better analogy for cases of disagreement between 
effective peers than Schafer’s original example, we have good reason to think that the entitlement 
to self-trust will not hold in just those cases that give rise to ‘The Problem of Ordinary 
Disagreement’.  
Now, at this point, Enoch or Schafer might refer us back to the descriptive aspect of the Default 
Self-Trust thesis. For, isn’t the point made there that, whatever additional information might be in 
play in case of disagreement, disputant’s can only process that information by exercising their own 
belief forming faculties and practices. After all, if Quinn is to factor her awareness of Zaius’s 
qualifications into her response to the disagreement in DOCTORS-1 – she still has to rely upon 
some or other of her belief forming practices to do so. Thus, when it comes down to it, if there is 
to be any reasonable response to disagreement, isn’t it still the case that one will have to rely on at 
least some or other of one’s belief forming practices to arrive at that response? 
This point seems fair but leads straight to the second objection to the Default Self-Trust View. 
That is, even admitting the inevitability of one’s reliance on one’s own belief forming practices, we 
can simply reiterate the original problem by asking which of one’s belief forming practices one 
should rely upon? Take Quinn: Should she continue to act as if the practices that led her to believe 
‘A is best’ are reliable; should she act as if practices that led her to believe that ‘Zaius is a highly 
qualified doctor’ are reliable; or, indeed, should she continue to act as if the practices that led her 
to believe that ‘Zaius and I disagree’ are reliable? And so on. Crucially, whichever of these practices 
Quinn does rely upon – given CO – she ought also to accept that at least one of the others has let 
her down in this instance. In other words, however Quinn responds to the disagreement – she will 
have to ‘trust’ one of her belief forming practices over others. The relevant question from the first-
person perspective is which of those practices that is. The thesis of Default Self-Trust, however, 
has nothing to say upon this question. And, that being so, it is hard to see how the supposed 
entitlement to epistemic self-trust can support any default response to disagreement with an 
effective peer. 
This last issue, we might note, is not exclusive to the Default Self-Trust View. Rather, if we 
presume that something like CO is true, then, any disagreement with an effective peer will require 
some of one’s beliefs to be revised, it is just a question of which beliefs those are. The 
conciliationist says that the answer to that question is that one ought always to revise one’s beliefs 
79 
 
about the propositions under dispute. Any alternative to Conciliationism has to explain how, at 
least sometimes, it is better to revise some other of the relevant beliefs. Though neither is framed 
in terms of self-trust, Lackey and Kelly’s non-uniform accounts can be understood as attempts to 
explain just that by reference to features of disagreement that we have not yet discussed in detail: 
Respectively: the content of the disputed beliefs, and the different kinds of evidence one comes to 
possess in case of disagreement. Without further ado, then, let us turn to discuss these accounts. 
3.2 The Justificationist View of 
Disagreement 
Jennifer Lackey (2010) offers an explicitly ‘non-uniform’ account of disagreement that she labels 
the ‘Justificationist View’ of disagreement. Per the Justificationist View, in some cases of 
disagreement between effective peers, one may be required to revise one’s beliefs toward the 
disputed propositions, in others one may be permitted to retain those beliefs. Cases in which 
steadfastness is permitted, or as Lackey calls it ‘non-conformism’, are cases in which disputants 
have an exceptionally high degree of justified confidence in those beliefs. In some such cases, despite 
first appearances, one can infer a symmetry breaking explanation of the disagreement that favours 
one’s own view and that does so independently of the substance of the disagreement. Cases in 
which conciliation is required, or as Lackey calls it ‘conformism’, are cases in which one of those 
conditions is not met. 
Let us look at the kinds of case in which Lackey argues ‘non-conformism’ or steadfastness is 
permissible. Slightly paraphrased, here are two of Lackey’s own examples: 
PERCEPTION 
Lackey is eating lunch in her apartment with Edwin, one of her two long-term roomies. 
She asks Edwin to pass the wine to their other room-mate Estelle. Edwin replies ‘Estelle 
isn’t here today’. Prior to this surprising comment, Lackey has no reason to think that there 
is anything wrong with Edwin’s perceptions or that he is currently in anyway cognitively 
impaired. Nor does she have any impression that there is any insincerity to Edwin’s odd 
assertion. 
DIRECTIONS 
Lackey and her neighbour Jack moved into the same apartment block fifteen years ago. 
Both are familiar with downtown Chicago and regulars at the restaurant My Thai. One 
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evening Lackey bumps into Jack and informs him that she is headed to Michigan Avenue 
to dine at My Thai. Jack replies ‘But My Thai is on State Street’39 
In both of these cases, Lackey claims, she is justified in retaining her original belief. And what 
grounds her doing so is the exceptionally high degree of justified confidence that she has for her 
initial belief in each case. Given that justified confidence, so the thought goes, Lackey can take her 
colleague/friend’s disagreeing with her as evidence that ‘he is not well, either evidentially or 
cognitively’ (Lackey 2010: 309). In other words, Lackey suggests that in these cases she is permitted 
to treat the disagreement as evidence that she has the relative epistemic advantage – even though 
her interlocutor’s in each case are her effective peers. 
Lackey’s position clearly has echoes of the Default Self-Trust View. In place of trust in her belief 
forming practices, Lackey leans upon the notion of justified confidence – but the role that that 
plays in her response to the disagreement seems, at first blush to be quite similar. Despite the 
surface similarities, however, there are two crucial differences between the two arguments. 
First of all, Lackey does not claim that justified confidence can underwrite one’s treating the 
disagreement as evidence against an effective peer in all such disagreements. Rather, her having 
sufficiently high degree of justified confidence in the beliefs ‘Estelle is sat at the table with us’ and 
‘My Thai is on Michigan’ to do that, is a feature of the specific content of those beliefs as they 
relate to the wider background of other things she believes, evidence she has, the environment she 
in, the belief forming practices and faculties she brings to the table, and so on. The crux of all that 
is that, given her general epistemic situation, both propositions are ones that Lackey would be 
extremely unlikely to falsely believe if her basic belief forming practices and faculties were functioning 
at all properly. 
Secondly, Lackey makes it clear that her justified confidence does not in its own right ground her 
retaining her original belief in either case. What she still requires is some kind of ‘symmetry breaker’ 
that is specific to the case at hand. So, Lackey explains: 
A symmetry breaker is something that indicates that the epistemic position of one of the 
parties to the disagreement in question is superior to the other’s…there needs to be a 
symmetry breaker that justifies my noncomformity. Otherwise, my resistance to doxastic 
revision is little more than dogmatic egotism. (Lackey 2010: 309). 
This of course should sound quite familiar; in effect, it is the same thought that motivates 
Independence. For where on the Default Self-Trust View you can downgrade your assessment of 
 
39 For Lackey’s original formulation of these examples see her (2010: 308-09). 
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an effective peer in case of disagreement simply because they disagree with you – Lackey’s 
suggestion here is that you can do so only if you have a non-question begging argument to the 
effect that you have the relative epistemic advantage over your peer. 
What Lackey suggests is special about cases like PERCEPTION and DIRECTIONS, then, is that 
her justified confidence in these cases – though not itself a symmetry breaker – can serve to make 
salient a class of information that she possess about herself, and not about Edwin or Jack, and 
which can serve as such. That is, personal information about the state of her cognitive faculties. So, 
for instance, in normal circumstances, Lackey knows whether she has been drinking or not, if she 
has had a good night’s sleep, if she has a recent history of hallucination or memory lapses, and so 
on. With this information in hand, Lackey can infer an explanation of the disagreement that 
indicates that she has the relative epistemic advantage. The argument goes something like this: 
In each case, one party or other must be mistaken. At the same time, both disagreements are ones 
in which is it extraordinarily unlikely that either party would be mistaken unless they were 
somehow seriously cognitively impaired at the moment of disagreement. Lackey has direct access 
to personal information that provides her with evidence that she is not so impaired. She does not 
have access to similar information about her interlocutor in either case. On account of this 
asymmetry, Lackey infers that the best explanation of the disagreement is that her opponent is 
somehow cognitively impaired. If her opponent is cognitively impaired, and she is not, Lackey has 
a clear epistemic advantage – thus, if she is justified in believing that that is the case, Lackey is 
under no rational pressure to reduce her confidence in her beliefs as regards the disputed 
propositions. 
In light of her general account, let us call this the ‘Justificationist Argument for Steadfastness’ – or 
JAS for short. As Lackey summarises this line of thinking: 
An instance of ordinary disagreement regarding the question whether p provides me with 
a defeater for my belief that p. When I am very highly justified in holding this belief, the 
personal information that I possess about myself and lack about my interlocutor can 
provide me with a defeater-defeater. And so long as I do not then acquire a defeater-
defeater-defeater, I am thereby permitted to rationally retain my belief that p with the same 
degree of credence. (Lackey 2010: 310). 
The first thing to emphasis here is that this argument respects the principle of Independence in a 
way that the Default Self-Trust View does not. Whilst it is Lackey’s justified confidence that 
underwrites her inferring a defeater-defeater, it is the personal information that she has about the 
state of her own cognitive faculties that grounds that inference – and she comes to possess that 
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information independently of the substance of the disagreement. In this way, we might say, 
steadfastness via JAS does not so much contravene the Independence principle, as circumvent it.  
The second thing to emphasise is that JAS is only available in cases in which one both has an 
exceptionally high degree of justified confidence and the personal information one has about the 
state of one’s cognitive faculties is sufficient to rule out alternative explanations of the 
disagreement. So, for instance, if in DIRECTIONS Lackey’s opinion about the whereabouts of 
My Thai was not based on personal experience, but Google Maps, she could not rely upon the 
personal information about her own cognitive faculties to rule out the possibility that Google Maps 
was in error – even if she initially had an exceptionally high degree of justified confidence in its 
accuracy. Clearly enough, then, both of these conditions will not apply in all cases of peer 
disagreement. Indeed, this is just what makes Lackey’s account a non-uniform account of 
disagreement. 
The crucial question, then, is just how widely JAS is available. This question becomes more 
pressing if we keep in mind the Spinelessness objection to Conciliationism. For given Lackey’s 
suggestion that conciliation/non-conformism will be the correct response to disagreement with 
an effective peer in any and all cases where JAS is not available – much of the appeal of the  
Lackey’s account will depend upon how well it contains the sceptical consequences associated with 
widespread conciliation. 
Unfortunately for the account, JAS does not generalize widely at all. To see why, consider Lackey’s 
response to the classic restaurant case (i.e. Diners-1). In this case, Lackey claims, the JAS gets no 
traction and conciliation is required. Drawing on the previous cases she cites three key differences 
between this case and those like PERCEPTIONS and DIRECTIONS that explain this result: 
1. The content of the disagreement in the cases in which the JSA is available make it very 
likely that one or the other disputants is cognitively impaired. Not so for Jack and Jill in 
DINERS-1. 
2. Jack and Jill in DINERS-1 may be confident in their conclusions, but they ought not to 
have such a high degree of confidence as Lackey’s in cases PERCEPTIONS and 
DIRECTIONS. Why? Because, Jack and Jill are sufficiently fallible in the circumstances 
described that, even if there were no disagreement, it is a non-negligible possibility that 
they have made a mistake. 
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3. If either Jack or Jill does have such a high degree of confidence as Lackey’s, this will not 
be justified – again, Jack and Jill are sufficiently fallible in the circumstances described that 
they should recognise the non-negligible possibility that they have made a mistake. 
I think Lackey is quite right here – if a disagreement has any of these features, then the JSA will 
be a non-starter. And, once again, the key feature is the content of the beliefs under dispute. Whilst, 
say, Jill might be able to rule out more egregious forms of cognitive impairment, it isn’t the case 
the she would be exceptionally unlikely to believe that the diners each owe $43 if she was not 
seriously cognitively impaired. For instance, she might have made a mistake because she was just 
a little more tired than she thought, or because she rushed her sums, or because that last glass of 
wine was half a glass too many for mathematical funny games, or, indeed, just because mistakes 
are easy to make when doing mathematics. These would all be good explanations of this 
disagreement – and would all be non-negligible possibilities even if there were no disagreement. 
Yet, judgements of our own cognitive functioning just don’t come with the fidelity required for 
Jill to rule these explanations out on the basis of the personal information she has about the state 
of her cognitive faculties. And, if Jill cannot rule out explanations of the disagreement that would 
put her at fault she cannot infer that it is Jack who is impaired. In which case, in Lackey’s terms, 
Jill does not gain a defeater-defeater for the realisation that her effective peer disagrees with her 
about the restaurant bill. 
So, Lackey seems right about the kinds of conditions that will preclude one’s access to the JAS in 
case of disagreement. The problem for her account more generally, is that at least one of these 
conditions is going to be met in the great majority of disagreements. For, whilst I might be 
extremely unlikely to believe, unless I am seriously and obviously impaired, that someone is sat in 
front of me when they are not, or that my favourite restaurant is on a completely different street 
to the one that it is on – it is not that unlikely that I will make some mistake when forming beliefs 
about politics, economics, philosophy, the time the movie is on, the street a new restaurant is on, 
and so on… even when my cognitive faculties are operating within standard margins of error.  
If though, JAS is not available in a great majority of disagreements and conciliation is the correct 
response in those cases where it is not – then it seems that the Justificationist View will have almost 
as wide, and unpalatable, sceptical consequences as we saw Conciliationism to have in the previous 
chapter. In so far as the Spinelessness objection was motivation to look elsewhere than 
Conciliationism for a satisfactory account of ordinary disagreement, so too is it motivation to look 
elsewhere than the Justificationist View. 
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With that said, let us move on to Thomas Kelly’s Justificationist View. 
3.3 Total Evidence  
Like Lackey’s Justificationist View, Thomas Kelly’s account of disagreement is a non-uniform 
view. According to Kelly, the conciliationist is quite right to argue that, if the principle of 
Independence is true, Conciliationism is the correct view or ordinary disagreement (Kelly 2013: 
38). But Independence is not true. What determines the appropriate response to disagreement, 
according to Kelly, is not the evidence that one has independent of the substance of the 
disagreement, but the total evidence one has about the disagreement and the context of that 
disagreement. This includes both the first-order evidence upon which one originally reasoned, and 
which bears directly upon the disputed issues, and the higher-order evidence that one acquires on 
realising that someone disagrees with one on those issues. 
Before turning to the positive component of Kelly’s account, it will be useful to rehearse the case 
he makes against Independence. 
  Against Independence 
To remind ourselves, we formulated the principle of Independence as follows: 
Independence 
If S1 realises that S2 disagrees with her about Q, S1’s attitude toward Q (whatever that 
attitude might be) will be justified only if it is based upon justification that is independent 
of the substance of the disagreement.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the motivation for this principle is that it rules out certain 
clearly dogmatic arguments to dismiss the potential significance of disagreement. Arguments such 
as: 
 OVERCONFIDENT 
Ten similarly competent individuals who share the same evidence as I have all 
independently come to believe ~Q. But the evidence supports Q. Therefore, Q. Therefore, 
my interlocutors have all made a mistake in their assessment of the bearing of the evidence 
on Q. 
As noted in the previous chapter, however we theorise its shortcomings, an argument such as 
OVERCONFIDENT is paradigmatically dogmatic – at least if there are no other relevant 
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epistemic considerations in play – and clearly an inappropriate response to the realisation of 
disagreement. At least as far as this argument goes, Kelly would not disagree. Nor, I think, would 
he disagree with the more general idea that beliefs maintained through dogmatic responses to 
disagreement will fail to be justified (no matter whether they were justified beforehand). What 
Kelly does suggest, as I shall explain, is that by invoking Independence to rule out obviously 
problematic arguments like this we also lose the resources to accommodate cases in which the right 
response to disagreement cannot but involve a question-begging response. Thus, if there are such 
cases, Independence must be false. 
The conciliationist’s error lies, for Kelly, in treating dogmatism as a ‘formal epistemic vice’ (Kelly 
2013: 43). A formal epistemic vice, he explains, is an epistemic failing of which we can identify 
instances without having to make substantive judgements about the relevant epistemic features of 
particular cases. To explain formal epistemic vices, we need special epistemic principles that 
describe the conditions under which the vice is instantiated. Once we have such principles, though, 
we need only to check the details of any particular case against those conditions to see if the vice 
in question is instantiated. Independence, Kelly points out, is a perfectly good explanation of 
dogmatism, if dogmatism is the kind of failing that we can identify independently of making 
substantive judgements about the details of particular cases. Kelly, however, denies that we can 
identify examples of dogmatism in this way. To illustrate his point, he offers the following example: 
[C]onsider the status of so-called “Moorean” responses to revisionary philosophical 
theorizing. You present me with certain metaphysical responses that you endorse and the 
arguments for them entail that there are no tables and chairs […] I consider your principles 
and supporting arguments. I then reason as follows: “Well, the principles seem quite 
plausible, and I don’t have an intellectually satisfying diagnosis of where the arguments go 
wrong (if in fact they do). But of course, there are tables and chairs. Therefore, the theory 
is false (Kelly 2013: 44). 
The Moorean argument here has a similar structure to the paradigmatically dogmatic argument 
above. For the Moorean admits the sceptical arguments to the conclusion that there are no tables 
and chairs are intellectually persuasive and that he has no independent reason to reject those 
arguments, yet, on the basis that tables and chairs do exist, he concludes that his friend’s thesis 
must be false nonetheless: even though he cannot take for granted the existence of tables and 
chairs without thereby presupposing the falsity of the sceptical argument. Question begging 
though this response is, Kelly maintains that it is the only reasonable response for the Moorean to 
his experiential evidence of tables and chairs – even in conjunction with his friends otherwise 
convincing metaphysical arguments. If dogmatism is the formal vice explained by Independence, 
however, this defence of common-sense will count as no less dogmatic than the paradigmatically 
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dogmatic response to disagreement that is OVERCONFIDENT. If, on the other hand, Kelly is 
right about this case and the Moorean’s response is, as the only reasonable response to the 
disagreement, not dogmatic – then Independence is not true – or at least is in need of revision.   
Moreover, even if we disagree with Kelly that this Moorean response is the only reasonable 
response to the conjunction of sceptical arguments and empirical evidence, it is not clear that we 
should conflate this argument with the paradigmatically dogmatic argument at 
OVERCONFIDENT. After all, as OVERCONFIDENT was described, I dismiss the possibility 
that my peers might be right about Q out of hand. In Kelly’s example, on the other hand, the 
Moorean considers the various arguments his friend offers, admits their plausibility, weighs these 
considerations up against the evidence he has from his senses, and only then concludes that his 
friend must have gone awry somewhere in his arguments. In character at least, these differences 
would seem to represent a marked difference between the two responses are. So we might think, 
even if the Moorean response is dogmatic it is less dogmatic than the response described in 
OVERCONFIDENT. Again, though, if we treat dogmatism as the formal vice that corresponds 
to contravention of Independence, we cannot accommodate that line of thought: Whilst we might 
say informally that the Moorean’s response is less dogmatic than mine, in theoretical terms, we 
would have to conclude that there are no significant differences between the two cases.40 
Rather than attempt to accommodate these considerations by somehow tweaking Independence, 
Kelly’s suggestion is that we should simply conclude that dogmatism is not a formal vice. And, if 
dogmatism is not a formal vice, then, we do not need to posit some special epistemic principle to 
explain it. And, if that is the case, the conciliationist loses the primary motivation for positing the 
principle (i.e. Independence) that we saw in the previous chapter to form the backbone of that 
view. Instead, Kelly argues that what we need to consider when judging the appropriateness of an 
agent’s response to the realisation of disagreement – including the question of whether that 
response is dogmatic or not – is not whether that response violates Independence but whether it 
is the response that a substantive judgement of the agent’s total evidence would reveal to be a 
reasonable response to that evidence. This brings us to Kelly’s ‘Total Evidence View’ of 
disagreement. 
 
40 See Batally (2018b, 2018a) for a virtue theoretic account of dogmatism that would better accommodate these kinds 
of considerations than the principle-based understanding implied by Independence. 
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 The Total Evidence View  
Kelly distinguishes between two kinds of evidence that, combined, make up an agent’s total 
evidence in respect to a given proposition: first-order evidence and higher-order evidence. Where an agent’s 
first-order evidence for Q is the evidence that they have which bears directly upon the truth of Q; 
their higher-order evidence is evidence that bears in some way upon the justificatory relationship 
between their first-order evidence and their beliefs about Q. What that agent is justified in believing 
about Q, according to the Total Evidence View, is what they are justified in believing having taken 
into account both first-order and higher-order evidence. In situations where the agent realises that 
someone disagrees with them about Q, their higher-order evidence will include their evidence of 
disagreement, their evidence about the context of that disagreement, and their evidence about the 
epistemic credentials of the people they disagree with.  
Crucially, when the higher-order evidence one possesses counts against one’s beliefs it can, to 
borrow Kelly’s phrase, exert a ‘downwards epistemic push’ (Kelly 2010: 159) on one’s justification 
for those beliefs, as Kelly explains: 
Rationality consists in responding appropriately to one's evidence. But one's evidence 
includes evidence to the effect that one does not always respond appropriately to one's 
evidence... as well as evidence to the effect that one is more likely to have responded 
inappropriately when one finds oneself in certain circumstances. When one possesses 
higher-order evidence to the effect that one is currently in circumstances in which one is 
more likely than usual to have made a mistake in responding to one's first-order evidence, 
one has a reason to temper one's confidence – even if that confidence is in fact an 
impeccable response to the first-order evidence (Kelly 2010: 139). 
Adding shortly after: 
[C]ases in which one in fact responds impeccably to one’s evidence, but one’s peer 
responds inappropriately, are much like cases in which one engages in a flawless piece of 
practical reasoning despite being inebriated. The fact that a peer has responded to the 
evidence differently should lead one to temper one’s confidence in one’s own response, 
just as the fact that one is inebriated should lead one to temper one’s confidence in the 
conclusion of one’s practical reasoning, despite the actual flawlessness of one’s 
performance (Kelly 2010: 140). 
Whilst the higher-order evidence acquired when an agent realises that their peer or effective peer 
disagrees with them about Q can lower the support that their beliefs have in respect to their total 
evidence however, it does not, in Kelly’s words ‘make all the difference’ (Kelly 2010: 141). After 
all, even having acquired that higher-order evidence, the agent’s total evidence will still include 
their original first-order evidence. And, if they were initially justified in believing Q on the basis of 
that first-order evidence, their total evidence will still contain a proportion of evidence that 
supports their believing Q. Or so it will do on Kelly’s account. What the agent is justified upon 
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discovering the disagreement, then, according to the Total Evidence View, will depend upon the 
proportion of their evidence vis-à-vis Q that is first-order evidence – and how strong the support 
from that first-order evidence is for their believing Q – and the proportion of their evidence that is 
higher-order evidence – and how strongly that higher-order evidence counts against their believing 
Q.41 Importantly, Kelly suggests, on this view there will be no satisfactory and properly general 
answer to the problem of ordinary peer disagreement. In some cases, one’s first-order evidence 
will be substantial enough to swamp the higher-order evidence acquired on learning of 
disagreement – and so steadfastness will be the right response to disagreement. In other cases, the 
balance of first-order and higher-order evidence will be about equal – and so one ought to suspend 
judgement on the disputed issue, as per Conciliationism. In other cases, the balance of first-order 
and higher-order evidence will fall somewhere between these two situations, and the appropriate 
response to one’s total evidence be to lower one’s confidence in one’s original beliefs, but not so 
far as to suspend judgement altogether. Finally, in some cases, the higher-order evidence will be 
substantial enough to swamp the first-order evidence entirely; as Kelly, echoing the discussion of 
multi-party disagreement in the previous chapter, explains here: 
Significantly the point generalizes beyond the two-person case. As more and more peers 
weigh in on a given issue, the proportion of the total evidence that consists of higher-order 
psychological evidence increases, and the proportion of the total evidence that consists of 
first-order evidence decreases. […] when the number of peers grows large enough, the 
higher-order psychological evidence will swamp the first-order evidence into virtual 
insignificance (Kelly 2010: 144).42 
What should we make of this approach to disagreement? 
In its favour, at least if we accept Kelly’s claims about the normative consequences of the view, 
the Total Evidence View will not be subject to the same kind of sceptical consequences as 
Conciliationism. As discussed in the previous chapter, the sceptical consequences of 
Conciliationism are problematic only in so far as a wide enough range of real-world disagreements 
meet the conditions under which that view requires disputants to suspend or forego judgement on 
the issue under dispute. Since the Total Evidence View allows the possibility that the reasonable 
response to disagreement with one’s peer can, in some cases, be to suspend judgement – the Total 
 
41 It is worth noting that higher-order evidence can cut both ways – one might, for instance, have higher-order 
evidence that one is less likely than usual to have made a mistake in responding to one’s first-order evidence. However, 
since my focus is upon the evidence one acquires on learning of disagreement, unless stated otherwise, references to 
higher-order evidence in the text should be taken to refer to higher-order evidence against one’s beliefs. 
42 Interestingly, Kelly also accepts something like the diagnosis of multi-party, multi-position disagreements that I 
suggested in the previous chapter that the conciliationist is committed to (see Kelly 2010: 141 and Kelly 2014: 306-7). 
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Evidence View is also susceptible to the possibility that a wide range of disagreements in the actual 
world will require significant revision. Thus, just as Conciliationism does not in principle lead to 
scepticism, so, the Total Evidence View does not in principle evade scepticism. However, given 
the fact that we are sensitive to evidence and form beliefs on the first-order evidence, it would 
seem to follow that one could not be systematically mistaken in one’s assessment of that evidence 
unless there were the kind of fault line in one’s evidence described by sceptical hypotheses. Yet, 
the possibility of disagreeing with one’s peers is not one of these sceptical hypotheses.43 So, given 
that one forms one’s beliefs in response to the first-order evidence, it is very likely that one’s 
evidence based beliefs, by and large, will be well supported the first-order evidence. But, then, it is 
also very likely that one’s Total Evidence will, by and large, point in the same direction. And so, 
following the dictates of the Total Evidence View is unlikely to have the sceptical consequences 
associated with Conciliationism. In a nutshell, where scepticism in the social world we live in is an 
inevitable consequence of Conciliationism, it is a possible but improbable consequence of the 
Total Evidence View. 
At the same time as the Total Evidence View avoids Spinelessness; in so far as it allows that the 
conciliatory response will in some cases be the reasonable response to disagreement, it also avoids 
the kind of issues that we saw to face the Default Self-Trust View – namely, why we should think 
that the entitlement to rely on the practices by which one came to hold the disputed beliefs will 
always hold in case of disagreement with an effective peer. Indeed, the distinction between first-
order and higher-order evidence would appear to be just the theoretical resource by which we 
might explain why it is sometimes appropriate to rely on one set of one’s belief forming practices, 
and sometimes appropriate to rely on another. I.e. In cases where it is appropriate to continue to 
rely on the practices by which one came to believe Q, that is because one’s first-order evidence 
swamps one’s higher-order evidence; and in cases where it is appropriate to continue to rely on 
the practices by which one came to believe one’s interlocutors are competent, that is because one’s 
higher-order evidence swamps the first-order evidence. 
Of course, both of these advantages to the Total Evidence View come at the cost of its being 
unable to provide the kind of guidance on how to respond to disagreement that would allow us to 
programmatically read off the correct response to disagreement from principle, and without 
considering the substance of the particular disagreement. Yet, this would hardly be the first (or 
last) time that our best philosophical theories have let us down in this way. Moreover, whilst the 
 
43 At least not independently of any particular view of disagreement. 
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hope of offering actionable guidance is one of the principal motivations behind the literature on 
the epistemology of disagreement, it is not necessarily the case that a theory needs to provide top-
down, off-the-rails, guidance to have something useful to say. The exhortation to respect one’s 
evidence is rarely not worth repeating. And by highlighting the significance of higher-order 
evidence, the Total Evidence View reminds us to not ignore an important subset of that evidence. 
Thus, by following the advice of the Total Evidence View, we might still improve our judgements 
of particular cases, even if the view does not itself tell us what to believe in those cases. 
As presented so far, the appeal of the Total Evidence View lies in the claim that it can sail between 
the Scylla and Charybdis of scepticism and dogmatism. We have seen already that the view has the 
resources available to steer clear of the jaws of scepticism. However, what I want to suggest in the 
rest of the discussion is that, despite initial promise, given the way that Kelly appears to conceive 
the normative significance of higher-order evidence, the Total Evidence View fails to escape the 
pull of dogmatism. To see why, it will be useful to offer a more formal encapsulation of how Kelly 
appears to conceive the relationship between one’s first-order and higher-order evidence.  
Evidence of this can be found in Kelly’s discussion of a generic example of peer disagreement in 
which he and the reader share a body of evidence E, yet disagree about its bearing on a theoretical 
statement H. As per the case, having assessed E, Kelly is quite confident that H is false; having 
assessed the same evidence, the reader is quite confident that H is true. As it happens, the reader 
is right – given E, it is reasonable to be confident that H is true. On realising that they disagree, 
Kelly suggests the disputants total evidence consists of E*, where E* includes: 
(i) The original evidence E 
(ii) The fact that the reader is quite confident, given E, that H is true. 
(iii) The fact that Kelly is quite confident, given E, that H is false 
As per the points above, there is not enough detail to this case to give a judgement on what Kelly 
or the reader is justified in believing vis-à-vis H on the basis of E*. Nonetheless, Kelly’s comments 
on the case are revealing as to how he conceives the relationship between higher-order and first-
order evidence. So, he states: 
Given that you and I are peers, it is plausible to suppose that the two pieces of higher-
order psychological evidence ((ii) and (iii)) are more or less equally strong pieces of 
evidence that point in opposite directions. All else being equal, then, one would expect E* 
to favor H over not-H inasmuch as it is composed of a substantial body of evidence that 
strongly favors H over not-H, supplemented by two additional pieces of evidence of 
91 
 
approximately equal strength, one of which tends to confirm H, the other of which tends 
to disconfirm H. (Kelly 2010: 142-43). 
As Jon Matheson points out, and echoing points made earlier, the suggestion here seems to be 
that E* offers less support to H than E because E* contains a greater proportion of evidence that 
supports agnosticism than does E (Matheson 2015: 86). At the same time, though, E* continues 
to support H over not-H because a substantial proportion of that evidence, E, is evidence that 
supports H. And, crucially, if Kelly’s claim about the bearing of E* is correct, E must continue to 
support H when combined with the higher-order evidence from the realisation of disagreement. 
Further support for this reading is offered by remarks Kelly makes later in the same paper, where 
he suggests that: 
[I]n any case in which you hold a given belief because you recognize that this is what your 
evidence supports, not only is your belief a reasonable one, but you are also justified in 
believing an epistemic proposition to the effect that it is reasonable for you to hold that 
belief. Indeed, given that recognizing that p entails being justified in believing that p, you will be 
justified in believing that the evidence supports your view for as long as you continue to 
recognize that it does. (Kelly 2010: 156).44 
More generally, then, the core idea behind Kelly’s conception of the relationship between one’s 
first-order and higher-order evidence seems to be that higher-order evidence has normative 
significance only in so far as it alters the balance of one’s total evidence – but, that it has no bearing 
upon what one’s original first-order evidence supports, nor on what one is rationally permitted to 
believe about what one’s first-order evidence supports.45 This includes the higher-order evidence 
acquired by those party to disagreement between effective peers. Given that line of thought, then, 
we might encapsulate the Total Evidence View in some more detail as follows: 
The Proportional Conception of Total Evidence (PCTE) 
If at t1, Q is reason for S to believe Q; at t2, S acquires higher-order evidence HOE1 against 
her believing Q; and at t3, S acquires higher-order evidence HOE2 against her believing Q, 
other things being equal: 
 
44 Kelly makes this point in responding to the Truthometer Analogy. Kelly’s suggestion is essentially that, given 
Uniqueness, only one party to a disagreement with shared evidence can have recognized what it is that the evidence 
supports – thus, only one party to a disagreement is ‘justified’ in believing that the evidence supports their belief. This 
asymmetry, he claims, casts doubt upon the Truthometer Analogy just because that analogy depends upon their being 
symmetry between disputants at this level. I’m not convinced that that is the case but will leave that aside for now. 
45 I prefer ‘rationally permitted’ here since it seems clear that Kelly does not mean ‘justification’ in the sense employed 
in this thesis. Nothing about the main discussion depends upon this point though. 
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(i) S's total evidence at t2 (P&HOE1) will provide less justificatory support for S's believing 
Q than S’s total evidence at t1. 
(ii) S’s total evidence at t3 (P&HOE1&HOE2) will provide less justificatory support for S's 
believing Q than S’s total evidence at t2 
Given that what S is justified in believing at any time is determined by her total evidence, S will 
not be justified in believing Q to the same degree of confidence at t2 as she is at t1, nor will she be 
justified in believing Q to the same degree of confidence at t3 as she is at t2. Moreover, if the 
reading of Kelly’s view given above is accurate, then, whilst the higher-order evidence that S 
acquires at t2 and t3 alters the bearing of S’s total evidence, the evidence that S possessed prior to 
acquiring that higher-order evidence can be bracketed and considered discretely as providing the 
same support that it always had. Thus, bracketing the evidence S acquired at earlier times, the 
following will also be true under PCTE: 
(iii) At t2, P will provide the same justificatory support for S’s believing Q as it did at t1. 
(iv) At t3, (P&HOE1) will provide the same justificatory support for S’s believing Q as it 
did at t2. 
Given (iii) and (iv), then, we might say that on PCTE the higher-order evidence changes the 
bearing of S’s total evidence whilst leaving intact the justificatory connection between S’s first-
order evidence and Q. 
At first blush this way of conceiving the relationship between one’s first-order and higher-order 
evidence seems quite reasonable. In particular, it would appear to accommodate the worry behind 
the Spinelessness objection that there is something problematic with any view that requires us to 
suspend judgement on many issues that we care deeply about and have invested considerable 
epistemic effort and resources into investigating. For in these kinds of case (for instance, if you 
discover that someone disagrees with you on a philosophical topic that you have spent 
considerable time working upon), we might suspect that at least some of the disputants will, 
through their efforts, have amassed a considerable body of first-order evidence in support of their 
view. Thus, since on PCTE that first-order evidence will continue to provide the same degree of 
support for the relevant parties’ original beliefs even when discovering that someone disagrees 
with them on that topic, they would have to acquire a considerable body of higher-order evidence 
before the balance of their Total Evidence no longer supported their original belief. 
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Unfortunately, these good first impressions don’t last. For, whilst PCTE easily explains the cases 
in which steadfastness appears to be the correct response, it is not so clear that it can account for 
cases in which the conciliatory response is intuitively the correct response. To see why, consider 
the case of DINERS-2 from the previous chapter. In this variant on the original restaurant case, 
recall, Jill finds out that all of the other members of the dinner party are Jill’s effective peers, and 
that they all agree with Jack that they each owe $45, and not $43 as Jill believes. As it was stipulated, 
prior to discovering the disagreement, Jill was justified in believing that each diner owes $43. 
Nonetheless, intuitively it seems that Jill should not only revise her belief that each diner owes $43 
but she should lend considerably more credence to the possibility that each diner owes $45 than 
in the one-on-one case.  At first blush, PCTE appears to accommodate this intuition quite neatly. 
For, whilst the first-order evidence will provide the same degree of support for Jill’s original 
conclusion no matter who she disagrees with, as the number of disputants increases, so too the 
proportion of her total evidence that consists of higher-order evidence against her believing that 
increases. Recall, however, that PCTE is motivated partly by Kelly’s suggestion that, when one 
recognizes that P is evidence for Q, one is rationally permitted to believe that ‘P is evidence for 
Q’. Thus, given that Jill, as stipulated, recognizes that her calculation upon the bill total, number of 
diners, and tip amount is evidence that each diner owes $43, so too Jill is rationally permitted to 
believe that calculation is evidence that each diner owes $43. But, if PCTE is correct, then, even 
after learning of the opinions of the other diners, the first-order evidence can be bracketed and 
considered discretely as providing the same support that it always had. Thus, it seems that Jill will 
also be rationally permitted to believe that her calculation is evidence that each diner owes $43 on 
learning of the disagreement. And, if Jill is rationally permitted to believe that her calculation 
supports her conclusion that each diner owes $43, then, she has reason to believe that the higher-
order evidence she acquires on learning of the disagreement is misleading – i.e. she can reason as 
follows: (i) we each owe $43, (ii) the others all believe that each diner owes $45, so (iii) they are 
wrong, thus, (iv) I need not given any weight to their opinions.46  
Interestingly, the position I am suggesting that PCTE leads to is close to an earlier position of 
Kelly’s, labelled by Adam Elga the ‘Right Reasons View’ (see Kelly 2005; Elga 2007). On the ‘Right 
 
46 To be fair to Kelly, he does consider the possibility that encountering disagreement with a peer or peers might ‘strip 
one of one’s prior ability to recognize the bearing of the first-order evidence for what it is.’ (Kelly 2010: 158) 
Nonetheless, Kelly is clearly unconvinced by this idea, stating that ‘if you were better justified in thinking that your 
response was reasonable than I was in thinking that my response was reasonable, then this would break the putative 
higher-level symmetry and provide a basis for favoring your original belief over mine’ (Kelly 2010: 157) and, shortly 
thereafter, ‘the peer whose view more accurately reflects the evidence will typically be better justified in thinking that 




Reasons View’, as the name suggests, the appropriate response to disagreement with a peer will be 
determined primarily by objective facts about what the disputants first-order evidence supports – 
whilst the significance of the higher-order evidence in such cases washes out.47 Typically, this view 
has been taken to represent a particularly robust steadfast view of disagreement. Whilst the Total 
Evidence View appears to be an explicit retreat from the Right Reasons View, the suggestion here 
is, effectively, that the way Kelly appears to conceive of the relationship between first-order and 
higher-order evidence in the Total Evidence View does not support that move. If this is correct, 
then despite the intentions, the Total Evidence View is not after all a non-uniform view of 
disagreement – but is committed to a particularly robust version of the steadfast view. Indeed, one 
that is dangerously close to mandating a policy of dogmatism in the face of disagreement. 
Despite these points, I think the distinction between first-order and higher-order evidence that 
forms the backbone of the Total Evidence View offers a useful general schema with which to 
approach ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ (and as we shall see later, also ‘The Normative 
Problem of Deep Disagreement’) – irrespective of whether PCTE is the correct way of conceiving 
the relationship between first-order and higher-order evidence. I have already alluded to how the 
distinction between first-order and higher-order evidence neatly dovetails with the Default Self-
Trust View, as well as the concerns raised about that view. But it also lends itself naturally to 
Lackey’s Justificationist View. For, if we drop PCTE, we might  describe those cases in which, on 
Lackey’s view, significant revision is required as cases in which the higher-order evidence defeats 
one’s first-order evidence; and the case in which revision is not required as cases in which one has 
positive higher-order evidence in the form of the personal information about one’s own cognitive 
faculties that defeats the higher-order evidence acquired by way of the disagreement. In similar 
spirit, a number of conciliationist thinkers have turned to the concept of higher-order evidence to 
supplement the Truthometer and Independence arguments (for instance Matheson 2015; 
Christensen 2011; Rasmussen, Steglich-Petersen, and Bjerring 2018; Feldman 2009 also leans on 
the concept of higher-order evidence to develop a view closer to Kelly's Total Evidence View than 
his earlier conciliationist position)   
On this note, I would suggest that a fruitful way forward in the discussion will be to consolidate 
the various theoretical approaches to disagreement under the general schema of first-order and 
higher-order evidence. Thus, we might approach ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ (and 
later ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’) by considering the more focused question: 
 
47 The main difference between the two positions appears to be the emphasis in the Total Evidence View on the 
proportions of one’s Total evidence that is made up, respectively, of first-order and higher-order evidence. 
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what is the normative significance of the higher-order evidence acquired on discovering that one 
disagrees with an effective peer? As Kelly notes, and as we have already seen, higher-order evidence 
is not confined only to contexts of disagreement but is a general and common feature of our 
epistemic lives. Thus, it will also be useful to consider how the higher-order evidence acquired in 
non-disagreement cases interacts with the first-order considerations – and how the disagreement 
cases differ from or resemble these other cases. By doing so, we might hope to arrive at a 
satisfactory normative theory of disagreement without needing to posit special epistemic 
principles. As per Kelly’s points about the principle of Independence, I take it that this would be 
a desirable result.  




 Higher-Order Evidence 
and Defeaters 
Introduction  
Chapter 1 introduced two problems of disagreement: ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ 
and ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. In Chapters 2 and 3, I surveyed a number 
of prominent responses to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ that have been forwarded in 
the literature. On the basis of that discussion we can recognise two desiderata for a satisfactory 
response to that problem: 
1. It should explain how disagreement can have epistemic significance without that leading 
to the sceptical consequences associated with Conciliationism. 
2. It should explain how we can avoid those sceptical consequences without endorsing a 
policy of dogmatism in the face of disagreement. 
My suggestion toward the end of Chapter 3 was that a fruitful approach to developing an account 
of disagreement that satisfies these desiderata lies in understanding the normative significance of 
higher-order evidence. Roughly speaking, higher-order evidence in respect to Q is evidence that bears 
upon the evidence or reasons upon which one has based one’s beliefs about Q. The evidence that 
you acquire when you realise an effective peer disagrees with you, so the thought goes, is a form 
of higher-order evidence. As such, the question of how to respond to the realisation that one 
disagrees with an effective peer is simply a question of what it takes to respect one’s higher-order 
evidence. Call this a ‘Higher-Order Approach’ to disagreement. 
In this chapter, I consider how best to understand the normative significance of higher-order 
evidence. The chapter is in three sections. In the first sections, I offer some examples of negative 
higher-order evidence outside of the context of disagreement and suggest that the key to 
understanding the normative significance of higher-order evidence lies in understanding how,  and 
if, it can be accommodated within a more general schema of defeaters, reasons and justification. 
In the second section, I lean upon John Pollock’s influential account of defeasible reasoning to 
introduce the relevant kinds of defeater: rebutting and undercutting. In addition, I suggest that 
Pollock’s definition of undercutting is insensitive to an important distinction and offer a further 
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distinction between contextual undercutting defeaters and general undercutting defeaters. As a result, three 
kinds of defeater need to be recognized. In the third section, I consider whether any of the higher-
order evidence cases can be explained in terms of rebutting, contextual undercutting, or general 
undercutting.  
4.1 What is higher-order evidence 
Consider the following two cases: 
BROWNIES 
Bones is a forensic anthropologist tasked with determining the biological sex of a 
decomposed body. Bones exhaustively measures, documents, and records the physical 
structure of the skull and pelvis, then takes a break before analysing the information 
collected. A little exhausted, Bones eats a pile of brownies left her by her colleague Brer. 
Sometime later, feeling extremely relaxed, Bones continues with the analysis part of the 
examination. On the basis of the information she collected earlier, Bones concludes that 
the deceased individual was male. She puts this in her report and sends it to her boss. A 
little while later, Brer explains that the secret ingredient to her delicious recipe is a liberal 
dose of a mind-altering drug. Peeved to hear this, Bones calls to inform her boss that she 
will need to conduct the analysis part of her examination again, but she won’t be able to 
do so until the next day (when the effects of the drug will have worn off). As it happens, 
the deceased was male, what is more and unbeknownst to all, Bones is strongly resistant 
to the psychotropic agent in the recipe. 
HEAVY MUSIC 
Truman is an overworked and underpaid research scientist with a heavy teaching load, a 
huge stack of papers to mark, and not much time to do it in. Truman puts on a playlist of 
heavy-industrial, noise music made by a friend of his, gets to work, and finishes the 
marking in record time. The next day, Truman attends a talk by an eminent neurologist 
about the effect of different music genres on the brain. The neurologist draws the 
audience’s attention to new and compelling research that there are some genres of music 
that can, with even the slightest exposure, have permanent debilitative effects upon the 
listeners ability to concentrate upon certain kinds of cognitive task. Amongst the maligned 
genres is the genre of heavy-industrial noise music that filled up his friend’s playlist, 
amongst the cognitive tasks purportedly affected are the kinds of thinking one does when 
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marking university exam papers.  Reflecting back on the playlist, and with sinking heart, 
Truman realizes that he will have to ask someone else to regrade the papers (and that is 
the least of his worries!). As it happens, Truman’s grading was spot-on, what is more the 
research the neurologist was describing was completely bogus. 
That Bones might have had some dodgy dessert has no bearing on the fact as to the sex of the 
body on her examining table. That Truman’s playlist might have compromised his ability to focus 
on the exam scripts has no bearing upon the facts as to the scripts’ merits. Each, though, is 
evidence that Bones and Truman may have been at greater risk of error when judging the bearing 
of their original evidence than they might otherwise expect. Bones and Truman would appear, at 
first blush, to respect that evidence by reducing their confidence in their original conclusions. 
In the previous chapter, we introduced a distinction between the first-order evidence on which those 
party to disagreement based their original, disputed, beliefs, and the higher-order evidence that they 
acquire on realising disagreement. Neither BROWNIES, nor HEAVY MUSIC are cases of 
disagreement – yet, a number of commentators (see below) have suggested that evidence of error 
acquired in cases likes these is of a kind with the higher-order evidence acquired in case of 
disagreement. Thus, or so the thought goes, by understanding the nature and normative 
significance of the higher-order evidence acquired in cases like these, we might gain some traction 
on the problems associated with the higher-order evidence acquired on realising disagreement. 
Unsurprisingly, no two characterisations of this sort of evidence are quite the same, but the 
common thread is that higher-order evidence – in both disagreement and non-disagreement cases 
– somehow pertains to the practices of the agent that led them to form a certain belief, and only 
indirectly to the facts. So, Christensen suggests that we call evidence that ‘constrains one’s credence 
on some subject-matter via bearing on the reliability of one’s thinking about that subject-matter – 
higher-order evidence.’ (Christensen 2016b: 397); Lasonen-Aarnio that ‘higher-order evidence… 
works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process’ (Lasonen‐
Aarnio 2014: 314); and King that ‘higher-order evidence… is, evidence about our grounds for 
belief, our dispositions for responding rationally to those grounds, and our performance in 
responding to those grounds.’ (King 2016: 133)48 
 
48 As noted in the previous chapter, whilst higher-order evidence can be both negative and positive, the literature has 
tended to focus on negative higher-order evidence. In that light, unless otherwise made clear, the reader should take 




In cases like those above, the higher-order evidence appears to defeat the support that the individual 
in question would otherwise have for his or her belief. If the higher-order evidence does not bear 
directly upon the facts, however, there is a question as to just how this defeat occurs.  
To start with, it will be useful to discuss the kinds of defeater that are relevant to the discussion 
and how they relate to the general schema of reasons and justification around which this thesis has 
been framed. 
4.2 Forms of defeat 
Following John Pollock’s influential work on defeasible reasoning, we might describe what it is for 
something to be an epistemic defeater as follows. 
Defeater 
If P is a reason for S to believe Q, R is a defeater for this reason if any only if R is logically 
consistent with P and (P&R) is not a reason for S to believe Q (Pollock 1986: 38). 
On Pollock’s definition, defeaters defeat one’s reasons for belief. This definition, thus, fits neatly 
with the schema of justification introduced at the top of this thesis. To reiterate the key aspects of 
that, let’s use justification to refer to the kind of epistemic support an agent has for believing Q when 
they have reflective access to an argument with Q its conclusion. Justification, so understood, is 
the kind of epistemic support that corresponds to having reasons for one’s beliefs. 
Correspondingly, then, let’s say that if P is a reason for S to believe Q, provided that there is no 
undefeated defeater R, S would be justified in believing Q, were S to believe Q on the basis of P. 
Further to that, to say that P justifies S believing Q only given no undefeated defeater, is to say 
that P is a prima facie reason. To echo a point made by Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 314-15), if higher-
order evidence can have defeating force, it may be that many more reasons are prima facie reasons 
than we might otherwise have thought. 
On the picture of reasons described, then, to say that you have an undefeated defeater for your 
reasons for believing as you do, is to say that 
1. Your reasons are prima facie reasons. 
2. You would be justified in believing as you do on the basis of those reasons in some context. 




In other words, defeaters render beliefs that would otherwise be justified unjustified. 
This gives us a generic model of what it is for something to be an epistemic defeater. We can 
recognise two principal varieties of defeater: rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters. 
Sometimes you acquire counter-evidence for things you already believe. If that counter-evidence 
is as strong as, or stronger, than your original reasons for believing as you do, it is a rebutting 
defeater for those reasons. Pollock defines rebutting defeaters as follows: 
Rebutting Defeater: 
If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is a rebutting defeater for this reason if 
and only if R is a defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe Q) and R is a reason for S to 
believe ~Q (Pollock 1986: 38). 
On this definition, there are two conditions for something to constitute a rebutting defeater. First 
of all, it must be a reason to believe the negation of the proposition supported by your original 
reasons. Second, it must be a defeater in the generic sense described previously. That is to say, if a 
reason R to believe ~Q is a rebutting defeater for P as a reason to believe Q, then, you would not 
be justified in believing Q, were you to believe Q on the basis of the conjunction of R and P. To 
illustrate, consider the following two cases. 
In the first case, imagine that a doctor with the unlikely name General Practitioner (let’s call her 
GP) diagnoses a patient with condition-Z on the basis of a positive result from one reliable clinical 
test. GP then receives a negative result from a second equally reliable test. GP has no reason to 
believe that either test is more reliable than the other. In this case, GP acquires evidence against 
her initial diagnosis that is just as good as the evidence she has for it. Consequently, GP’s total 
evidence no longer justifies her diagnosis. Thus, the second test result is a rebutting defeater for 
the first. Call this case COMPETITION. 
Now, suppose that, in place of a second test result, GP receives testimony from a colleague that 
the patient does not have condition-Z. And suppose that GP’s colleague is familiar with the 
patient’s clinical history, but not with the positive test result – and GP is aware of this. In this case, 
as in the previous, GP has reason to believe that the patient has condition-Z (the clinical history 
and test result) and reason to believe that the patient does not have condition-Z (her colleague’s 
testimony). The test result, though, outweighs her colleague’s testimony. Moreover, given that GP 
is aware that her colleague has not seen the test result, she can reasonably expect that he will change 
his opinion on learning of it. In other words, since GP can take herself to have a clear epistemic 
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advantage over her colleague, he is not her effective peer.49 Thus, we might suppose, there is no 
question that GP’s diagnosis remains justified even on learning of her colleague’s opinion. Call this 
case NO-COMPETITION. In cases like NO-COMPETITION, R’s being a reason to believe ~Q 
is not sufficient for it to be a rebutting defeater for P as a reason for S to believe Q, since it is not 
sufficient for it to be a defeater for P as a reason for S to believe Q 
Rebutting defeaters characteristically leave intact the connection between your original reasons and 
the content of your beliefs but shift the balance of your total evidence such that those connections 
are no longer sufficient to justify your belief. Sometimes, though, we acquire evidence that alters 
the bearing of our total evidence by undermining those connections. Imagine, for instance, that 
GP receives the test result and forms her diagnosis accordingly, but, then, receives word that there 
was a mishap in the lab and her patient’s test may have been contaminated. Evidence of 
contamination is not evidence that the patient does not have condition-Z – he may well do. Hence, 
this evidence is not a rebutting defeater. Nonetheless, if GP can’t be sure that the test is 
uncontaminated, then, any diagnosis she bases on the result of that test won’t be justified. Call this 
case CONTAMINATION. In this case, GP’s new evidence defeats her old, as Pollock puts it, ‘by 
attacking the connection between the evidence and the conclusion, rather than attacking the 
conclusion itself.’ (Pollock 1986: 39) 
This is an example of undercutting defeat. Pollock defines what it is for something to be an 
undercutting defeater as follows: 
Undercutting Defeater 
If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is an undercutting defeater for this reason 
if and only if R is a defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe Q) and R is a reason for S 
to deny that ‘P would not be true unless Q were true.’ (Pollock 1986: 39).50 
 
49 Nor, since GP is justified in believing that her colleague is unaware of an absolutely crucial piece of evidence, is he 
her approximate peer. 
50 It is clear elsewhere that Pollock uses the term ‘reason to deny “P would not be true unless Q were true”’ to mean 
‘reason to believe ~(P would not be true unless Q were true)’ (E.g. Pollock 1987: 485) On the current understanding 
of what counts as a reason for belief, this is too strong a condition. For instance, if GP was told ‘there is a 50% chance 
that the test was contaminated’ she would not have reason to believe ~(this test would not have come up positive 
unless my patient has condition-Z) – but  rather that there is a 50% chance that that proposition is true. Still, I presume 
that if, GP is justified in believing that ‘there is only a 50% that this test would not have come up positive unless my 
patient has condition-Z’, she will have an undercutting defeater for the test result as a reason to believe her patient 
has condition-Z. We might say that in this kind of case, the agent would have reason to doubt that ‘P would not be 
true unless Q were true’. In what follows, I shall proceed on the understanding that ‘R is an undercutting defeater for 




In CONTAMINATION, the possibility of Z’s test result being contaminated is a reason to deny 
that ‘the test result would not be what it is unless the patient had Condition-Z’. This is because 
there is now another explanation of the test result being as it is, the contamination. Thus, the 
defeater undercuts GP’s justification by giving her reason to believe that the usual connection 
between a positive test result and the presence of Condition-Z does not hold in the current context. 
Another way in which GP’s justification could be undercut, though, would be if she had reason to 
doubt that there was any kind of connection between a positive test result and the presence of 
condition-Z to start with. 
To illustrate, imagine that underwriting GP’s use of the first test in her diagnostic practices is her 
awareness of the results of a large-scale randomized control trial that showed a statistically 
significant correlation between a positive result in the test and later development of condition-Z. 
Now, imagine that, having made her diagnosis, GP reads a follow up study that details several 
problems with the randomized control trial that would invalidate its results if true. Call this case 
FOLLOW-UP. 
In FOLLOW-UP, once she is aware of the problems with the randomized control trial, any 
justification GP’s diagnosis might have had in respect to the test results is defeated. It is not 
defeated, though, because GP has evidence that the positive test result fails to have significance it 
would otherwise have. Rather, the follow-up study attacks the support that GP has for believing 
that there is ever a connection between a positive test and the patient’s condition. And, as such, 
GP also has reason to doubt that the test results would not be as they are unless the patient has 
condition-Z. The follow up study pointing out the flaws in the trial is an undercutting defeater. 
But it is of a kind that is importantly different from CONTAMINATION. Pollock’s definition is 
not sensitive to this distinction. 
Undercutting defeaters are reasons to doubt that the connections between P and Q that would 
justify believing Q on the basis of P hold. What CONTAMINATION and FOLLOW-UP 
illustrate is that there are two ways the justificatory relationship between P and Q can be called 
into doubt. A defeater R might be evidence that the connection between P and Q fails to hold in 
the current context, whilst giving S no reason to doubt that P justifies Q in other contexts. Or, R 
might be a reason for S to doubt that P justifies Q in any context. Let’s call the first kind of defeater 
a contextual undercutting defeater and the second a general undercutting defeater. We can define each as 
follows: 
Contextual Undercutting Defeater 
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If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is a contextual undercutting defeater for this 
reason if and only if R is an undercutting defeater and S could justifiably believe (were it 
not for R, P would be reason to believe Q) without having a defeater-defeater for R. 
General undercutting defeater  
If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is a contextual undercutting defeater for this 
reason if and only if R is an undercutting defeater and S could not justifiably believe (were 
it not for R, P would be reason to believe Q) without having a defeater-defeater for R.51 
Just as for rebutting defeaters, what it is for something to count as a contextual or general 
undercutting defeater on these definitions is derivative of the more general conditions on defeaters 
given previously. First of all, if R is either kind of undercutting defeater, it must have the kind of 
content characteristic of undercutting defeaters more generally. That is to say, R must in some way 
constitute reason for S to deny or doubt that ‘P would not be true unless Q were true’. Second, R 
must satisfy the generic definition of a defeater. Thus, even if R is reason for S to deny or doubt that 
‘P would not be true unless Q were true’ it will not constitute an undercutting defeater of either 
sort if, other things being equal, S could still justifiably believe the conjunction of P, Q, and R.52 
These together, of course, are the conditions of undercutting defeat more generally. What 
distinguishes the two types of undercutting defeater is what, in light of R, S is permitted to believe 
about the justificatory relationship between P and Q.  
Where R is a contextual-undercutting defeater, S has no reason to doubt that the justificatory 
relationship between P and Q holds in other contexts – thus, S might justifiably believe that P is a 
prima facie reason to believe Q at the same time as believing R. CONTAMINATION is a case of 
contextual undercutting defeat. Given the evidence of contamination GP ought not to base her 
diagnosis upon the test result. She has no reason to doubt, though, that that result would justify 
her diagnosis were it to turn out to be uncontaminated. Correspondingly, GP could justifiably 
 
51 See below for discussion of defeater-defeaters. 
52 Suppose for instance, that in FOLLOW-UP the putative defeater comes in the form, not of the follow-up study, 
but testimony from Di’s colleague that ‘that test is not reliable’. So long as it is appropriate for Di to trust her colleague, 
his testimony would constitute reason to deny that ‘there is unlikely to be a positive test result unless the patient has 
condition-Z’ – but, similarly to NO-COMPETITION, his testimony is outweighed by Di’s awareness of the results 
of the randomized-control test that indicate that the test is a reliable indicator of condition-Z. Thus, in this case, Di 
would have evidence that has the content characteristic of an undercutting defeater (i.e. reason to deny ‘not-P unless 




believe both that the current test result is contaminated and that, in other contexts, a positive test 
result would justify her believing that the patient has condition-Z.  
In cases of general undercutting defeat, R impugns the justificatory relationship between P and Q 
precisely because, for any context in which S believes (or ought to believe) R, S ought to deny or 
doubt that there is any context in which P justifies believing Q. At least, that is, unless S has some 
further evidence that shores up her justification for believing P is a prima facie reason to believe Q. 
FOLLOW-UP is a case of general undercutting defeat. Given her awareness of the follow-up 
study, GP ought not to base her diagnosis upon the test result. But that is because (i) her use of 
the test result in her diagnostic practice is underwritten by her justified belief that the test is a 
reliable indicator of condition-Z, and (ii) by impugning the results of  the trial on which that belief 
is based, the follow-up study undercuts that justification. Without that justification, or some other 
evidence to that effect, GP cannot justifiably believe that a positive test result is evidence of 
condition-Z in this, or any other, context. 
This completes the brief survey of the relevant kinds of defeater. It leaves us with three 
explanations of how negative higher-order evidence might defeat an agent’s justification for 
believing as they do to: 
1. The higher-order evidence is a rebutting defeater for the agent’s reasons for belief. 
2. The higher-order evidence is a contextual undercutting defeater for the agent’s reasons for 
belief. 
3. The higher-order evidence is a general undercutting defeater for the agent’s reasons for 
belief. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas Kelly effectively treats higher-order evidence against 
one’s justification for believing as one does as a form of counter-evidence to one’s first-order 
evidence. Thus, where one’s higher-order evidence is a defeater, it would work as a rebutting 
defeater. Conciliationists such as Matheson (2009, 2015) and Christensen (2010, 2016b) – as well 
as Feldman (2009) – have suggested that defeating higher-order evidence works as a form of 
undercutting defeater.53 Though not always voiced in such terms, the majority opinion in the wider 
 
53  Comments from Feldman that higher-order evidence undercuts ‘not by claiming that a commonly present 
connection fails to hold in a particular case, but rather by denying that there is an evidential connection at all’ (Feldman 
2009: 113) suggest that he views defeating higher-order evidence of the kind discussed here along the lines of general 




literature on higher-order evidence appears to be in line with the conciliationists (for instance  
Dipaolo 2018; Horowitz 2014; Schoenfield 2018; Silva 2017; Sliwa and Horowitz 2015). Having 
said that, a number of authors have argued that we should accept some form of ‘level-splitting’ 
view (the 'level-splitting' label is owed to Christensen 2013) whereby the rational response to the 
kind of situation Bones and Truman find themselves in in BROWNIES and HEAVY MUSIC is 
to apportion one’s beliefs to both the first-order and higher-order evidence. Thus, on a level 
splitting view Bones should believe both that ‘The body is male’ (in response to the first-order 
evidence) and something like ‘It is not clear to me that the relevant evidence supports believing 
the body is male’ (in response to the higher-order evidence). Defences of level-splitting have been 
forwarded by Coates (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), and Worsnip (2018). I shall not engage with 
these positions independently. Rather, I shall just note that all of these arguments rest on some 
variant of the claim that defeat from higher-order evidence cannot be accommodated in non-ad-
hoc fashion within a general schema of defeat and a general theory of justification and reasons for 
belief.54 I agree. Thus, I shall take it that: if we cannot accommodate the relevant kinds of case 
within a more general schema of defeat – and are required to introduce special (read ad hoc) 
principles of justification to explain the putative cases of defeat – we may have reason to go back 
to the drawing board when it comes to the general suggestion that negative higher-order evidence 
(including that acquired on realising disagreement) can have normative significance. On the other 
hand, if we can accommodate the relevant kinds of case within a more general schema, I shall 
presume we do not have to entertain the level-splitting view. 
With that said, in the next section I shall consider whether cases like BROWNIES and HEAVY 
MUSIC, as well as the different kinds of ordinary disagreement between effective peers, fit to the 
structure of rebutting, contextual undercutting, or general undercutting defeat. If they do not, then, 
we may have reason to entertain a level-splitting view. If they do, then, we shall be half-way to 
explaining how such evidence can have normative significance and, so, half-way to a higher-order 
approach to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’. 
Before doing that, however, it is important to note two further aspects of epistemic defeat. 
 
2010: 194) suggest that he accepts this conclusion. Neither explicitly argue for this claim though, nor do they place 
any great significance upon it in their broader approaches to higher-order evidence – thus, I shall not take these 
comments as either authoritative or necessarily representative of the respective author’s views. 
54 This idea is perhaps most clearly expressed by Lasonen-Aarnio when she writes ‘assume that I am right that there 
is no elegant way of accommodating systematic defeat by higher-order evidence. […] Ultimately, I think the right 
conclusion to draw is that the desire to accommodate limitless defeat lands one into a paradoxical predicament with 
no happy resolution’ (Lasonen‐Aarnio 2014: 342). 
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First, defeaters can be misleading, For instance, in FOLLOW-UP, so long as she has no reason to 
doubt the veracity of the follow-up study, GP would still acquire a defeater if that study was a 
clever fake produced by a powerful pharmaceutical company to drive business toward their own 
proprietary testing solution. Second, and related to that, just as you can acquire defeaters for your 
reasons for belief you can acquire defeaters for those defeaters. For instance, if GP learns that the 
follow-up study is a clever fake, its significance in respect to the results of the trial will be defeated. 
In turn, the justification that her diagnosis enjoys in respect to the test result will be restored. 
Where the follow-up study was a defeater for the test result, then, evidence that the follow-up 
study is bogus is a defeater-defeater for that evidence. Just like defeaters, defeater-defeaters can come 
in rebutting or undercutting form. And, in principle, just as you can acquire defeater-defeaters, in 
principle, you can acquire defeater-defeater-defeaters, and so on. Importantly, then, any higher-
order approach to disagreement needs to consider, not only what form of defeater one acquires in 
case of defeat from higher-order evidence, but also what kinds of consideration might work as a 
defeater-defeater in such cases. I consider defeater-defeaters in Chapter 5. 
For the moment, though, let’s consider whether any of the cases of putative defeat from higher-
order evidence fit the general schema of defeaters we have seen in this section. 
4.3 Higher-order evidence and defeaters 
Let’s start by considering whether we can explain the significance of the higher-order evidence in 
any of the cases in terms of rebutting defeat. 
 Rebutting defeat 
As we saw in the previous section, the conditions on R being a rebutting defeater for P as a reason 
for S to believe Q are just that (i) R is a reason for S to believe ~Q and (ii) the conjunction of P 
and R is not a reason to believe Q. Clearly enough, the higher-order evidence in BROWNIES and 
HEAVY MUSIC is not a rebutting defeater. That Bones ate some dodgy brownies is certainly not 
evidence that the body on her examining table is not a male body (as she originally concluded it 
was). That Truman’s playlist may have permanently impaired his ability to concentrate on exam-
marking is not evidence in favour of any other set of grades that Truman could have dished out. 
What about cases in which justification for believing Q is purportedly defeated when you learn 
that someone disagrees with you about Q? 
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Here it is worth returning to a distinction between two core types of disagreement noted in Chapter 
1: Cases in which the disputants are effective peers and share the same evidence, and cases in 
which the disputants are effective peers and have different evidence. 
4.3.1.1 Different evidence disagreements 
Let’s consider ‘different evidence’ cases first. To remind us, here is the example from Chapter 1 in 
full again: 
SPIES 
Agent-M is an US intelligence analyst. Agent-M has collected a large body of data 
pertaining to the interference of a foreign agent G in the recent US election, on which 
basis she has concluded that ‘G interfered’. Agent-M liaises with Agent-S, a British analyst 
investigating the same issue, who informs Agent-M that he believes ‘G did not interfere’. 
Agent-M and Agent-S are both justified in believing each other to be competent and 
trustworthy analysts. However, both Agent-M’s and Agent-S’s evidence is constituted by 
information that is classified by their respective governments and neither are in a position 
to share all of their evidence with the other. As it happens, Agent-M’s belief that ‘G 
interfered’ is justified by her evidence. 
Let’s consider this case from Agent-M’s perspective. What significance does Agent-M’s realisation 
that Agent-S disagrees with her about G’s purported interference in the US election have upon 
her justification for believing that G did interfere?  
Agent-M knows that Agent-S is both trustworthy and competent. Thus, given that: 
(1) Agent-S says 'G did not interfere' 
It follows that: 
(2) (1) is prima facie reason for Agent-M to believe that Agent-S has evidence that justifies 
believing G did not interfere,  
And, so 
(3) (1) is prima facie reason for Agent-M to believe that G did not interfere 
Treated evidentially, given the stipulations about competence and sincerity, Agent-S's testimony is 
evidence of evidence that supports ‘G interfered’. In the absence of defeaters, were Agent-M to believe 
'G did not interfere' on the basis of Agent-S's testimony, she would be justified in believing 'G did 
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not interfere'.55 Thus, the discovery of the disagreement fulfils the first condition of rebutting 
defeat. Does it fulfil the second condition? I.e. Is it a defeater in the more general sense. It does, 
but in a way that is distinct from a case like COMPETITION. 
In COMPETITION, GP initially has the evidence of the first test. On acquiring the evidence of 
the second test, the total evidence GP has consists of the first and second test. Since, as stipulated, 
these together do not support believing 'the patient has condition-Z', GP has a rebutting defeater. 
In this kind of case, whether the counter-evidence is a defeater reduces to the question of whether 
the first-order evidence the agent has supports their initial belief or not. Importantly, in this kind of case 
– given that GP has no evidence of any other evidence – GP can rely upon her judgement of the 
evidence she has as reliable guide to the truth about the patient's condition. 
Since, in this kind of case the putative defeater defeats without calling into question the practices 
by which the agent came to believe Q, let us call a defeater of this kind a first-order rebutting defeater. 
And let’s say more generally that: 
First-order rebutting defeat 
If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is a first-order rebutting defeater for P as a reason 
for S to believe Q, iff  R is a rebutting defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe Q) and S 
is permitted to rely upon her judgement of (P&R) as a reliable guide to the truth about Q. 
Now consider Agent-M’s position in SPIES. Agent-M initially has the data she collected. On 
realising the disagreement, Agent-M has as first-order evidence the data and Agent-S's testimony. 
Agent-S's testimony is prima facie reason for Agent-M to believe ~G interfered, but it is also higher-
order evidence of evidence. It is in respect to the higher-order aspect of the evidence M acquires 
on discovering the disagreement that M acquires a defeater. For crucially, given the practical details 
of the case, i.e. that Agent-M and Agent-S’s are prevented from sharing their evidence, Agent-M 
does not have access to the content of the evidence on which S based his belief that ‘G did not 
interfere’. Thus, given the evidence of evidence that supports G did not interfere, M can no longer rely 
upon her judgement of the evidence she has as a reliable guide to the truth about G's interference. 
(And this is so even if the conjunction of the evidence Agent-M has with the evidence Agent-S 
has does in fact support Agent-M’s original belief.) In lieu of a defeater-defeater, then, Agent-M 
 
55 There is some debate as to whether, as Feldman (2006) coined the term, ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Given 
the features of this case, though, we can put aside those worries. As we might, rather clumsily, transpose the slogan 
Agent-M has ‘evidence that justifies believing that there is evidence that justifies believing ~Q’. Evidence that fits that 
description, I presume is evidence that ~Q (for further discussion of the question of whether 'evidence of evidence is 
evidence', see Feldman 2006, 2009, 2014; Fitelson 2012). 
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will no longer be justified in believing ‘G interfered’. Thus, the discovery of the disagreement fulfils 
the second condition of rebutting defeat. 
 If a first-order rebutting defeater leaves the agent’s judgement of the evidence they have unquestioned, 
then, it seems apt to call a rebutting defeater that prohibits an agent from relying upon their 
judgement of the evidence they have a higher-order rebutting defeater. Thus, let’s say more generally 
that: 
Higher-order rebutting defeat 
If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is a higher-order rebutting defeater for P as a 
reason for S to believe Q, iff  R is a rebutting defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe 
Q), R is a prima facie reason for S to believe there is evidence R* that S does not have and 
that justifies believing ~Q, and S is not permitted to rely upon her judgement of (P&R) as 
a reliable guide to the truth about Q. 
The evidence that one acquires on discovering disagreement with an effective peer who does not 
share one’s evidence, thus, does afford one a rebutting defeater – it affords one a higher-order rebutting 
defeater. 
4.3.1.2 Same evidence disagreements 
As reconstructed in the previous chapter, Thomas Kelly’s ‘Total Evidence’ view effectively treats 
the higher-order evidence acquired in case of same-evidence disagreements on the lines of 
rebutting defeat. As we saw in that discussion, this way of conceiving such evidence fails to explain 
how it could have significance in same-evidence disagreement cases – whether with one’s effective 
peer or, indeed, one’s superior. Though we have covered some of this ground already it will be 
worth revisiting these issues in light of the discussion in the previous section. To do so, I will focus 
upon DOCTORS-1. In this case, recall, Doctors Quinn and Zaius are attempting to determine 
which of two treatments, A and B, is the best option for a patient they are jointly treating. Based 
on her assessment of the relevant clinical and scientific evidence, Quinn believes ‘A is best’. Based 
on his assessment of the same evidence Zaius believes ‘B is best’. As the case was described, Zaius 
is Quinn’s effective peer and Quinn is initially justified in believing ‘A is best’ on the basis of the 
clinical and scientific evidence.  
Let’s consider the case from the perspective of Quinn. 
Similarly as with Agent-S for Agent-M in SPIES, given that Zaius is Quinn’s effective peer, Quinn 
is justified in believing that Zaius is both sincere and competent when it comes to assessing the 
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clinical and scientific evidence relevant to the treatment options. Thus, paralleling the 
reconstruction of SPIES, given that: 
(1) Zaius says ‘B is best’ 
It follows that, 
(2) (1) is prima facie reason for Quinn to believe that ‘Zaius has evidence that justifies believing 
B is best.’ 
Therefore: 
(3)  (1) is a prima facie reason for Quinn to believe ‘B is best’ 
Where this case differs from SPIES is in that:  
(4) Quinn is justified in believing that Zaius based his opinion ‘B is best’ on the same body of 
clinical and scientific evidence that she has already assessed. 
Given the discussion in the previous section, we might approach the question of whether the 
evidence Quinn acquires on learning of the disagreement is a rebutting defeater by considering 
whether it can be accommodated under the heading of either first-order rebutting or higher-order 
rebutting. 
Consider higher-order rebutting first. As we defined higher-order rebutting, for R to be a higher-
order rebutting defeater-defeater for P as a reason for S to believe Q it must be evidence of 
evidence that justifies believing ~Q. More specifically, it must be evidence of evidence that S does 
not have. Given (4), however, this is not the case for Quinn. At most, Zaius’s testimony is evidence 
that the evidence Quinn has is evidence that justifies believing ~Q – it is not, though, evidence of 
evidence that Quinn does not have. Thus, this case – and same-evidence peer disagreements in 
general – are not cases of higher-order rebutting defeat. 
The question, then, is whether they are cases of first-order rebutting defeat? I would suggest not. 
Why? Because first-order rebutting defeaters leave intact the connection between one’s original 
first-order evidence and one’s original conclusion – instead, they work by changing the balance of 
the first-order evidence one has. That being so, the evidence that Quinn acquires from Zaius’s 
testimony will not be a first-order rebutting defeater. For, if Zaius’s testimony does not give Quinn 
reason to doubt the connection between the clinical and scientific evidence and her conclusion 
that ‘A is best’, then, given that, as stipulated: 
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(5) Prior to learning (1), Quinn justifiably concluded that the clinical and scientific evidence 
establishes that ‘A is best’, 
Quinn will have access to the following argument: 
(i) The clinical and scientific evidence establishes that ‘A is best’ 
(ii) Zaius believes that ‘B is best’ 
(iii) Zaius is wrong 
(iv) Zaius has made a mistake in his assessment of the clinical and scientific evidence 
(v) I need not give any weight to Zaius’s opinion that ‘B is best’ 
And if Quinn has access to that argument, then, the higher-order evidence she acquires on learning 
of the disagreement with Zaius will not be a first-order rebutting defeater – for just the reason that 
it will not be a defeater at all.56 
It is worth being a little careful here. As far as Pollock’s general conditions for rebutting defeaters 
go, since Zaius’s testimony is prima facie reason for Quinn to believe ‘B is best’, the evidence Quinn 
acquires on learning of the disagreement will be a rebutting defeater in the formal sense – just so 
long as it is a defeater. I.e. Zaius’s testimony is a reason for Quinn to believe that ‘B is best’, What 
I am saying here, though, is that Zaius’s testimony does not fit either of the specifications of how 
rebutting defeat works – i.e. as first-order or higher-order rebutting.  Thus, if the realisation of 
disagreement in which the disputants share the same evidence affords any party a defeater, that 
defeater must do so via some form of undercutting – just as for Brer’s testimony to Bones in 
BROWNIES and Truman’s newfound awareness of the debilitating effects of his music 
preferences in HEAVY MUSIC.  
With that said, then, let us turn to consider whether we can account for any of these cases in terms 
of undercutting defeat – and if so, what kind of undercutting defeater that might be. 
 Undercutting defeat 
In the previous section, we saw that the higher-order evidence acquired in different-evidence peer 
disagreements satisfies the conditions of rebutting defeat. We also saw that, if negative higher-
order evidence acquired in the non-disagreement cases or in same-evidence disagreement has 
defeating force, it must do so in the way characteristic of undercutting defeat. If it can, then, we 
 
56 This analysis, of course, echoes the discussion of the Dogmatism Paradox and Independence in Chapter 2 and what 
I called the PCTE conception of higher-order evidence in Chapter 3. 
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have the makings of a case that such evidence does have defeating force. If it cannot, then, in line 
with the suggestions made by Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Worsnip (2018), and others, we should 
consider the possibility that defeat from higher-order evidence cannot be accommodated within a 
standard model of justification. 
Earlier, we saw that undercutting defeaters work, in general, by calling into question the 
justificatory relationship between your reasons for belief and the content of your beliefs. We have 
already seen that this is the only way in which the higher-order evidence acquired in cases like 
BROWNIES and HEAVY MUSIC, as well as the same-evidence disagreement cases, can have 
defeating force. At first blush, it also seems an apt description of what happens in the various 
cases. Consider Bones and her suspicious brownies. 
In this case, Brer’s testimony about the brownies is not evidence that the deceased was male. It is 
also not reason for Bones to doubt that the specific skull and pelvis measurements on which she 
based her conclusion are correct – after all, she collected and recorded that evidence before she 
ate the brownies. Brer’s testimony is, though, reason for Bones to believe that the calculation she 
made with those measurements was much more likely prone to error than it would usually be. 
And, if she has reason to believe that, it seems reasonable to suppose that she ought also to doubt 
that the connections between her evidence and her conclusion are as she took them to be. 
Similar points apply to Quinn’s discovery of the disagreement with Zaius. That her otherwise 
competent and trustworthy colleague believes that ‘B is best’ may well afford Quinn prima facie 
reason to believe that ‘B is best’. At the same time, however, the realisation that Zaius came to 
believe ‘B is best’ on the basis of the same clinical and scientific evidence that she took to establish 
‘A is best’, raises the possibility for Quinn that her judgement of the bearing of that evidence may 
have somehow gone awry. The discussion in the previous section established that, whilst Quinn’s 
discovery of the disagreement does afford her prima facie reason to believe ‘B is best’, its defeating 
force must lie in its casting doubt on the justificatory connection between the clinical and scientific 
evidence and Quinn’s conclusion that ‘A is best’. That Quinn has evidence of the possibility that 
she may have gone awry in her judgement of the clinical and scientific evidence would seem to 
explain why. For, if Quinn has reason to doubt her judgement in that way, then, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that she ought also to doubt that the connections between her evidence and her 
conclusions are as she took them to be. 
The higher-order evidence in both the same-evidence disagreement and non-disagreement cases, 
then, does look like an undercutting defeater. To paraphrase David Christensen (2010: 198) – and 
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echoing the discussion of SPIES – the higher-order evidence in each case appears to put the agent 
in a position where they cannot trust the practices by which they came to treat P as a reason to 
believe Q. In section 4.2, however, I suggested that Pollock’s general definition of undercutting is 
insensitive to a significant distinction between two kinds of undercutting defeater: contextual 
undercutting defeaters and general undercutting defeaters. So, we also need to ask if any of these cases fit 
the model of contextual or general undercutting defeat – and what determines which case fits 
which model if that is the case. 
Per the earlier discussion, a contextual undercutting defeater R for P as a reason for S to believe 
Q, casts doubt upon the connection between P and Q in the context of the case at hand – but in 
such a way that R’s significance upon the relationship between P and Q is limited to the case at 
hand. The significance of a general undercutting defeater, on the other hand, carries across from 
the current context into any other context in which S’s evidence relevant to Q is P. 
Let’s start with BROWNIES. Presuming that the psychotropic agent Brer included in the brownie 
recipe has no permanent effects, Brer’s testimony is not evidence for Bones of a general 
shortcoming in her skills as a forensic anthropologist. Instead, it is evidence of a higher than usual 
likelihood of performance error in the specific context following her consumption of the spiked 
brownies (and for a relevant period thereafter). So, we might say, Brer’s testimony about the 
Brownies is reason for Bones to doubt that she was in a state of mind to properly appreciate the 
bearing of the physical evidence she collected earlier when she assessed that evidence. But it is not 
reason for Bones to distrust her judgement either before ingesting the psychotropic agent or in 
future examinations made after the drug has worn off. 
In a case like BROWNIES, then, what the higher-order evidence indicates about the agent’s 
epistemic practices is specific to her performance of those practices in the context to which that 
evidence pertains. Thus, the higher-order evidence is evidence that Bones may have made an error 
in judging the bearing of the physical measurements on the sex of the body. And so, Brer’s 
testimony is evidence for Bones that the skull and pelvis measurements may not, as she judged 
them to be, be evidence that the body is male. Importantly, though, just as the doubts raised about 
Bones performance are confined to the moments after she consumed the brownies, so too is Brer’s 
testimony status as a reason to doubt ‘the physical measurements are evidence that the body is 
male’ confined to those moments. 
Or, in other words, the higher-order evidence in this kind of case is a contextual undercutting defeater 
for the first-order evidence. 
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Interestingly, however, this need not be the case for all instances of putative defeat from higher-
order evidence. Compare HEAVY MUSIC. As this case was described, Truman acquires evidence 
that the kind of music he was listening to whilst marking the exam scripts may have had debilitating 
effects upon his ability to concentrate on just that kind of cognitive task. If Truman is unable to 
concentrate when marking the exam papers, he is presumably more likely to make an error when 
marking those papers than if he were concentrated. Thus, similarly to Brer’s testimony for Bones, 
Truman gets evidence of an increased likelihood of performance error after listening to the music 
than he would have expected beforehand. Unlike that case, however, since the research paper was 
evidence that the debilitating effects of heavy-industrial music are permanent (with even the slightest 
exposure) the significance of that evidence is not confined to a single context. Instead, it is evidence 
for Truman that – since listening to his friend’s playlists – he will be unable to properly concentrate 
anytime he is marking exam scripts in the future. Thus, in so far as the research paper was 
compelling evidence and Truman has no defeater-defeaters for that evidence, the doubts that 
Truman ought to have about the practices and performance by which he reached this set of exam 
marks are not specific to the context in which he initially came to those marks – but are quite 
general for any other relevantly similar context (from that point onwards).  
In other words, the higher-order evidence in this kind of case is a general undercutting defeater. 
Higher-order evidence of the kind acquired in the non-disagreement cases, then, can constitute 
either a contextual or general undercutting defeater. As per the discussion of the two cases above, 
which category of undercutting defeater any particular case corresponds to will depend upon 
whether the doubts induced by the evidence are specific to the performance of the agent in the 
particular case or are more general in scope. Now let’s consider the same-evidence disagreement 
cases. 
As we saw earlier, it is reasonable to suppose that the higher-order evidence acquired in the same-
evidence permutations of peer disagreement generate the same kinds of doubts about the agent’s 
assessment of their first-order evidence as do the non-disagreement cases. Likewise, that kind of 
doubt seems to raise questions about the justificatory relationship between an agent’s first-order 
evidence and the conclusions they reached on that evidence that are characteristic of undercutting 
defeat in general. The question, then, is whether those doubts are (i) specific to the context of 
disagreement or (ii) general in nature.  
In the case of BROWNIES and HEAVY MUSIC we were able to determine which kind of doubts 
were in play by paying attention to the scope of the potential errors indicated by the higher-order 
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evidence (i.e. a temporary impairment of Bones’s performance; and a permanent impairment of 
Truman’s concentration). To return to comments in Chapter 1, it is possible that those party to a 
disagreement could be effective peers and have evidence of error that is just as specific as the 
evidence that Bones and Truman acquire. For instance, we might add the additional wrinkle to 
DOCTORS-1 that Quinn and Zaius both pulled a 36-hour shift prior to assessing the evidence 
pertaining to the treatment options for their shared patient (and both are aware of this). That being 
so it would seem reasonable for Quinn (and Zaius) to conclude that the most likely explanation of 
their disagreement is that one of them made a mistake in their assessment of the clinical and 
scientific evidence as a result of extreme fatigue and tiredness. In which case, any doubts Quinn 
ought to have about the practices by which she came to believe ‘A is best’ would be specific to the 
context. Thus, when this detail is added to the case, the higher-order evidence Quinn acquires on 
realising the disagreement would correspond to contextual undercutting defeat. (Likewise for 
Zaius) We might just as easily add details to this case (or any other hypothetical case) such that the 
doubts about the agents’ practices and performance would be more general in nature – and so, the 
disagreement-evidence would correspond to general undercutting defeat. We shall consider just 
such a class of disagreements in Chapter 6. Though, for now, I shall leave it to the readers to guess 
which class of disagreement this is (hint: Chapter 6 is about deep disagreement).  
Similarly, to the non-disagreement cases, then, the higher-order evidence acquired in cases of 
same-evidence peer disagreement may come in the form of a contextual undercutting defeater or 
a general undercutting defeater. And, which that is will depend upon whether the evidence the 
disputants have about the content and context of their disagreement indicates a context-specific 
or general source of error. On the other hand, where the evidence the disputants have about the 
content and context of their disagreement does not allow them to narrow the possible explanations 
of the disagreement down to either context-specific or general sources of error – the higher-order 
evidence will be a general undercutting defeater. Why? Because, when S has higher-order evidence 
R of some kind of error or flaw in the practices by which she came to believe Q on the basis of P 
– and  she cannot rule out a general source of error, then, S could not justifiably believe (were it 
not for R, P would be reason to believe Q) – or at least not without some form of defeater-defeater 
for R. 
It is important to note, however, that the kinds of case in which disputants are effective peers, the 
disagreement is an ordinary disagreement, and the disputants cannot rule out general sources of 
error, will be relatively uncommon. This is because, in ordinary disagreement (or at least the kinds 
that are theoretically interesting) interlocutors will only be effective peers if they are justified in 
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believing that they are all generally competent. Unless there is specific reason to think a general 
error is more likely than usual in the particular circumstances, satisfying this competence condition 
will be enough to rule out more general errors. So, for instance, in the original DOCTORS-1, none 
of the evidence Quinn has about the content and context of her disagreement with Zaius indicates 
anything specific about how the disagreement arose. However, Quinn is justified in believing that 
she and Zaius generally conduct their medical practices with a high degree of expertise and 
competence. Thus, without a defeater for her justification for believing that, Quinn might 
justifiably infer that the disagreement is most likely explained by some factor or feature of the case 
that is specific to the context of the disagreement. In which case, as per the discussion above, the 
higher-order evidence Quinn acquires on realising that Zaius disagrees with her will be in the form 
of a contextual undercutting defeater – even whilst Quinn has no evidence of any particular 
context-specific flaw or shortcoming in the practices by which she came to hold the disputed 
belief. 
In principle, then, cases of same-evidence disagreement between effective peers can be instances 
of both contextual and general undercutting defeat – in practice, however, where there is no 
positive evidence of a general flaw or shortcoming as explanation of the disagreement, such cases 
are most likely to be cases of contextual undercutting defeat. 
Conclusion 
This completes the first half of the study of higher-order evidence, ordinary peer disagreement, 
and defeaters. Significantly, we have found that we can accommodate all of the various cases within 
a more general structure of reasons and defeaters. As noted in section 4.2., however, a full account 
of ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ also needs to say something of the kinds of 
consideration that might constitute a defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence in the relevant 
cases. I shall address this topic in the next chapter. To do so, I shall return to a suggestion that I 
glossed over earlier: that defeating higher-order evidence works by placing the agent in a position 




 Higher Order Evidence, 
Defeater-Defeaters, and Epistemic 
Self-Trust 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw that the cases of putative defeat from higher-order evidence can 
be accommodated within a standard framework of defeaters. This includes cases of ordinary 
disagreement between effective peers. In this chapter, I turn to consider the kinds of consideration 
that might count as defeater-defeaters in such cases. Echoing the distinction between first-order 
and higher-order forms of defeater forwarded in the previous chapter, I suggest in the first section 
of the chapter that, where one has independent evidence that rebuts or undercuts the defeating 
higher-order evidence, one will have a first-order defeater-defeater for that higher-order evidence. In 
cases of disagreement between effective peers no such evidence is available. Thus, I suggest that, 
unless there can also be higher-order defeater-defeaters, conciliation will always be the appropriate 
response to the realisation of such disagreement. Roughly, if defeating higher-order evidence puts 
the agent in a position where they cannot, in lieu of defeater-defeaters, trust their appreciation of 
the first-order evidence, a higher-order defeater-defeater would be reason in favour of such trust. 
In the rest of the chapter I address the question of whether there can be higher-order defeater-
defeaters that are genuinely distinct from first-order defeater-defeaters. To do so, I explore what 
we might mean by epistemic self-trust, what role it has to play in the structure of justification and 
reasons, and what forms such self-trust might take.  
5.1 Forms of defeater-defeater 
In this section, I make some general points about defeater-defeaters as they apply to cases of 
higher-order defeat. These points lead to the suggestion that, just as there can be first-order and 
higher-order defeaters, so too we might consider the possibility that there are both first-order and 
higher-order defeater-defeaters. 




First, defeaters work by giving an agent access to reason to believe ‘~Q’ (rebutting) or reason to 
doubt or deny ‘~P unless Q’ (contextual and general undercutting). For convenience, lets refer to 
these propositions as ‘defeat propositions’. Thus, we can say, when R is a rebutting defeater, the 
corresponding ‘defeat proposition is ~Q; when R is an undercutting defeater the corresponding 
defeat proposition is ‘~P unless Q’. The discussion of the various kinds of defeating higher-order 
evidence in the previous chapter showed that defeaters can give an agent access to reasons to 
believe, deny, or doubt such propositions in two ways. Where R is a first-order defeater for P as a 
reason for S to believe Q, R does so because the defeater pertains directly to the relevant defeat 
proposition. Where R is a higher-order defeater, R does so indirectly – by placing S in a position 
where, in lieu of a defeater-defeater, S cannot trust the practices by which she came to believe P on 
the basis of Q. 
Second, defeater-defeaters are just defeaters. What are they defeaters for? They are defeaters for 
defeaters as reasons to believe the corresponding defeat proposition.  
Thus, taking these two points together, for any defeater-defeater DD for R as a defeater for P as 
a reason for S to believe Q, and where (defP) refers to the relevant defeat proposition, we can say: 
(i) If DD is a defeater-defeater for R as a defeater for P as a reason for S to believe Q, 
then, (DD&R) is not a reason for S to believe (defP).  
i.e. DD must be a defeater for R as a reason to believe, doubt, or deny (defP) in the general sense. 
(ii) If DD is a defeater-defeater for R as a defeater for P as a reason for S to believe Q, 
then, DD is a reason for S to believe, doubt, or deny (defP),  
i.e. DD must be a rebutting, contextual undercutting, or general undercutting defeater for R as a 
reason to believe, doubt, or deny (defP). 
These constraints simply reiterate the general definitions of defeaters given in the previous chapter. 
Importantly, since both first-order and higher-order defeaters have defeating significance for S 
only in so far as they bear in some way upon a relevant defeat proposition, these conditions hold 
whether R comes in the form of a first-order or higher-order defeater. For that reason, just as we 
saw that higher-order defeaters fit to the general taxonomy of defeaters, so we only need to 
introduce a single taxonomy of defeater-defeaters for first-order and higher-order defeat. Whilst it 
is not entirely necessary in the current discussion, I have included such a taxonomy at fig. 1 at the 
end of the thesis.  
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The different classes of defeater-defeaters, then, are simply iterations of the different kinds of 
defeater we discussed in the previous chapter, indexed to the particular kinds of doubt thrown up 
by each category of defeater. That being so, just as we described first-order defeaters as defeaters that 
pertain directly to the relevant defeat propositions for P as a reason to believe Q, so we might 
describe first-order defeater-defeaters as defeaters that pertain directly to the defeat propositions 
relevant to R’s status as a defeater for P.  
To illustrate this idea, suppose that in SPIES, after talking to Agent-S, Agent-M acquires evidence 
that agents of G coerced Agent-S into telling Agent-M that he believed G did not interfere in the 
US election. Given this evidence, Agent-S’s testimony would no longer be reason for Agent-M to 
believe that G did not interfere in the US election. As such, this new evidence would be a defeater-
defeater for the higher-order evidence Agent-M acquired on learning of the disagreement 
originally. More specifically, it would be a first-order contextual undercutting defeater-defeater. Or, suppose 
that in DOCTORS-1, Quinn acquires new evidence that Zaius has faked his entire qualification 
history and track-record – as it turns out Zaius is not a highly qualified medical doctor but a Doctor 
of Philosophy, and a middling one at that. In this case, Quinn’s new evidence would be reason for 
her to deny that Zaius’s testimony that ‘B is best’ was ever reason to believe ‘B is best’ or that ‘the 
medical and clinical evidence supports believing B is best’. Thus, Quinn’s new evidence would be 
a defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence she originally acquired on learning of the 
disagreement. More specifically, it would be a first-order general undercutting defeater-defeater.  
That one’s defeater comes in the form of higher-order evidence about the practices by which one 
came to believe Q, is in principle no barrier to having a first-order defeater-defeater for that higher-
order evidence. Crucially, though, for that to be so, the putative defeater-defeater cannot fall within 
the scope of the doubts about the agent’s practices induced by the higher-order evidence. Where 
defeating higher-order evidence is acquired through the realisation of disagreement, this amounts 
to the more specific requirement that any first-order defeater-defeater an agent has must be 
independent of the substance of the disagreement. If not, it will fall under the scope of the doubts 
about the agent’s practices induced by the higher-order evidence acquired on realising the 
disagreement. Moreover, any first-order defeater-defeater must also be independent reason for the 
agent to believe that they have the relative epistemic advantage over their opponent vis-à-vis the 
substance of the disagreement. For, if it is not, then it is not a defeater-defeater. The significance 
of these points in respect to ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ should be quite clear. ‘The 
Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ arises in cases where disputants are effective peers. Yet, 
someone you disagree with is your effective peer if and only if you have no independent reason to 
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believe that you or they have the relative epistemic advantage vis-à-vis the substance of the 
disagreement. In other words, ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ concerns just those cases 
in which disputants do not have a first-order defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence the 
realisation of that disagreement affords them. This implies that, if the only kinds of defeater-
defeater one might have for defeating higher-order evidence are first-order defeater-defeaters, 
Conciliationism will be the correct view of ordinary disagreement. Given the sceptical 
consequences of Conciliationism discussed in Chapter 2, however, this would be a dispiriting 
conclusion indeed.  
For that reason, I would suggest that we have motivation to consider the possibility that, just as 
there can be higher-order defeaters, there might also be higher-order defeater-defeaters. To explore this 
possibility, I want to spend some time discussing a thought alluded to in the previous chapter. 
That is the idea, to paraphrase David Christensen, that higher-order evidence works by putting the 
agent in a position where, in lieu of a defeater-defeater, they cannot trust the practices by which 
they came to believe Q on the basis of P (Christensen 2010: 198). To echo a point made  by Silva, 
commenting on Christensen, the thought that misleading higher-order evidence gives an agent 
reason to distrust their epistemic practices suggests that in other circumstances it can be appropriate 
for the agent to trust their epistemic practices (Silva 2017). In the remaining sections of this chapter, 
then, I want to return to the topic of epistemic self-trust touched upon in Chapter 3 to consider: 
what is the nature of epistemic self-trust, what role does it play in the structure of justification and 
reasons, and what kinds of consideration might make it appropriate to have epistemic self-trust.  
5.2 Epistemic self-trust 
 Reliance 
As we saw in Chapter 3, discussions of epistemic self-trust centre around the thought that one 
cannot achieve one’s fundamental epistemic aims without relying upon one’s epistemic practices. 
Before discussing the nature of epistemic self-trust, it will be worth going over this thought and 
its motivations in some more detail. 
In what way, then, must each of us rely upon our own epistemic practices? 
The first thing to consider is the way in which our chances of fulfilling our fundamental epistemic 
aims depend upon the reliability of our epistemic practices. 
As I have been using the term, ‘epistemic practice’ refers to the broad gamut of ways in which we 
come to acquire beliefs. Thus, forming beliefs based on the deliverances of my perceptual faculties 
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is amongst my epistemic practises; but so too are inquiry, inference to the best explanation, trusting 
others, and so on. In short, I form beliefs by way of my epistemic practices, and any belief that I 
might come to hold, I must have done so by way of one or more of my epistemic practices.57 
Say, though, that none of my epistemic practices reliably yield truths over falsehoods (i.e. all of my 
practices are unreliable). That being so, the beliefs I come to hold by way of those practices are no 
more likely to be true than false. Presumably, though, my fundamental epistemic aims include the 
aims of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. But, if any beliefs I might come to hold 
are no more likely to be true than false, then, I am no more likely to achieve those aims than not 
to achieve them. Similarly, if my practices are all anti-reliable, i.e. they reliably yield falsehoods over 
truths, I will be less likely to achieve my fundamental epistemic aims than I am to achieve them. It 
is only if my practices reliably yield truths over falsehoods that my chances of acquiring true beliefs 
and avoiding false beliefs will be higher than not. In this way, my chances of achieving my 
fundamental epistemic aims are dependent upon how reliably my epistemic practices yield truths 
over falsehoods.58 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which my having unreliable epistemic practices can prevent 
my achieving my epistemic aims. One is if they include practices that are generally unreliable. For 
example, wishful thinking is (presumably) not a reliable way of forming beliefs. Thus, if I come to 
hold a number of beliefs because I wish the relevant propositions true, those beliefs will no more 
likely be true than false. Correspondingly, other things being equal, I will be less likely to achieve 
my fundamental epistemic aims than if wishful thinking were not amongst my practices. Similarly, 
for practices such as counter-induction, forming beliefs via my biases and prejudices, and so on. 
These are all ways in which I might come to form beliefs, but in so far they are generally unreliable 
ways of doing so, beliefs formed via such practices are no more likely to be true than false (and 
depending on the practice, may be more likely false than true). Thus, if any of these are amongst 
my epistemic practices, other things being equal, I will be less likely to achieve my fundamental 
epistemic aims than if they are not. 
A second way in which my practices may prevent me achieving my fundamental epistemic aims is 
if I employ otherwise reliable practices in unreliable ways. For instance, assume that induction as 
 
57 Discussion of self-trust is sometimes framed in terms of reliance on one’s own cognitive faculties (see Foley 2001; 
Fricker 2016; Zagzebski 2012). I prefer ‘epistemic practice’, since, it is not only our cognitive faculties that we rely on 
but also the various methods, rules, and norms that we follow when exercising those faculties. 
58 This is not to say anything about whether I might have other epistemic aims that can be fulfilled if my practices fail 
to be reliable. 
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is generally practiced by people in our world is reliable. Even if that assumption happens to be 
correct, my own practice of induction can still fail to be reliable. I might tend to over or 
underestimate relations of inductive support, make my inductions on false premises, only on 
grue/bleen like properties, consistently infer from non-representative samples, and so on. Take 
another example – our practices of forming beliefs via testimony. Assume that the world we live 
in contains trustworthy and untrustworthy speakers, but that testimony is in general a reliable way 
of acquiring beliefs. Even if that assumption is correct, if I am truly terrible at discriminating 
between trustworthy and untrustworthy people to the extent that I am more likely to believe the 
untrustworthy than the trustworthy, beliefs that I form on the basis of other peoples’ testimony 
are unlikely to be true. On the assumptions made, then, both of these are cases in which a generally 
reliable practice is unreliably employed. This is the second way in which my practices may prevent 
mr achieving my fundamental epistemic aims. 
To take stock. We rely on our epistemic practices in the sense that our chances of achieving our 
epistemic aims depend upon those practices reliably yielding truths and not falsehoods. And, we 
can be let down by our practices if (i) they are generally unreliable, or (ii) we fail to employ 
otherwise reliable practices competently. 
The second feature of our reliance on our own epistemic practices I want to draw attention to is 
the way that – as believers – we act or reason as if those practices are reliable. Imagine, for instance, 
that I come to believe that there are two orange birds in the garden on the basis of my experience 
of seeing two orange birds in the garden. We might say that, in forming that belief, I act as if my 
perceptions have yielded a truth about the avian contents of my garden. Similarly, if I suppose that 
the best explanation of there being two orange birds in my garden is that it is summer in Africa 
and so come to believe that it is summer in Africa, I reason as if my practice of inferring to the best 
explanation has yielded the truth about the season in Africa. Importantly, such acting or reasoning 
as if need not result from any explicit consideration of my epistemic practices, nor reflect any 
explicit attitude toward their reliability. Instead, we might say, in acting or reasoning as I do, I 
presuppose that the deliverances of those practices are reliable indicators of the way things are in the 
world. Following Wright (2004) and Gerken (2013), we can understand such presupposing as a 
kind of underlying normative commitment. That is to say, to take the current example, it would 
be epistemically irrational for me to believe that it is summer in Africa, if I were to doubt the 
reliability of my practice of IBE or my eyesight when I took myself to see two orange birds in the 




Presupposition of Reliability (PR): For any practice K and belief Q formed via K, other things 
being equal, S would not be justified in believing Q were S to doubt that ‘K is reliable’.59  
So stated, and as per the previous paragraph, this principle does not require belief in the reliability 
of one’s practices, only an absence of doubt. As such, PR is a clear corollary to what I called the 
‘Objective Attitude Condition’ (OAC) on justification in the Introduction. As I shall discuss 
shortly, the negative nature of this commitment is crucial to the place that epistemic self-trust has 
in our lives. What is important at this point, though, is that this kind of presupposition underlies 
any attitude of belief that I might come to hold. In this sense, so long as I hold any beliefs at all, I 
cannot avoid relying on at least one of my epistemic practices. 
Note that this is not to say that one cannot avoid taking for granted the reliability of specific 
practices in certain circumstances. I can, for instance, avoid relying upon my eyesight to yield the 
truth as to the state of my garden by keeping my eyes closed whenever I am in, or even turn my 
head towards, the garden. In this case, I would avoid relying on my garden-vision by not employing 
the practice at all. It is harder to see, though, how I could lead any kind of life without ever engaging 
my perceptual faculties. To do that, I would have to look at nothing, listen to nothing, feel nothing, 
and so on. Similarly, even if I had relied upon my garden-vision when initially forming my bird-
beliefs, I could allay that reliance by, say, snapping a photo of the garden and showing it to my 
neighbour. Having double-checked the truth of my beliefs about the contents of my garden with 
my neighbour, I would no longer presuppose the reliability of my garden-vision. Nonetheless, I 
only allay my reliance on my garden-vision by, instead, relying on my judgement of other people’s 
trustworthiness/testimony (as well as my perception of utterance). In respect to these points, then, 
it is worth making a further distinction between epistemic practices. In his seminal paper 
‘Epistemic Circularity’, William Alston defines epistemically ‘basic sources of belief’ as follows:  
O is an epistemologically basic source of belief – df. Any otherwise cogent argument for 
the reliability of O will use premises drawn from O (Alston 1986: 8).60 
Alston’s definition fits neatly with the internalist notion of justification that we have been working 
with and is easily transposed into the terms of the current discussion. Along these lines, let’s say 
that: 
 
59 Similarly, Wright states: ‘P is a presupposition of a particular cognitive project if to doubt P (in advance) would 
rationally commit one to doubting the significance or competence of the project.’ (Wright 2004: 191) 
60 In his later work on epistemic circularity Alston switches to the term ‘doxastic practices’ instead of ‘sources of belief’ 
(See Alston 2005) 
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K is a basic epistemic practice for S, iff K is amongst S’s practices and S could not justifiably 
believe ‘K is reliable’ without presupposing that K is reliable. 
K is a non-basic epistemic for S iff K is amongst S’s epistemic practices and S could 
justifiably believe ‘K is reliable’ without presupposing that K is reliable. 
So defined, my basic practices are those that I cannot allay reliance upon by way of any of my 
other practices. These include perception, as well as fundamental forms of reasoning such as 
induction and deduction. Practices like my garden-vision are non-basic – I can legitimately allay 
my reliance on these by employing other practices to establish their reliability.  
One further point of importance regarding this distinction is that any general attempt to allay 
reliance on one’s non-basic practices will ultimately lead back to reliance on one’s basic practices. 
For instance, I might be astute enough to make sense of some inference to the best explanation 
to the effect that testimony is reliable – and so come to believe that testimony is reliable without 
presupposing that it is. In doing so, however, I presuppose that my inferences to the best 
explanation are reliable. Inference to the best explanation, though, is either basic for me, or it is 
not. If it is basic, I have hit bedrock, so to speak. If it is not, my attempt to allay reliance on my 
non-basic practices will not be successful, and I shall have to dig deeper. For that reason, we can 
make a parallel point about each of our standing vis-à-vis the sum of our practices as to our basic 
practices. That is to say, it is not possible to believe ‘My epistemic practices are reliable overall’ 
without presupposing that at least of some of those practices are reliable. 
With these various point in mind, then, it appears that the only other way that I could entirely 
avoid reliance upon my epistemic practices would be to withhold judgement on each and every 
output of those practices. Such withholding of belief, I assume, is practically impossible. Thus, it 
is also practically impossible to avoid relying on one’s epistemic practices altogether.  
What I now want to suggest is that, not only can one not avoid relying upon one’s epistemic 
practices, but that the possibility of having justified belief depends upon the rational permissibility 
of doing so. The argument is simple enough.  
Suppose that: 
(1) S believes Q 
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that: 
(2) There is some practice K such that S cannot believe Q without relying upon K. 
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And, to this we can add: 
(3) If it is rationally impermissible for S to rely on K, it is rationally impermissible for S to 
believe Q 
And, since: 
(4) If it is rationally impermissible for S to believe Q, S is not justified in believing Q 
We can also infer that: 
(5) If it is rationally impermissible for S to rely on K, S is not justified in believing Q, and 
(6) If S is justified in believing Q, it is rationally permissible for S to rely on K 
A necessary condition of having justified beliefs, thus, is that it is rationally permissible to rely on 
the practices by which we come to hold those beliefs. Two further lines of thought allow us to 
draw additional conclusions from this argument. 
First, as noted in previous chapters, it is implicit in debates about the epistemic significance of 
disagreement that it is possible to have justified beliefs. Likewise, for the debate over how higher-
order evidence might serve as a defeater for beliefs justified by first-order evidence. For the sake 
of the current discussion, then we can table sceptical worries about the possibility of justified belief 
(or at least those that do not follow from discussion of disagreement and higher-order evidence). 
With that said, let us stipulate that: 
(7) S has acquired a large number of justified beliefs via K 
I.e. K is the kind of practice that can produce justified beliefs and S has been a competent employer 
of K. 
The second line of thought picks up the point from earlier, that we often form beliefs without 
having considered the practices by which we came to hold those beliefs or the reliability of those 
practices. For, whilst we might suppose that we are sensitive to facts about our epistemic practices 
up to a point – and indeed PR requires this – the project of establishing the reliability of those 
practices is a distinct epistemological undertaking of the sort that we do not ordinarily engage in. 
At the same time, it is hard to see why we should think that beliefs formed without having 
considered the reliability of the relevant practices would generally represent any kind of error in 
performance of those practices. For example, it does not seem that my chance of avoiding 
performance error in coming to believe that I saw two orange birds in the garden particularly 
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depends upon my having a conscious, reflective attitude to my garden-vision. Or, at least not if 
those circumstances are what we might think of as normal (e.g. good light, a clear view, not under 
the influence of psychotropic substances, not fanatically hopeful of seeing a hoopoe, and so on.) 
What this suggests, though, is that for many of us, a large number of our beliefs will be formed 
and held (i) without having reflected upon the reliability of the practices by which we came to hold 
those beliefs, and (ii) without having committed any performance error in the ways that we 
employed those practices to do so. But if that is so, I would suggest it is reasonable to suppose 
that the possibility of justified belief does not depend upon one’s having reflected upon the 
reliability of the relevant epistemic practices. For, if it does, we would have to allow that someone 
could be in normal circumstances, have evidence P that justifies believing Q, assess the bearing of 
P upon Q via the competent employment of an appropriate (justificatory) practice, and on that 
basis believe Q – yet not be justified in believing Q. But, except in cases where the person in 
question also has undefeated defeating higher-order evidence – that seems to describe a 
paradigmatic instance of justified belief. 
Following these points, then, and presuming that S is much like the rest of us, K is much like her 
other epistemic practices, and given the stipulation at (7) – I would suggest that we can assume the 
following: 
(8) S has acquired a large number of justified beliefs via K, without having any conscious 
attitude toward the reliability of K 
And, if that is so, we can also infer that: 
(9) In lieu of defeaters, it is rationally permissible for S to rely on K without having any 
conscious attitude toward the reliability of K. 
Following Burge (2003, 2013a) and Wright (2004) we can refer to this in terms of entitlement. In 
Burge’s words: 
[E]ntitlements are epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even 
accessible to the subject. We are entitled to rely, other things equal, on perception, memory, 
deductive and inductive reasoning, and on – I will claim – the word of others. The 
unsophisticated are entitled to rely on their perceptual beliefs. Philosophers may articulate 
these entitlements. But being entitled does not require being able to justify reliance on 
these resources, or even to conceive such a justification. (Burge 2013b: 230). 
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Thus, the more general suggestion is that we are each entitled to rely on our epistemic practices 
without having any conscious attitude towards their reliability – or at least those of our practices 
by which we come to hold justified beliefs. 
This argument and its conclusion represent a more detailed formulation of the comments on self-
trust in Chapter 3. A key point I want to bring out here, however, is that this is not an argument 
for self-trust in anything but name. ‘Trust’, in contrast to reliance, is typically understood to include 
some conscious attitudinal component taken by the trusting toward the trusted (see Baier 1986; 
Faulkner 2011; Holton 1994; Jones 1996) So understood, the entitlement to rely on one’s epistemic 
practices without any attitude toward that reliance is not an entitlement to self-trust. What I want 
to suggest next, then, is that there are certain contexts in which this entitlement does not hold and 
in which it is not permissible to rely on one’s epistemic practices without having some kind of 
positive attitude toward that reliance. As we shall see, these are contexts in which justified belief 
requires a genuine form of epistemic self-trust. 
What kind of contexts do I have in mind? 
Contexts in which an agent realises both that they came to believe Q via K and that beliefs formed 
via K are unlikely to be true if K is not reliable; and contexts in which an agent ought to realise 
both that they came to believe Q via K and that beliefs formed via K are unlikely to be true if K 
is not reliable. 
To illustrate, let’s suppose that S is in the kind of context described. That being so, we can say 
(10) S realises, or ought to realise, that she came to believe Q via K 
(11) S realises, or ought to realise, that beliefs formed via K are no more likely to be 
true than false unless K is reliable. 
Let’s say that, given (10), S is in a context of realisation vis-à-vis her belief Q. We have established 
that, in other contexts, S is entitled to rely on K without any conscious attitude toward K’s 
reliability. Being in a context of realisation is not, on its own, sufficient to bring this entitlement into 
question. (Simply realising that I came to believe there are ‘two birds in the garden’ via perception 
is not a reason to doubt my perceptions). However, when S is in a context of realisation and also 
realises that the likely truth of beliefs formed via K depends upon how reliable K, S is confronted 
directly with the question: Is K reliable? And, once that question is raised, if S cannot give a positive 
answer to it, S ought to rely on K no longer. Why? Because, to be faced with the question ‘Is K 
reliable’, yet have taken no attitude toward the reliability of K that would involve the presumption 
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that K is, or is likely to be, reliable – just is to doubt that K is reliable. And, if S doubts that K is 
reliable, or ought to doubt that K is reliable – then S cannot continue to rely on K without 
contravening PR. So, we might say given (11), the context of realisation at (10) becomes a context of 
doubt. And, when in a context of doubt vis-à-vis her reliance on K: 
(12) S ought to take a positive attitude toward the reliability of K, or not rely on K. 
In respect to that suggestion, then, more generally, we can introduce the following principle: 
Positive Attitude Requirement (PAR): For any practice K and belief Q formed via K, if S is 
in a context of doubt vis-à-vis Q and K, other things being equal, S will not be justified in 
believing Q unless S has a positive attitude toward the reliability of K and that attitude is a 
defeater for the doubts that K is reliable. 
PAR complements both PR and the OAC condition on justification suggested in the Introduction 
to the thesis. Given that PAR comes into play in S’s case, the question is what kind of close the 
question as to whether K is reliable and so underwrite S’s continued reliance on K? 
The obvious answer is that S might close the question via belief – more specifically, belief that ‘K 
is reliable’. The combination of reliance and belief in the reliability of the thing relied upon, though, 
describes a genuine form of trust. Following Faulkner (2011), we can refer to this form of trust as 
predictive trust. Correspondingly, were S come to believe that K is reliable, and so continue relying 
on K, we might reasonably describe S as having predictive self-trust (in respect to K). Once we have 
in mind the idea that S’s situation requires a form of epistemic self-trust, however, the question of 
whether there are forms of self-trust other than predictive self-trust comes into play. For, just as 
predictive trust is only one among various forms of trust more generally – so it may be that 
predictive self-trust is only one among forms of epistemic self-trust. 
What would be the significance of this for the current discussion? 
In short, when one acquires higher-order evidence that impugns the practices by which one came 
to believe Q – including that acquired in case of disagreement with an effective peer or peers -- 
one is placed in a context of realisation vis-à-vis Q precisely because one ought to consider the 
question ‘Is K reliable?’ In other words, higher-order evidence generates contexts of doubt. Thus, in 
lieu of some independent reason to dismiss the significance of the higher-order evidence acquired 
on realising that one is engaged in such a disagreement, one will retain any justification one has for 
believing Q if and only if one has the kind of positive attitude that can properly underwrite one’s 
continued reliance on the relevant practices. The possibility that there may be forms of epistemic 
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self-trust other than predictive self-trust, however, raises the possibility that one may have such an 
attitude even if one would not be justified in believing that those practices are reliable. And, that 
being so, it may also be so that there can be higher-order defeater-defeaters available to those party 
to peer disagreement that are significantly distinct from what we referred to as first-order defeater-
defeaters. 
In the next section, I shall consider in more detail how predictive self-trust works. As I shall argue, 
there are limitations to the extent that predictive self-trust can be justified. These limitations require 
us to seriously consider the possibility that there are other forms of epistemic self-trust. 
 Predictive self-trust 
As noted in the previous section, the obvious attitude through which one might close the question 
of whether one’s epistemic practices are reliable is belief that those practices are reliable. I 
described this combination of belief and reliance as predictive self-trust. Let’s say, then, that: 
Where S is amongst S’s epistemic practices, S has predictive self-trust iff: 
(i) S epistemically relies on K 
(ii) S believes that K is reliable  
As I explain below, the belief component of predictive self-trust can underwrite reliance on one’s 
epistemic practices in contexts of doubt by affording one reason to believe that the beliefs one 
comes to by way of those practices are true. Consider: 
Given the stipulation that S is in a context of doubt vis-à-vis K, S either realises or ought to realise 
that the likely truth of her belief Q depends upon the reliability of K. Now, suppose that S has 
predictive self-trust (in K). This entails that: 
(13) S believes that K is reliable 
Given (13), however, so long as S has understood the context in which she finds herself, S could 
reason to ‘Q’ as follows: 
(a) My belief ‘Q’ was formed via K 
(b) Beliefs formed via K are more likely to be true than false 
(c) My belief ‘Q’ is more likely true than false 
(d) Q is more likely true than false 
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S could make this inference either by simple induction or inference to the best explanation. Thus, 
so long as S is permitted to rely on induction or inference to the best explanation, the following 
will also be true: 
(14) If S is justified in believing that K is reliable, then, in lieu of defeaters, were S to 
believe Q on the basis of her belief that K is reliable (in conjunction with the realisation 
that she came to believe Q via K), S would be justified in believing Q 
I.e. S’s belief that K is reliable is, in the context, prima facie reason for S to believe Q. Importantly, 
whilst the argument from (a) to (d) gives S access to a new source of justification for believing Q, 
it does not allay her reliance on K entirely – as might be the case if S has access to an argument 
for Q that makes no reference at all to K or its reliability. For, were S to believe ‘Q’ on the basis of 
her belief ‘K is reliable’, S would still rely on K as a source of information, no matter the source of 
justification for that inference.  That being so, it follows from (13) that: 
(15) If S is justified in believing that K is reliable, S is rationally permitted to rely on K 
How might one acquire justification for that kind of belief? 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of case to consider. There are cases in which one comes to 
predictive self-trust through practices other than those under review. This would be the case, for 
instance, if I were to come to believe that my practice of trusting the testimony of others is reliable 
by way of inference to the best explanation. There may also be cases in which one comes to, or 
can only come to, predictive self-trust through the very same practices that are under review. This 
would be the case, for instance, if I were to come to believe that my practice of trusting the 
testimony of others is reliable on the basis of testimony to that effect from someone that I trust. 
The first kind of case is, in principle, unproblematic. Consider S again and suppose the following: 
(16) L is amongst S’s epistemic practices 
(17) S has acquired justified beliefs via L 
(18) S comes to believe ‘K is reliable’ via L 
That being so, then, as per the earlier argument, we can say that: 
(19) In lieu of defeaters, S’s belief ‘K is reliable’ is justified 
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In which case, for any beliefs that she forms via K, S will have access to the relevant variations on 
the inference pattern at (a)-(d) and so, in lieu of defeaters, will have justification for those beliefs. 
And, that being so, it follows that: 
(20) S is rationally permitted to rely on K 
I see no reason to think that there will not be a wide variety of situations in which it would be 
possible to acquire predictive self-trust (relative to specific practices) in this way. Nonetheless, 
there is an important limitation to how far this gets us. Following Alston (1986), we can describe 
instances in which predictive self-trust is acquired by way of the same practices in which that trust 
is placed in terms of epistemic circularity. As I shall discuss in more detail in the next section, 
justification is epistemically circular if one cannot justifiably believe the target proposition without 
presupposing that that proposition is true. As per the discussion of basic and non-basic practices 
earlier, however, one cannot justifiably believe that one’s basic epistemic practices – or the sum of 
one’s practices – are reliable, without presupposing that those practices are reliable. Reflecting 
these points, the limitation to predictive self-trust is that one cannot have justified predictive self-
trust when it comes to one’s basic practices, or the sum of one’s practices that is not epistemically 
circular justification. In the next section, I discuss the implications of this point. 
5.2.2.1 Epistemic Circularity and Predictive Self-Trust 
Epistemic circularity, as is widely noted, is distinct from logical and rule circularity.61 The following 
epistemically circular track-record argument illustrates this well: 
TR-K 
At t1, I came to believe Q1 via K, Q1 
At t2, I came to believe Q2 via K, Q2 
[…] 
At tn, I came to believe Qn via K, Qn 
Conclusion. K is reliable (i.e. K reliably yields truths over falsehoods.62 
Any shortcomings TR-K might display cannot be chalked up to other forms of circularity. The 
conclusion does not appear in the premises, so the argument is not logically circular. The 
conclusion does not describe the form of inference instantiated by the argument, so the argument 
 
61 See Alston (1986), Battaly (2012), Bergmann (2004).   




is not rule-circular. Rather, what seems circular about this kind of argument is that I cannot believe 
the premises of the argument without in some way presupposing that the conclusion is true. 
Specifically, the problem lies with the second conjunct of each premise. Say that Q1 is the belief 
that ‘my curtains are red’ and K is perception. It seems that, to establish the second conjunct of the 
first premise, I need to somehow verify my belief that ‘my curtains are red’. I might do so directly, 
say, by going back to look at the curtains again. In that case, though, I will depend upon the 
reliability of my perceptions when verifying my initial belief, just the same as I did when I first 
formed it. Alternatively, I might try to very my initial belief indirectly, say, by asking you whether 
you believe the curtains are red. In that case, I might indeed verify my initial belief without relying 
upon my perception of the curtain’s redness. However, in accepting your testimony I would still 
presuppose that my perceptions are reliable more generally. To paraphrase Bergmann, it is only by 
relying on my perceptions that I believe that there is someone with me and that they confirmed 
what my senses told me about the colour of my curtains (Bergmann 2004: 739).  
It is in this respect, then, that Alston and others following him describe this kind of argument as 
epistemically circular. Whether epistemically circular arguments can ever confer justification is the 
matter of some debate.63 There is consensus, though, that they carry no persuasive force. As 
already discussed, epistemically circular routes to belief work by presupposing the truth of the 
belief in question. What this means, though, is that epistemically circular arguments cannot 
rationally compel belief in a person who is not in some way committed to the truth of the 
conclusion of that argument. For instance, to call back to one of our core disagreement cases, if 
Zaius believes that Quinn’s judgement of medical evidence is unreliable, Quinn could not rationally 
compel Zaius to believe that her judgement of that evidence is reliable by way of an epistemically 
circular track-record argument of the sort we saw before. To quote Bergmann: 
[A]n argument is commonly evaluated in terms of how useful it would be in convincing 
someone who initially doubts its conclusion. An epistemically circular track record 
argument fails abysmally by that standard. It is of no use whatsoever to anyone who begins 
by questioning its conclusion. (Bergmann 2004: 720). 
To say that epistemically circular arguments carry no persuasive force unless the audience for that 
argument is already committed to the truth of the conclusion to that argument is, in effect, to say 
that epistemically circular arguments cannot close questions – when they are genuinely open. This 
applies equally to cases where one is presenting such an argument to another person and when 
 
63 See Alston (1986, 2005), Bergmann (2004), Foley (2001), Sosa (2009) for qualified endorsements of epistemically 
circular justification; Battaly (2012) and Brown (2004) respectively for criticisms of Sosa and Bergmann’s positions; 
Cohen (2002), Fumerton (1995), and Vogel (2000) for rejections of the idea of epistemically circular justification.  
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one is considering that argument for oneself. For instance, if S treats the question of whether ‘K 
is reliable’ as a genuinely open question, then, S should not be persuaded by consideration of the 
argument at TR-K. Why not? Because S can only reason from the premises of TR-K if she 
presupposes that ‘K is reliable’ – and, if S reasons in a way that presupposes that ‘K is reliable’, S 
does not treat the question of whether ‘K is reliable’ as genuinely open. Whilst, then, S’s 
consideration of TR-K may bring to the surface her presuppositions about the reliability of her 
own epistemic practices – S should not make any new commitments of that sort on such a basis. 
Now, this on its own does not mean that S cannot come to have justified predictive self-trust via 
an argument such as TR-K, even in a context of doubt. After all, if K is already amongst S’s 
practices, then, S is already committed to the presupposition of K’s reliability. So, perhaps it is 
enough that S can use an epistemically circular argument to bring her commitments to the surface 
– even if she cannot make any new commitments on that basis.64 I don’t want to rule this out – 
yet, it seems to me that there is an important limit to this kind of reasoning. Namely, it will not 
deliver justified predictive self-trust if belief is the only kind of attitude that can underwrite reliance 
on one’s epistemic in a context of doubt. To see why, it will be useful to return to an earlier point 
in our general argument. Thus, let us move back a few steps and stipulate that (contrary to (16)-
(20)): 
(16') K is a basic practice for S 
Given (16’), S could only justifiably come to believe ‘K is reliable’ by relying on K. Thus, S could 
only come to have justified predictive self-trust via an argument such as TR-K, which moves from 
premises of the kind ‘At t1, I came to believe Qn, Qn’, to the conclusion ‘K is reliable’. Given (10) 
and (11), however, S is in a context of doubt vis-a-vis Q and K and, as per PAR, in such a context 
S will not be justified in believing Q via K unless S has a positive attitude toward the reliability of 
K. These, together with (16’), entail that: 
(17') If S does not have a positive attitude toward the reliability of K, then, S will not be 
justified in believing the premises of TR-K (or any similar argument) 
Now, suppose that the only attitude that could underwrite S’s reliance on K in a context of doubt 
is belief (i.e. reliance in a context of doubt requires predictive self-trust). Given this assumption, it 
follows from (17’), that: 
 
64 Foley refers to this as the project of putting 'one's intellectual house in order' (Foley 2001: 13); it also recalls what 
Salmon(1991), drawing on Reichenbach, refers to as a 'vindication' of one's reasoning.  
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(18')  If S does not believe that K is reliable, then, S will not be justified in believing the 
premises of TR-K. 
But, if S cannot justifiably believe the premises of the argument without believing ‘K is reliable’, S 
cannot justifiably come to believe ‘K is reliable’ on the basis of that argument. Nor, even if she did so 
beforehand, can S justifiably continue to believe that ‘K is reliable’ if her original justification came via 
an argument like TR-K. (Which, given K is basic, it must have done). For, given the demand that 
the implicit presupposition of K’s reliability be made explicit in a context of doubt, 'K is reliable' 
would in effect come to feature amongst the premises of TR-K. In which case, the argument would 
no longer be epistemically circular, but logically circular. And, whether there are contexts in which 
epistemically circular arguments can confer justification, I assume there are no contexts in which 
logically circular arguments can do so. Thus, S cannot have justified predictive self-trust within a 
context of doubt – at least not if predictive self-trust is necessary for S to be rationally permitted 
to rely on K in such a context. Given, then, that we are working under the assumption that one 
can sometimes be rationally permitted to continue to rely on one’s basic epistemic practices in a 
context of doubt – there must be some combination of attitude and reliance other than predictive 
self-trust that makes it so. In other words, there must be some form of epistemic self-trust that 
does not involve belief. I shall explore what that might be in the next section. 
 Self-trust without belief 
The idea that there is some form of epistemic self-trust that does not involve belief is a widespread 
one, both in the literature explicitly focused on self-trust and the literature on epistemic circularity. 
Richard Foley, for instance, suggests that since the kinds of sceptical doubt associated with 
epistemic circularity cannot be eliminated by any degree of inquiry, at some point inquiry must 
stop and self-trust step in. At times, Foley describes self-trust in terms of an ‘intellectual faith’ in 
one’s practices – as when he claims that: ‘Significant inquiry requires an equally significant leap of 
intellectual faith. The faith need not, and should not, be unlimited; that is the path to dogmatism 
and irrationalism. But there does need to be such faith.’ (Foley 2001: 20). And at other times, it is 
clear that self-trust as Foley conceives it has a cognitive element that is in parallel with, if not 
equivalent to, belief. Thus, he reiterates at various points that ‘trust in one’s intellectual faculties, 
methods, and practices ought to be proportionate to the degree of confidence one has in their 
reliability and to the depth of this confidence’ (Foley 2001: 25). But, whilst these remarks are 
suggestive, Foley does not develop them sufficiently to help us answer the question of just how 
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self-trust can underwrite reliance on one’s epistemic practices when it does not include (justified) 
belief.65 
Similar points apply to Crispin Wright’s discussion of the rational trust we each must have in the 
truth of any number of propositions that we cannot but presuppose in our various intellectual 
projects (Wright 2004, 2014). These presuppositions include one’s about the reliability of our 
epistemic practices and faculties, and so we might take this ‘rational trust’ to encompass what I 
have referred to as epistemic self-trust. Echoing Foley, Wright is careful to emphasise the cognitive 
component of self-trust. Thus, and in line with the earlier discussion of whence the need for self-
trust arises, he argues that ‘if acceptance of such a presupposition [about the reliability of one’s 
epistemic practices] is to be capable of underwriting rational belief in the things to which execution 
of the project leads, it has to be an attitude which excludes doubt’ (Wright 2004: 193) and 
elsewhere, ‘it needs to be a rational attitude to take for reasons other than our possession of 
evidential support for the effectiveness of the methods concerned.’ (Wright 2014: 227) 
As the latter quote makes clear, Wright is of the view that the conditions of this rational trust must 
be distinct from the justification conditions of predictive self-trust. I agree. Again, though, whilst 
these points help us to mark out the boundaries between self-trust without belief and predictive 
self-trust, they tell us little about the kind of attitude that might accompany the former. 
In that respect, it is worth briefly considering how the attitude of trust has been discussed in the 
broader corpus of work on the topic, and especially in work upon relations of interpersonal trust. 
Here we do find more substantive accounts. Particularly promising is the suggestion made by a 
number of writers that there is an affective dimension to certain forms of epistemic trust. So, Karen 
Jones suggests that: 
Trusting is composed of two elements, one cognitive and one affective or emotional […] 
Roughly, to trust someone is to have an attitude of optimism about her goodwill and to 
have the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly 
and favourably moved by the thought that you are counting her (Jones 1996: 5). 
And Richard Holton, that: 
In cases where we trust and are let down, we do not just feel disappointed, as we would if 
a machine let us down. We feel betrayed. […] betrayal is one of those attitudes that 
Strawson calls the reactive attitudes. These are attitudes that we normally take only towards 
people. We feel hurt or resentful when they let us down; grateful, perhaps touched, when 
they help (Holton 1994: 66). 
 
65 This is not a criticism of Foley’s discussion of self-trust, it is just not a question that comes up in his discussion. 
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Though not as such in conflict, these quotes illustrate two ways in which the affective nature of 
interpersonal trust can be conceived depending on which aspect of that relationship is emphasised. 
On Jones’s account, trust is affective primarily because the attitude of the trustee when trusting 
involves an affective, as well as, cognitive component. Holton, on the other hand, emphasises the 
kinds of reactive – and so affective – attitudes that the trustee is liable to experience when the trusted 
acts or fails to act in line with the trust placed in them.  Paul Faulkner draws upon this latter approach 
to identify a mode of trust that he explicitly labels affective trust and which stands in contrast to 
predictive trust. He defines this as follows:  
A trusts S to  (in the affective sense) if and only if (1) A depends on S -ing; and (2) A 
expects (1) to motivate S to  (where A expects this in the sense that A expects it of S that 
S be moved by the reason to   given by (1)) (Faulkner 2011). 
Like predictive trust, ‘affective trust’ so defined implies a relationship of reliance and an 
expectation that the trusted party will make good on that relationship. Where they differ is in the 
nature of that expectation. As Faulkner puts it, with predictive trust the trusted expects that 
‘something will happen’; with affective interpersonal trust the trusted expects ‘something of someone’ 
(Faulkner 2011: 148). Crucially, the expectation associated with predictive trust is impersonal – its 
emphasis is upon the likelihood of the desired outcome, not the person relied upon to bring about 
that outcome. As such, and as we have seen, the notion of predictive trust can be extended to 
relationships other than those between people – as for instance the relationship between an agent 
and their own epistemic practices. In contrast, the expectation associated with affective trust, as 
Faulkner defines it, is inherently personal – when we trust in this way, we not only rely on the 
people we trust to do certain things, but we expect them to do those things because they are the 
kind of person to recognise and be moved by the fact that we rely on them. Thus, echoing the 
quote from Holton, whilst we might be disappointed, angry, or frustrated if events don’t go as we 
expected, the feelings of resentment and betrayal that accompany affective trust are reserved for 
the people who break our trust. In that respect, the model of affective trust understood in terms 
of the reactive attitudes associated with that stance does not naturally extend to the domain of self-
trust.  
More promising is Jones’s emphasis upon the affective nature of the attitude held when trusting. 
For whilst, on Jones’s account, the attitude of optimism takes the other person and their goodwill 
as its object in the context of interpersonal trust, it need not in other contexts. Instead, just as one 
may believe that X will ‘reliably yield truths and not falsehoods’ when X is another person or when 
X refers to one’s own epistemic practices; so one may be optimistic about relying on X to ‘reliably 
yield truths and not falsehoods’ when X is another person or X refers to one’s own epistemic 
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practices. In this respect, then, I would suggest it is worth exploring whether there is a mode of 
self-trust that can be characterised in terms of an agent’s affective attitude towards their reliance 
on their epistemic practices. 
Precedent for this move can be found in Jones’s own work on self-trust, where (echoing her work 
on interpersonal trust) she argues that ‘self-trust is best understood as a domain-relative attitude 
of optimism about our cognitive competence’ (Jones 2012a: 243). Along similar lines, McCraw 
suggests that trust – including self-trust – is best characterised as an attitude of confidence in the 
trusted involving ‘an affectively loaded way of seeing the one trusted (McCraw 2015: 418); and 
Zagzebski that self-trust involves, in addition to reliance and belief, ‘a trusting emotion towards 
[one’s] faculties in that respect’ (Zagzebski 2012: 38-39). I think Jones’s ‘optimism’ gives us the 
best grip on the notion of an affective mode of self-trust, so I will follow her in that usage.  
5.2.3.1 Self-trust without belief: Affective self-trust 
Echoing our earlier definition of predictive self-trust let’s define affective self-trust such that: 
Where K is amongst S’s epistemic practices, S has affective self-trust iff: 
(i) S epistemically relies on K 
(ii) S is optimistic about relying on K 
With this concept on the table, we might ask: What does optimism involve? And, how might it 
underwrite one’s continued reliance on one’s epistemic practices in a context of realisation?66 
As I conceive it, optimism is a primitive attitude that manifests in an agent’s willingness to act in 
certain ways and willingness to think well of the person, practice, or relationship to which that 
action corresponds. In the context of trust and reliance, optimism manifests in the willingness to 
rely on X to  and a willingness to think well of X and one’s reliance on X. To think well of X in 
the sense implied involves making a series of presumptions in the context of action that correspond to 
having a positive affective and cognitive attitude toward X’s -ing.  
What I would like to suggest first, then, is that for S to be optimistic about her reliance on K is for 
S to manifest a willingness to rely on that practice under the presumptions that (i) it will be beneficial 
 
66 To be clear the aim in this section is not to identify some definitive interpretation of ‘optimism’. Rather, to borrow 
the words of Karen Jones, we should see ‘optimism’ as discussed in reference to trust and self-trust as a ‘a term of art 
serving as a place-holder […] It draws from our ordinary usage of the term “optimism” connotations of confidence 
and security, but it is not meant to imply a generalized tendency of the kind attributed when we say a person is 
optimistic’ (Jones 2012a: 243).  
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to her epistemic aims and interests if K reliably yields truths over falsehoods and (ii) that S will 
accrue those benefits if she acts as if K is reliable, and so (iii) K will reliably yield truths over 
falsehoods. 
These presumptions allow affective self-trust to play a similar role in the rational structure of the 
agent’s attitudes as belief does in the case of predictive self-trust. Crucially though, they do not 
involve or imply belief – explicit or otherwise. Instead, we can think of optimism here in terms of 
one’s having an affectively loaded way of perceiving or experiencing the world that is structured by a 
commitment to act in accordance with the three presumptions described.67 In the words of Guido 
Möllering (who conceives trust in a way that fits to the current discussion of optimism): 
If trust's destination is a state of favourable expectation (from which various functional 
consequences can follow), then its point of departure is the experiencing […] of our life-
world which we interpret as the reality to which our trust relates. (Möllering 2001: 412. 
Italics Added). 
And, similarly Faulkner, 
[I]f any of these propositions were not accepted, it would cease to make sense to say that 
A trusted because accepting this set of propositions is an expression of A’s attitude of trust 
and so a commitment of A’s decision to trust. This is not to suggest that trusting someone 
to do something involves explicitly committing to these propositions in one’s reasoning. 
The claim is rather that the acceptance of these propositions partly defines how it is that 
the attitude of affective trust involves seeing things in a certain light (Faulkner 2011: 152. Italics 
Added). 
To illuminate this initial sketch, it can be useful to think of epistemic self-trust as it stands in 
relation toward the inherent ‘riskiness’ of each of our reliance on our own epistemic practices. 68  
As we saw earlier, in relying upon our epistemic practices we subject ourselves to a kind of 
epistemic jeopardy. I.e. If S relies upon K and K reliably yield truths over falsehoods, S will stand 
to fulfil her fundamental epistemic aims by relying on those practices; if K is unreliable, S will stand 
to have those aims frustrated. But, so too S will have those aims frustrated if S somehow refrains 
from that reliance. In a context of doubt vis-à-vis K, S realises, or ought to realise, both the fact 
that she relies upon K and the vulnerability that comes with that. Thus, we might say that in such 
contexts S becomes (or ought to become) aware of how vulnerable her reliance on K makes her. 
 
67 I return to and discuss further literature on the idea that there are normative ways of engaging with the world that 
can be described on a broadly perceptual model in the next chapter.  
68 I talk  of ‘riskiness’ and vulnerability to avoid the technical connotations of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ as those terms 
are used in economics and other fields (for the classical statement of the distinction, see Knight 1921: 19-20) 
139 
 
Correspondingly, in continuing to rely on K in such contexts by way of epistemic self-trust, S takes 
a stance towards the riskiness of her doing so. 
As defined earlier, the attitude of predictive self-trust is belief – specifically belief that the relevant 
practices are reliable. As noted, then, it will only be permissible for S to continue relying on K by 
way of predictive self-trust if her belief that ‘K is reliable’ is justified. And, at least as we have been 
treating justification for belief in this thesis, S will not be justified in believing that ‘K is reliable’ if 
S doubts that belief is objectively justified. Thus, and to call back to chapters 2 and 3, we might 
say that: for S to have justified predictive self-trust in K is for S to take a third-person theoretical stance 
toward K and the riskiness of her continued reliance on that practice. 
Another stance that S might take toward her reliance upon K, however, is as a relationship that 
she is already invested in and one –when seen positively through the light of her broader interests 
and aims – worth investing in despite how doing so leaves her vulnerable. In contrast to predictive 
self-trust, for S to take this stance toward her reliance on K, is for her to take what we might call 
a first-person phenomenal stance toward that reliance. To take this stance is for S to view her 
relationship to K, not through a calculation of the odds of benefitting or losing, but through a kind 
of affectively felt experience of the importance and value of that relationship to herself. 
It is this first-person stance that S takes when she has an attitude of optimism about her reliance 
on K – and it is in seeing things this way that, at some level of cognition, S makes the presumption 
that she will benefit from relying on K if K is reliable. Again, though this presumption of 
conditional benefit is not belief. It is not a response to S’s assessment of the evidence or critical 
reflection on what is and is not to her benefit, but rather a constitutive feature of S’s own personal, 
subjective, and affective experience of what comes with acting as if K is reliable. At the same time 
as this, since the attitude of optimism is a positive attitude, for S to see her reliance in this way, 
involves not only the presumption of conditional benefit but also the presumption that that benefit 
will come her way. I.e. The presumption that if she acts as if K is reliable, she will fulfil her 
epistemic aims. This presumption of expected benefit, in turn, rests upon the further presumption 
that K is reliable. For if S is optimistic about relying on K, then, it cannot be so that S presumes that 
that benefit will come any way other than through K’s proving to be reliable. E.g. If the 
presumption is that luck will do the job or that by acting as if K is reliable, someone else will step 
in to help her out, S is not optimistic about relying on K. Again, though, it is not that S has come to 
this conclusion via cost-benefit analysis, or assessment of the evidence that K is reliable. Instead, 
as Jones puts it, given S’s positive and affective investment in her reliance on K: ‘the situation is 
experienced as cognitively safe’ (Jones 2012b: 5. Italics Added). 
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So much for the attitude of affective self-trust. How does this relate to our broader discussion, i.e. 
how might affective self-trust underwrite reliance on one’s practices in a context of doubt. There 
are three important points to bring out. 
First, in so far as optimism manifests in a willingness to act, affective self-trust entails a propensity 
for action. More specifically since we are talking about epistemic self-trust, affective self-trust entails 
that, other things being equal, if K in someway indicates that Q, one will believe Q. In this way, if 
S believes Q because S has affective self-trust in K and K in someway indicates that Q, S does not 
believe Q for the reason that she has affective self-trust. She believes Q because believing Q in the 
circumstances is constitutive of what it is to manifest a willingness to rely on K – or in other words, 
it is constitutive of what it is to have affective self-trust. Thus, whilst we shall see that affective 
self-trust has an internal structure of reason, affective self-trust does not provide S new justification 
for believing Q as we saw justified predictive self-trust to do. Rather, we might say, affective self-
trust can restore one’s access to whatever justification one previously had for the beliefs formed 
via the relevant practices. 
Second, in so far as optimism involves making the presumption that K is reliable, affective self-
trust precludes doubting that K is reliable. To refer back to Jones’s description, to be optimistic 
about relying on K is to experience the situations in which one’s reliance on K comes to the fore 
as cognitively safe – and so to put aside or bracket the riskiness and vulnerability that are otherwise 
salient in contexts of doubt. This is not to say that the self-trusting person is ignorant or blind to 
their vulnerability – that way would be foolishness, arrogance, or over-confidence in one’s 
practices, not optimism. Instead, to borrow from Möllering, this way of seeing ‘can be defined as 
the mechanism that brackets out uncertainty and ignorance, thus making interpretative knowledge 
momentarily ‘certain’ and enabling the leap to favourable (or unfavourable) expectation.’ 
(Möllering 2001: 414).69  
The self-trusting person, thus, is not unaware of the riskiness of their relationship, it is just that 
these features of the predicament become less salient when that relationship is seen through the 
lens of optimism. Attention is directed toward the value of one’s continued reliance; value that can 
only come under the presumption that the practices on which one relies on are reliable. 
In respect to this aspect of affective self-trust, we can observe that S might have affective self-trust 
in K whilst in a context of doubt without contravening PAR. For confronted with the question: 
 
69 Möllering refers to this dimension of trust as ‘suspension’. 
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‘Is K reliable?’ S’s optimism suffices to close that question, just because that attitude involves the 
presumption that K is reliable. Moreover, since it also involves the presumptions of benefit, S’s 
optimism provides a practical explanation of why S continues to rely on K in the context. Affective 
self-trust we might say is self-rationalizing. Faulkner’s description of the rationality of affective 
interpersonal trust illustrates this thought nicely: 
In trust one lowers one’s guard because the possibilities of one’s trust being betrayed are 
excluded by what must be accepted in holding an attitude of trust. This background of 
acceptance then specifies a way of thinking about the trust situation, which yields the 
presumption that the trusted is trustworthy that provides a reason for trusting. (Faulkner 
2011: 153). 
Much the same can be said of affective self-trust.70 Since affective self-trust is self-rationalizing, 
however, it follows that it is not subject to the problems of epistemic circularity that we saw were 
associated with predictive self-trust in at least some contexts. This is because those problems arise 
when one attempts to justify belief in the reliability of the relevant practices – in the sense of 
finding reason to form such an attitude, or reason to continue to hold such an attitude. With 
affective self-trust there is no such act of justification, or practice of finding reasons. Rather, 
affective self-trust comes as a package – to have affective self-trust is to have reason for that trust 
built in. The question that remains, then, is not whether one can have reason to have trust oneself 
in the affective sense in a context of doubt – one can – but whether one has good reason to trust 
oneself? 
Which brings us to the third and final point: we do not and should not have affective self-trust 
come-what-may. Where predictive self-trust requires justification, whether one has good reason to 
trust oneself in the affective sense is a matter of whether such trust is available and whether it is 
well-calibrated to one’s epistemic experiences – or more simply, whether it is well-placed. 
Whether affective self-trust is available will depend upon the cognitive and affective character of 
the agent in question, as well as the circumstances they find and have found themselves in. It 
depends on the character of the agent, because some people are not inclined psychologically – 
whether by nature or as a result of experience – to see things in the positive affective light that 
affective self-trust involves. The availability of affective self-trust also depends on the agent’s 
character because to see or experience one’s reliance on one’s own practices in the way characteristic 
of affective self-trust requires a degree of sensitivity to epistemic considerations, and not all people 
 
70 Though, as noted earlier, it is questionable whether the attitude of betrayal has any relationship to self-trust – 
frustration or disappointed might be better terms in the current context. 
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show that sensitivity in all circumstances. (Just as the availability of predictive self-trust depends 
upon the agent having a certain capacity for critical and reflective reasoning.) The availability of 
self-trust depends on circumstance just because circumstances make a difference to how we see and 
experience the situations we are in. Whilst the optimism that is characteristic of self-trust can shape 
one’s experience of a situation such that one’s attention is elsewhere than its riskiness, as 
circumstances change, one’s experience of that situation as ‘cognitively safe’ may recede and one’s 
attention shift toward the sources of doubt and vulnerability. This may happen, for instance, if one 
is faced with persistent and fervent disagreement – then, again, it may not – that same situation 
may be the catalyst for someone else to find new levels of self-trust. This points to a crucial point 
about affective self-trust. For, whilst it is to be expected that one should be sensitive to such 
changes in situation, how that will play out in a particular case, I would argue, is not something 
that we can predict in abstraction from that case. In short, whilst we can point to its broad 
determiners, the ways in which character and circumstance can interact to render affective self-
trust available or unavailable are too various to give a principled account affective self-trusts 
availability.  
This brings us to the question of why we should not have affective self-trust come-what-may. The 
answer to this question is simple enough. We should not have affective self-trust come what may 
for the simple reason that the optimism that is characteristic of such trust can be misplaced – as it 
will be if one trusts K when K is not reliable. Since the availability of self-trust is dependent on an 
irreducible commixture of character and circumstance, however, we cannot be expected to trust 
only when K performs as we hope it too. Instead, what we can hope for and expect is that one’s 
trusting experience of situations are, over time, well-calibrated to one’s actual experience of the 
functioning of K in those situations. In general, well-calibrated self-trust will track one’s actual 
experience of the functioning of K – but what this amounts to will depend upon the nature of 
those experiences as well as the agent’s own sensitivity to the various feature of that experience 
relevant to their trusting. As with availability, what it takes for self-trust to be well-calibrated is too 
dependent on the features of an agent’s particular history of experience and circumstance to be 
amenable to any general, principled account of that. 
I shall finish the discussion of affective self-trust here, the question that remains is how this relates 
back to our discussion of higher-order evidence and disagreement. In line with the points above, 
I shall not attempt to offer a principled account of this. Instead, I shall attempt to elucidate the 
role of affective self-trust in contexts of disagreement and doubt by way of an example of ordinary 
peer disagreement in which such considerations are particularly pertinent. 
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 Affective self-trust and disagreement: an example 
THE TOXIC BULLROOM  
Kazimira has recently been promoted to the senior editorial team on a major international 
newspaper. One aspect of this new role is to participate in meetings where the paper’s 
editorial positions are set out, argued for, and decided upon. Though experienced, well-
qualified, and respected in the wider journalistic field, Kazimira is finding many of her 
otherwise well-founded assertions knocked back by the other members of the team. ‘That’s 
the wrong take’, ‘I think you’ve misread the climate’, ‘your biases are showing’ are not 
unheard-of reactions. All in all, Kazimira’s suggestions are met with disagreement an 
inordinate amount of the time. 
All of the other members of the editorial team have similar or greater experience and 
qualifications to Kazimira. From prior experience Kazimira has developed a keen sense of 
respect for everyone on the team. As it happens, though, Kazimira is the only woman and 
the only non-English journalist currently sitting in on the meetings. And, unbeknownst to 
her and everyone else, the environment is amplifying the underlying biases and prejudices 
of the men in the room regarding the journalistic credentials of women and non-English 
speakers. However, Kazimira has no obvious evidence of this aside from her 
disagreements. Indeed, the paper is a progressive, left-leaning publication and the various 
writers in the room have reported on and contributed to numerous progressive 
movements, including the broadly feminist stance the newspaper has cultivated in recent 
years. 
Initially, Kazimira’s response to the situation is to accept the ‘criticisms’ of her colleagues 
and stoically return to the metaphorical drawing board to come up with better ideas, 
research the issues, seek out other viewpoints and so on. As these negative experiences 
pile up, however, she begins to have a change of heart and approach to the situation. What 
started as a dispiriting and frustrating sense of her own inadequacy, morphs into a more 
defiant sense of anger and injustice. Instead of doubting herself, and with increasing 




In this case, Kazimira is subject to an instance of testimonial injustice that is manifest in the context 
of persistent disagreement.71 What is particularly pernicious about this case is that, as far as 
Kazimira can tell, the people who disagree with her so persistently are either her effective peers or 
indeed superiors. Since, though, the culture of disagreement that is aimed at Kazimira is shaped 
by bias and prejudice, the apparent authority with which the others speak is anything but. Again, 
though, Kazimira has no evidence of this aside from her experience of persistent disagreement 
itself. Nonetheless, I would suggest that given the features of the case it is (i) not implausible that 
Kazimira would respond in this way (though it would also be understandable were she never make 
the leap to trusting herself) and (ii) that Kazimira remains entirely within the limits of epistemic 
rationality in responding in the way that she does. Even if she never acquires any evidence of the 
real source of the reactions her opinions receive, apart from the experience of disagreement itself, 
it seems to me that there comes a tipping point where Kazimira should stop being conciliatory and 
begin to trust herself instead. 
Without recognising the role of affective self-trust, we cannot explain how this could be so. Since 
the group consists of her effective peers and superiors, Kazimira’s experience of disagreement 
affords her a significant body of higher-order evidence. And of the kind in light of which, in lieu 
of a defeater-defeater, Kazimira ought to not only revise her beliefs but accede to the group 
entirely. What is more, in so far as her opinions are consistently subject to disagreement from the 
group, in lieu of a defeater-defeater, Kazimira ought at some point to start questioning her general 
competence in the relevant fields. To refer back to the discussion of kinds of defeater, each single 
disagreement may be a non-contextual undercutting defeater. But the cumulative higher-order 
evidence at some point shifts into being a general undercutting defeater as a more general 
explanation of the persistent disagreement becomes more salient. As the case goes, however, the 
only evidence that Kazimira has in her favour is the history of disagreement itself. And that being 
so Kazimira will have no first-order defeater-defeaters for the higher-order evidence, nor will she 
have any kind of defeater-defeater by way of justified predictive self-trust (for just the reason that, 
without affective self-trust, she won’t be justified in having predictive self-trust). Thus, without 
recognising the possibility for affective self-trust to play a role in one’s response to disagreement, 
 
71 Testimonial injustice is one of two kinds of epistemic injustice that Fricker describes in her seminal work on the 
topic ‘Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing’ (2007). Testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker is 
granted less credibility than they merit because of the operation of some kind of identify-prejudice on the part of the 
hearer. Important contributions to the growing literature on this and other varieties of epistemic injustice include 
Dotson (2011, 2012, 2014) and Medina (2013), as well as Jones’s (2012a, 2012b) work on self-trust that I have being 
drawing on in my discussion of affective self-trust. For recent collections on epistemic injustice and related topics see 
Kidd and Medina (2017) and Barker, Crerar, and Goetze (2018) 
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the theorist is forced to accept that in this case rationality demands that Kazimira both accede on 
the matters under dispute and become significantly less trusting of herself in general. This is so, 
even though it is Kazimira’s colleagues who are in the wrong, epistemically and morally, and even 
though she has first-hand – if evidentially hidden – experience of how their biases and prejudices 
play out. This diagnosis of the case, it is worth noting is not entirely off base, as Karen Jones points 
out, epistemically unjust encounters are often characterised by such effects: 
[U]njust social relations cause epistemic injustice, which undermines self-trust among the 
underprivileged; unjust social relations create excessive self-trust among the privileged, 
which perpetuates epistemic injustice, which further undermines the self-trust of 
the disadvantaged in a vicious feedback loop. The pressure epistemic injustice 
places on self-trust, however, is not only causal, it is also a rational pressure. In 
our shared practices of inquiry we are counting on each other not only for information 
with respect to whether or not p, but also for ongoing mutual epistemic 
calibration […] The social calibration of our knowledge-seeking strategies puts rational 
pressure on us to conclude we have made a mistake when we cannot explain divergent 
judgment. (Jones 2012a: 247). 
In line with these points, we should recognise that it is quite possible that Kazimira would react to 
the experience described with deference and doubt – that is a part of the nature of epistemic 
injustice. Moreover, it is possible that she would be rational in doing so – be that a pernicious and 
destructive consequence of rationality, again, it is a part of the nature of epistemic injustice. 
However, in recognising the role that affective self-trust can have in responding to disagreement 
we can make sense of how Kazimara could also respond in the way this case is described – and 
how her remaining steadfast in the face of unjust disagreement might be rational, even when she 
has no independent evidence that that is the case. 
First, the concept of affective self-trust allows us to explain Kazimira’s gradual shift from 
deference to steadfastness in terms other than stubbornness or dogmatism. For, Kazimira does 
not make a sudden shift from basing her responses on the evidence to dogmatically resisting her 
colleague’s protestations. Instead, her perceptions of herself, her colleagues, and the situation 
undergo a gradual recalibration; from one of an externally imposed humility to a defiant optimism-
in-resistance. Once that optimism begins to manifest, Kazimira eventually comes to see the 
situation in a way that is structured by the presumption that her own practices are reliable. That 
quasi-perceptual experience in turn can ground her reasoning about the situation in a way that 
brackets out the doubts she might otherwise have about her own practices. The shift from doubt 
to optimism (about herself), thus, opens up new rational possibilities for Kazimira as it provides 
an internally consistent platform from which she might explore explanations of the history of 
disagreement that take the fact that her colleague’s positions are often wrong and poorly supported 
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as its starting point. In that way, we might say, as she comes to have affective self-trust Kazimira 
acquires a kind of higher-order defeater-defeater for her experiences of disagreement – one that allows 
her to rely upon the facts of the disagreement itself as the rational grounds for her staying steadfast.  
Whether this defeater-defeater is good, will depend, not only upon whether Kazimira has such 
self-trust, but whether it is well-placed. In this case, I would suggest that it is. Kazimira’s colleagues 
obstinance to her ideas is fuelled by prejudice and bias, not by critical reflection on the issues under 
debate. Kazimira’s own opinions, as stipulated, are well-founded and the produce of her own 
competence. If Kazimira did have independent evidence of these features of the disagreement, she 
would clearly be justified in downgrading her assessments of her colleagues’ competence. In that 
respect, her eventual trust in herself over her opponents is well-placed. What is more, as we saw, 
when Kazimira does manifest that trust in herself that shift is not the result of a sudden and 
inexplicable shift from deference to dogmatism. Rather, as noted, it is the result of a gradual re-
calibration of her epistemic sensibilities. Moreover, that re-calibration reflects epistemically 
significant features of the situation that Kazimira is directly subject to and of which she has 
immediate experience – even if they are initially hidden beneath the structure of explicable reasons. 
Even if the only evidence that Kazimira has in her favour is the history of disagreement, then, it 
seems to me entirely apt, that as a competent and sensitive epistemic agent, Kazimira would come 
to trust herself over her colleagues in this situation. 
Conclusion 
In discussing the example of testimonially unjust disagreement in the previous section, I hope to 
have shed some light on how affective self-trust as I have described it can relate to disagreement 
and the broader discussion of higher-order evidence. I hope also to have illustrated how the 
presence of such self-trust can help to explain how the steadfast response can be a rational 
possibility in case of disagreement between effective peers – as well as how an absence of such 
self-trust can take that possibility off the table. In this light, I alluded to the idea that affective self-
trust might be seen to give one a kind of higher-order defeater-defeater – of the kind that we were 
looking for at the start of this discussion. Given this, it seems apt to refer to this approach to ‘The 
Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ as the ‘Higher-Order Trust’ approach to disagreement. In the 
conclusion to this thesis I shall lay out the Higher-Order Trust approach in more schematic form. 
Before doing tha, what remains to be seen is whether this approach might also be extended to 
‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. I shall consider that in the next chapter. 
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 The Higher-Order Trust 
Approach and Deep Disagreement 
Introduction 
In the final chapter of the thesis, I extend the Higher-Order Trust approach to disagreement 
developed in Chapter 4 and 5 to ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. In the first part 
of the chapter, I re-introduce ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’ and discuss the 
possible theoretical responses to that problem. In the second part of the chapter, I situate the 
notion of 'epistemic norms' within the broader understanding of epistemic practices and self-trust 
forwarded in the previous chapter. In the final section of the chapter, I consider in more detail 
what the Higher-Order Trust account has to say about how those party to deep disagreement 
between effective peers ought to respond to that in two types of case: cases in which disputants 
are not in a position to recognise the nature of their disagreement, and cases in which disputants 
are in a position to recognise the nature of their disagreement.  
6.1 Re-introducing The Normative Problem 
of Deep Disagreement  
As per the discussion in Chapter 1, ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’ concerns the 
question of how, epistemically speaking, one ought to respond to the realisation of disagreement 
when the other parties to the disagreement are one’s effective peers and when the disagreement is 
deep. 
‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’ is distinct from ‘The Problem of Ordinary 
Disagreement’ in so far as deep disagreements involve more than a difference in beliefs, they also 
involve a difference in epistemic norms. More specifically, I characterised deep disagreements as 
occuring when a disagreement at the level of belief is explained by the disputants following 
different epistemic norms in coming to hold those beliefs. We glossed epistemic norms as 
corresponding to rule-like statements of the following form: 
Where  designates some normative epistemic act such as believing, inferring, trusting, and so on, 
Under condition C, one ought to/ought not to/is permitted to  
Or, imperatives of the form: 
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   If C, ! / don’t ! 
And we said that, for someone to follow an epistemic norm is, roughly, for that person to regulate 
the relevant epistemic actions in accordance with what they perceive to be the prescriptions of that 
norm in different circumstances. Following a norm, I suggested, then, is (i) something an agent 
does, not necessarily a matter of their holding any beliefs about that norm and (ii) constitutively 
connected to what an agent treats as epistemic reasons. I shall return to the topic of what epistemic 
norms are and what is involved in following an epistemic norm in 6.3, but this rough 
characterisation will make do for now. 
To remind us of what a deep disagreement might look like in practice, here again is the example 
from Chapter 1: 
POLITICIANS 
M and Prudence are politicians in rival political parties. A recent glut of polls from 
reputable pollsters indicates that the public have an extremely low level of trust in the 
political class. Both Fax and Prudence have sincerely professed that they think it crucial to 
their political roles to act in such a way as to engender just the kind of public trust the polls 
refer to. Additionally, both Fax and Prudence recognise that, were they not personally 
trusted by the public, engendering such trust would require considerable effort and 
expenditure on their behalf. Shortly after the release of yet another poll indicating the 
dearth of public trust, Fax asks Prudence what she thinks about the public-trust problem. 
Prudence replies ‘What problem?’ Surprised, Fax asks Prudence if she has seen the recent 
polls. Surely, Fax says, given the numbers ‘It is quite clear that the public do not trust either 
of us.’ Prudence responds: ‘Of course I’ve seen the polls and they definitely spell trouble 
for you. Fortunately for me, the public trust me implicitly,’ before adding, with no apparent 
irony or insincerity, ‘I mean, if they didn’t, I would have to change the whole way I go 
about doing politics!’ 
As it happens, Fax based her beliefs about who the public trust on the polls alone; 
Prudence treats both polls and practical considerations as relevant to determining who the 
public do and don’t trust. Since Prudence would incur a greater cost were she to act as if 
the public do not trust her, Prudence determined that the poll results must not be evidence 
of how the public feel about her. What is more, this difference in how the pair came to 
their beliefs represents a quite general feature of their epistemic practices – Prudence sees 
practical considerations as generally relevant to determining what is true, Fax does not. 
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In this case, Fax and Prudence disagree about the proposition ‘The public do not trust either of 
us.’ Fax and Prudence are both aware of the polls that show the publics general trust in politicians 
has declined, as well as the practical costs that they will incur if the evidence of the polls applies to 
themselves. Moreover, they concur that the poll results are relevant to the question of who the 
public trust. Where the two differ, and what makes this a case of deep disagreement, is in the way 
they perceive the relevance of the practical considerations. As I put it in Chapter 1, Fax 
distinguishes between the practical and epistemic reasons, whereas, for all intents and purposes, 
Prudence treats practical reasons as epistemic reasons. Given that this difference represents quite 
general features of their epistemic practices, then, I suggested that we could characterise this 
disagreement as one in which: 
Fax believes ‘the public do not trust either of us’ because Fax follows a norm such that: 
If the only considerations that support your believing Q are practical 
considerations, then, for the sake of acquiring true beliefs, you ought not to believe 
Q.  
And, Prudence disagrees with Fax because Prudence follows a norm such that:  
If the only considerations that support your believing Q are practical 
considerations, then, for the sake of acquiring true beliefs, it is permissible for you 
to believe Q. 
Having illustrated the idea of deep disagreement, I suggested that it was also important to consider 
the question of whether and when those party to a deep disagreement might be considered 
effective peers. I suggested that there are two important points to recognise in respect to this 
question. First, someone might be one’s effective peer in case of deep disagreement where they 
would not be so if it were not for the difference in norms. Second, and following that, I suggested 
that, since one may not be aware of the difference in norms, someone might be one’s effective 
peer in case of deep disagreement without one having the kind of evidence that would allow one 
to recognise that they are one’s effective peer. POLITICIANS illustrates both points. 
Were POLITICIANS an ordinary disagreement, and so Fax and Prudence shared the same norms, 
Prudence would not be Fax’s effective peer. This is because when Fax asks Prudence how she 
could not think that the pair both face a public trust problem, Prudence close to as admits that she 
has been swayed by the practical considerations. On Fax’s norms, however, Prudence’s ‘admission’ 
would afford Fax independent reason to believe that Prudence had made a mistake in her 
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reasoning. On Prudence’s norms, on the other hand, Prudence’s admission would afford Fax 
independent reason to believe that she had made a mistake in her reasoning (i.e. she ignored the 
practical considerations). Thus, in either case, Fax’s possessions of the evidence about Prudence’s 
reasoning would be sufficient to prevent Prudence from being Fax’s effective peer.  
Since POLITICIANS is a deep disagreement, however, things are quite different. For, not only do 
Fax and Prudence follow different epistemic norms, but since their respective norms determine 
the kind of considerations that each sees as providing reasons for belief, that difference cannot be 
separated from the substance of the disagreement. That being so, any justification that Fax might 
otherwise have for believing that she has the relative advantage, which would not count as such 
on Prudence’s norms, will fail to be independent of the substance of the disagreement (similarly 
for any justification Fax might otherwise have believing that Prudence has the advantage). Thus, 
since the only evidence Fax has in her favour is the evidence that Prudence was swayed by the 
practical considerations, and the difference in Fax’s and Prudence’s norms concerns just whether 
it is permissible to be swayed by practical considerations; Prudence is in fact Fax’s effective peer – 
even though she would not be were this an ordinary disagreement,  
This bring us to the second point. For, Prudence is Fax’s effective peer only because the brute 
facts about the norms they follow makes her so. And as a consequence of this, Fax cannot 
recognise that Prudence is her effective peer solely by reflection on the evidence she possesses as 
the case is described. Instead, she would have to acquire some additional evidence that would 
indicate to her that any consideration that she might suppose to favour her is likely to be disputed 
by Prudence. Given how fundamental is the difference in Fax’s and Prudence’s norms, this would 
appear to require either that Fax submit a wide range of her background beliefs to the scrutiny of 
Prudence, or that Fax have more direct evidence about the fundamental nature of her disagreement 
with Prudence. Neither, I would suggest, are necessarily easy to acquire, even with a good deal of 
further dialogue between the pair. In particular, recognising that the disagreement is deep would 
require that Fax be capable of thinking about epistemic norms – i.e. conceptualising behaviour in 
terms of them and recognising behaviour as following them – and it is doubtful that Fax could do 
this. Not only is Fax not currently in a position to recognise that Prudence is her effective peer – 
but, quite possibly, such recognition may beyond what it is reasonable to expect her to achieve. 
POLITICANS, thus, illustrates the core points about the relationship between deep disagreement 
and the status of effective peerhood: (i) those party to deep disagreement can be effective peers; 
(ii) those party to deep disagreements can be effective peers when they would not be were they to 
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share the same epistemic norms, and (iii) those party to deep disagreement can be effective peers 
even when they are not in a position to recognise that they are effective peers.  
In section 6.4, I shall consider what significance these features of deep disagreement have upon 
‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. Before doing that, it will be useful to summarise 
the potential theoretical positions on the question of how those party to deep disagreement ought 
to respond when they are effective peers. And, following that, it will be useful to say a little more 
about the nature of epistemic norms. 
6.2 Theoretical positions on the problem of 
deep disagreement 
Since deep disagreements are constituted by differences at two levels (i.e. the level of norms and 
the level of beliefs), the ways in which disputants might respond to deep disagreement are 
complicated in a way that they are not in ordinary disagreement. In the case of ordinary 
disagreement, the only theoretical question is whether disputants ought to revise or stick to their 
respective beliefs about the disputed propositions. In the case of deep disagreement, there are two 
(initial) theoretical questions: Should the disputants revise or stick to their original beliefs? And 
should the disputants continue to follow their respective norms? In contrast to the two possible 
responses to ordinary disagreement, then, there are four possibilities for how disputants might 
respond to deep disagreement: 
(a) Stick by norms and retain beliefs 
(b) Stick by norms but revise beliefs 
(c) Abstain from norms but retain beliefs 
(d) Abstain from norms and revise beliefs. 
As far as theoretical positions go, we can immediately rule out (c) – in lieu of some other source 
of justification for believing as they do, it will not be rational for someone engaged in a deep 
disagreement to abstain from their norms yet retain the beliefs formed in accordance with those 
norms. A similar line of reasoning to that underpinning the discussion of self-trust in the last 
chapter will help us to see why. Consider Fax in POLITICIANS. Any justification Fax has for 
believing ‘the public do not trust either of us’ is dependent on her being permitted to follow the 
norms by which she came to hold that belief. Fax’s being justified in holding the belief, thus, entails 
that she is permitted to follow the relevant norms. Correspondingly, if Fax ought to abstain from 
the norms by which she came to believe ‘the public do not trust either of us’ Fax will lose any 
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justification she had for believing as such by way of those norms. Thus, in lieu of acquiring 
justification for believing ‘the public do not trust either of us’ from some other source, it cannot 
be the case that Fax ought to abstain from her norms and retain her beliefs. In other words, (c) is 
not a theoretically viable response to the disagreement. More generally, this helps us to recognise 
the following principle: 
Total Revision (TR): If, in light of deep disagreement, S ought to abstain from her epistemic 
norm N, then, for any belief Q that S came to hold via N, other things being equal, S ought 
to revise her belief Q.  
I shall return to the significance of this principle shortly. First, let’s consider the plausibility of (b). 
Like (c), (b) calls for a different response at the levels of norms and beliefs (i.e. stick by norms, 
revise beliefs). As I shall argue in the later sections of this chapter, however, unlike (c), (b) will be 
appropriate in some cases of deep disagreement. I will say more on which cases those are later in 
the chapter, for the moment the important point is to recognise that the possibility of this response 
rests on the fact that epistemic norms properly understood are defeasible. Indeed, one of the 
lessons of the possibility of defeat from higher-order evidence is that, no matter how competently 
one may have formed one’s beliefs, no justification is inviolable. To say that norms are defeasible, 
though, is just to say that one can be in situation where one has no reason to abstain from one’s 
norms in any general fashion, but one ought to withhold from following the prescriptions of those 
norms in the specific context. The mixed response at (b) should be understood in this way. And, 
to jump ahead in the discussion, it would be rational for me to respond to deep disagreement in 
this way, if I have reason to distrust the practices by which I came to hold the disputed beliefs, but 
not specifically to doubt the norms by which I came to hold those beliefs. As I shall argue later in 
the chapter, this will sometimes – and perhaps often – be the case with deep disagreement. More 
specifically, this will be the correct response in cases where the disputants are not in a position to 
recognise that the disagreement is deep yet would be effective peers if the disagreement were not 
deep. 
Given these points, then, (a), (d), and (b) – properly understood – are all theoretically viable 
responses. Let’s call these the steadfast response to deep disagreement, the conciliatory response to deep 
disagreement, and the mixed response to deep disagreement. As with ordinary disagreement, we can 
categorise the possible theoretical views of deep disagreement in terms of their attitude to these 
different responses. Corresponding to uniform positions on ‘The Problem of Ordinary 
Disagreement’, one might offer a ‘uniform-steadfast account of deep disagreement’ or a ‘uniform-
conciliationist account of deep disagreement’ (i.e. the appropriate response is always to stick by 
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norms and beliefs, or always to abstain from norms and revise beliefs). Corresponding to non-
uniform positions on ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’, one might offer a ‘non-uniform 
account of deep disagreement’, whereby, which of the steadfast, conciliatory, or mixed responses 
is appropriate will depend upon the circumstances of the particular disagreement. In the rest of 
the chapter I shall argue that the Higher-Order Trust approach to disagreement developed in the 
previous two chapters – which is a non-uniform account of disagreement – can be extended to 
deep disagreement. 
Before doing so, it is worth considering some motivations we might have for endorsing a non-
uniform account of deep disagreement independently of the merits of the Higher-Order Trust 
approach. 
Consider the principle of Total Revision. On a uniform-conciliationist account of deep 
disagreement, this principle would apply in all cases of deep disagreement between effective peers. 
In a case like POLITICIANS, however, this would have sceptical consequences at a near global 
level. Why? Because, whilst the disagreement between Fax and Prudence occurs in the political 
domain, the norms that explain that disagreement are not specific to that domain. As described, 
Fax’s norms forbid her from placing weight upon the practical considerations in any and all 
epistemic deliberations; Prudence’s norms permit her to place weight on the practical 
considerations in any and all epistemic deliberations. Thus, if Conciliationism is the right response, 
both Fax and Prudence should withhold judgement on any and all beliefs in which they, 
respectively, omitted or included practical considerations in their epistemic deliberations. Given 
that the vast majority of our beliefs will relate in some way or other to our practical interests, we 
might expect that this would require Fax and Prudence to revise the vast majority of their beliefs. 
Of course, it is not a surprise that a case like POLITICIANS could have such global consequences. 
Not only are the differences between Fax’s and Prudence’s norms fundamental, but they are such 
that a follower of Prudence’s norm is likely to disagree widely with the follower of the Fax’s norms. 
After all, except for a lucky few, the world we live in does not consistently track our practical 
desires and interests – thus, someone who provisions their beliefs according to what is in their 
interests is likely to disagree widely with someone who takes, dare I say, a more realistic view on 
things. Given that we might expect there to be wide swathes of disagreement between Fax and 
Prudence, it is not a surprise that a conciliationist response to the disagreement between the pair 
would have similarly wide sceptical consequences. 
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I make these points here, since much of the discussion in the literature on deep disagreement has 
focused on cases similar to POLITICIANS. As we saw in Chapter 1, common examples include 
disagreement between practitioners of alternative and conventional medicine, those who follow 
scientific principles of inquiry and those who follow the authority of religious texts, people on 
opposite sides of the conservative/progressive political divide, and so on. All these, though, are 
examples in which we might expect the rival norms to be both general in scope and cover a range 
of issues wide enough that any sceptical consequences of the disagreement will be near-global. An 
additional feature that is common to these cases, including POLITICIANS – and one that I think 
stems from just the kinds of sceptical worries at issue – is that intuitively at least one party in these 
cases ought to retain both their norms and their beliefs. I.e. These are cases in which, for at least 
one party, the steadfast response to deep disagreement is intuitively the correct response. By 
focusing primarily on such cases, however, there is a danger that we are too easily tempted into 
endorsing, not just the steadfast response in the particular case, but a uniform-steadfast account 
of deep disagreement. Too readily giving into that temptation, I think, would be a mistake. For, 
the differences between those party to deep disagreement are not always so extreme as in 
POLITICIANS or the various other examples listed. Indeed, it strikes me that many of the most 
interesting examples of deep disagreement will be ones in which the disputants are in many ways, 
so to speak, following the same rulebook, yet are embroiled in deep disagreement nonetheless. In 
these cases, it is far less clear that either side to the dispute should stay steadfast. Nonetheless, such 
disagreements can be just as intractable and resolving them just as problematic as the cases typically 
discussed. To illustrate those thoughts, consider the following variant on the by now familiar peer 
disagreement between Doctors Quinn and Zaius: 
DOCTORS-2 
Doctor Quinn is treating a patient with Condition-X. Quinn is trained and experienced in 
the relevant field and has assessed the available case-evidence – including patient history and 
test results. Quinn has also checked and doublechecked the relevant medical guidelines. 
Following her assessment of the case-evidence and guidelines, Quinn believes that the 
patient is more likely to recover under treatment option-A. Quinn then comes to realise that 
a second doctor in the case, Doctor Zaius, having consider the same case-evidence and 
guidelines, believes that the patient is most likely to recover under treatment option-B. 
Quinn has every reason to believe that Zaius is as well trained and experienced as she. 
Whilst Quinn and Zaius based their conflicting beliefs on the same body of clinical and 
scientific evidence, however, there are some curious differences in their underlying approach 
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to that evidence. Quinn and Zaius agreed that the evidence for this case closely fits the 
conditions under which the medical guidelines for Condition-X recommend treatment 
option-B. However, Quinn felt that there was something about the evidence in this case that 
did not sit well with the advice in the guidelines. It was this subjective judgement that guided 
Quinn to her conclude that, given the case-evidence, treatment option A was best. 
Interestingly, Zaius shared Quinn’s feeling about the case-evidence but dismissed this in 
favour of more strictly following the medical guidelines. 
As it happens, Doctor Zaius trained at a top medical college in which students were taught 
to base their medical beliefs only upon ‘objective and high-quality scientific and clinical 
evidence’. In adhering strictly to the recommendations contained within the ‘evidence-
based’ medical guidelines, Zaius was following his training to the letter. Doctor Quinn, on 
the other hand, trained at a top medical college in which students were taught to base their 
medical beliefs primarily upon consideration of high-quality scientific and clinical evidence, 
but to also factor their ‘clinical judgement’ into assessment of each case. Crucially, Quinn’s 
clinical judgement sometimes, though not often, leads her to forming beliefs that differ from 
the relevant guidelines. This is one such case. 
In DOCTORS-2, as per the original example DOCTORS-1, Quinn and Zaius disagree about the 
truth of a narrow set of propositions, i.e. ‘A is best’ and ‘B is best’. Here, though, the disagreement 
is not explained by their having different evidence about the case, referring to different guidelines, 
or by any personal error in performance the assessing the case-evidence and guidelines. Instead 
the roots of the disagreement lie in the difference in how each weighted the case-evidence in light 
of the information in the medical guidelines and their own clinical judgement. What is more, in doing 
so, each was following the general understanding of how medical beliefs ought to be formed that 
they had been exposed to during their medical training. In this respect, I would suggest, the 
difference in how the pair came to their beliefs can be characterized in terms of epistemic norms.  
So, we might say, Quinn follows a norm that can be characterised as: 
If the available clinical and scientific evidence and your clinical judgement together indicate 
that Q, you ought to believe Q; if not, not. 
Zaius follows a norm that can be characterised as: 




Since it is the difference in these norms that explains the disagreement, similarly to 
POLITICIANS, DOCTORS-2 counts as a deep disagreement as I have defined them. 
Unlike POLITICIANS, however, Quinn’s and Zaius’s norms do not prescribe how one ought to 
or ought not to form beliefs in all circumstances – but only when deliberating on the likely truth 
of propositions that fall within the medical domain. In this respect, then, we might say that this is 
a domain specific deep disagreement.  Also, in contrast to POLITICIANS, Quinn and Zaius would be 
effective peers were this an ordinary disagreement. After all, apart from the additional wrinkle 
concerning the difference in norms, this case is identical to DOCTORS-1. Furthermore, I would 
suggest, given the content of their respective norms, this is much as we would expect. There are 
two aspects to this. Firstly, though allowing space for clinical judgement, Quinn’s norm still 
mandates that one place weight on the clinical and scientific evidence. Secondly, and more 
significantly, for Quinn to competently follow her norm, she will have had to have honed her 
clinical judgement through medical training and practice. More specifically, she will have honed it 
– even if not explicitly – against the standards and norms operative in the medical community. 
These will include the standards explicitly formulated in medical guidelines, as well as those 
explicitly or implicitly instantiated in the practice of other qualified medical professionals, including 
someone like Zaius. Thus, one would not expect a competent follower of Quinn’s norms to widely 
disagree on medical matters with a competent follower of Zaius’s norms. 
What is the significance of these differences? 
I would suggest that the possibility for deep disagreements that are (i) domain specific and (ii) 
between interlocutors who we might otherwise expect to be effective peers, undercuts the 
motivations that cases like POLITICIANS provide for a uniform steadfast response to deep 
disagreement. This raises the question: Is it possible to that the appropriate response for Fax in 
POLITICIANS is to be steadfast, whilst the appropriate response for Quinn and Zaius in 
DOCTORS-2 is to be conciliatory?  
Lending credence to this possibility are two further features of this case. For one thing, a 
conciliationist response to a domain specific deep disagreement – even granting the principle of 
Total Revision – would not have the global sceptical consequences of a case like POLITICIANS. 
The anti-sceptical motivation for a uniform steadfast view of deep disagreement stems from the 
thought that, if all cases of deep disagreement are like POLITICIANS, then, given the global 
sceptical consequences of conciliating in such cases, allowing that any deep disagreements require 
a conciliatory response would be to cede the mountain to the sceptic. However, the possibility of 
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domain-specific deep disagreements undercuts this anti-sceptical motivation. Granted the 
consequences of conciliating for, say, Quinn and Zaius would still be extensive and would still 
entail revising all beliefs formed via the respective norms – but they would not be global. Thus, 
we might allow the possibility that the conciliatory response is appropriate in some cases without 
that entailing that all cases of deep disagreement between effective peers have globally sceptical 
consequences. 
For another thing, the possibility that the normative perspective of those party to a deep 
disagreement might be sufficiently close that they could view each other as effective peers 
undercuts the intuition fuelled by cases like POLITICIANS that at least one party to the 
disagreement ought not to harbour any doubts about their practices. In cases like POLITICIANS, 
it is appealing to think that someone in Fax’s positions should not doubt her practices for the 
reason that, by her lights, Prudence is unlikely to seem in anyway a competent agent. But such 
intuitions do not hold up in a case like DOCTORS-2. As noted, in this case, despite their 
conducting their medical practices according to conflicting epistemic norms, there is no reason to 
suppose that either party (in lieu of specific evidence about the differences in their epistemic 
practices) would view the other party as incompetent. But that being so, the intuition that, say, 
Quinn ought not to question herself in respect to the practices by which she came to believe ‘A is 
best’ simply because Zaius follows different norms has little traction at all. 
In respect to cases like these, then, I think we need to take seriously the thought that the steadfast 
response will not be appropriate in all cases of deep disagreement. Instead, as I shall argue in the 
next two sections, we would do better to endorse a non-uniform account of deep disagreement. 
More specifically, I will argue that we can extend the Higher-Order Trust based approach to 
ordinary disagreement developed in the previous two chapters to also accommodate deep 
disagreement. To do so, it will pay first to consider in more detail what it means to say that a 
disagreement is explained by the disputants following different norms. 
6.3 Epistemic norms as social practices 
In this section, I discuss two aspects of epistemic norms and norm-following. First, I suggest that 
the epistemic norms that an agent follows can be understood in terms of the discussion of 
epistemic practices and self-trust developed in the previous chapter. Second, I forward an 
explanation of how most of us engage in such practices. 
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 Epistemic norms and epistemic practices 
As described in the previous chapter, the term ‘epistemic practices’ refers to the gamut of ways in 
which we come to acquire beliefs. For any belief that an agent holds, we saw, there will be some 
practice or practices upon which that agent relied in coming to hold and continuing to hold that 
belief. As such, any epistemic practice is apt for appraisal in terms of how reliably it leads to true 
over false beliefs. As I shall discuss in more detail below, to say that an agent follows a certain 
epistemic norm is to say that that agent somehow regulates the relevant epistemic actions in 
accordance with that norm. For our purposes, epistemic actions are actions that, in some way 
fundamental to their nature, contribute to achieving epistemic aims – the most fundamental of 
which are acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. What this means, however, is that an 
agent’s following a certain epistemic norm can be considered amongst that agent’s epistemic 
practices. This is most obvious for norms of belief. In so far as some norm encodes conditions 
under which an agent ought, ought not, or is permitted to form beliefs in a given domain, following 
that norm will be a good epistemic practice just in so far as following the prescriptions of that 
norm will reliably yield true and not false beliefs. Though less directly, we can say similar things 
about other kinds of epistemic norms. Norms of trust will be epistemically good in so far as agents 
who follow those norms reliably trust reliable sources of testimony. Norms of inquiry will be 
epistemically good in so far as agents that follow those norms reliably follow strategies of inquiry 
that reliably yield truths over falsehoods. And so on. 
Following these points let’s say that: 
If N is an epistemic norm and S follows N, then, N is amongst S’s epistemic practices. 
If, though, following-N is amongst S’s epistemic practices, the general considerations about 
reliance and epistemic self-trust in the previous chapter will apply to S’s following-N. So, we can 
add: 
(1) If S forms justified beliefs via N, then, outside of contexts of doubt, S is entitled 
to rely on N 
And, 
(2) If S is in a context of doubt vis-a-vis N, S will be rationally permitted to rely on N, 
iff N has some form of epistemic self-trust in respect to her following-N. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, epistemic self-trust comes in two forms: predictive self-trust, which 
is the combination of reliance and belief that the relevant practices are reliable; and affective self-trust, 
159 
 
which we characterised as the combination of reliance and optimism about one’s reliance on the 
relevant practices. Crucially, one ought not to trust one’s practices in either way come-what-may. 
Thus, we can say, in so far as the attitude of predictive self-trust is belief: 
(3) If S is in a context of doubt vis-à-vis N, S will be rationally permitted to rely on N 
via predictive self-trust, iff S justifiably believes N is reliable. 
Importantly, we saw that in contexts of doubt, one cannot justifiably come to predictive self-trust, 
or justifiably continue to hold predictive self-trust, by way of epistemically circular justification. 
Thus, we can also add, as for other epistemic practices: 
(4) If S is in a context of doubt vis-à-vis N, and S has no non-circular justification for 
believing N, S will be rationally permitted to continue relying on N, iff N has well-
placed affective self-trust in respect to her following-N. 
I will return to the topic of what it might mean to say that one has well-placed affective self-trust 
in the face of doubts about one’s epistemic norms in 6.4. For now, however, I want to consider 
the question of how it is that most of us come to subscribe to and follow the norms that we do. 
 Epistemic norms as social practices 
What I want to suggest in this section is that ordinarily – though, not necessarily – we can 
understand an agent’s practice of following some epistemic norm in terms of their internalization 
of socially sanctioned ways of regulating their epistemic activities. In other words, I want to suggest 
that norm-following should be understood not only as an epistemic practice, but as a social 
epistemic practice. 
The understanding of what it is to follow an epistemic norm that I shall forward in this section 
owes much to responses to the so-called ‘rule-following problems’ found in the various writings 
of Wittgenstein that posit a social or communitarian dimension to rules or rule-following. This 
includes positions forwarded by Robert Brandom (1998), Susan Hurley (1989), Saul Kripke (1982)  
(1982), John McDowell (1984), and Crispin Wright (1980).72 Rule-following problems, we might 
note, have the potential to afflict many domains. However, the bulk of contemporary discussion 
has followed Wittgenstein’s concern with the metaphysics of linguistic meaning. Before 
proceeding, then, I want to be entirely clear that I am not aiming in this section to forward any 
 
72 For Wittgenstein’s own remarks, see especially (Wittgenstein 1997 §138-242). For an excellent summary of this 
debate see McGinn (2013) For alternatives to communitarian responses to the rule-following remarks see Blackburn 
(1984) and Boghossian (2008b: 9-51) 
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metaphysical claims about epistemic norms or what it means to follow an epistemic norm. For 
that reason, I shall keep my engagement with the rule-following literature to a minimum. Rather 
less ambitiously, what I shall suggest is that the best explanation of how the ordinary agent follows 
a particular norm will make reference to that agent’s social context and upbringing. As we shall see 
later, this is directly relevant to discussion of deep disagreement. 
The first point to emphasise is one that is widely noted in the rule-following literature. Simply put, 
to follow a rule is more than to conform to a rule. My answers to the questions on an algebra test 
might, for instance, correspond precisely to the answers I would have got if I had successfully 
followed the rules of algebra when doing the test – even though I guessed all of those answers. If 
my answers are the product of guesswork, though, my answers are not the product of my following 
the relevant rules. Since it is possible for an agent’s actions to conform to a rule without following 
that rule, rule-following cannot consist of mere conformance. The natural suggestion, then, is that 
following a rule requires that one in some way regulates one’s actions in accordance with what one 
takes to be the prescriptions of that rule. Since we can understand epistemic norms in terms of 
rule-like propositions or imperatives, the same would apply to epistemic norms. 
Taking up this suggestion, then, the question is what kind of regulation is necessary for rule-
following, or, more specifically, for following epistemic norms. 
One answer we might consider is that following rules consists of one’s acting on an explicit 
intention to follow that rule. I.e. If I follow the rule ‘If C, then !’, when I do , I do so because 
I intend to follow the rule ‘IF C, then, !’ and because I have judged the conditions specified in C 
to obtain. Following Boghossian (2008a), we can call this model the ‘Intention View’. As 
Boghossian points out, rule-following on this view – and so the following of epistemic norms – 
takes the form of inference. As he explains: 
To act on this intention, it would seem, I am going to have to think, even if very fleetingly 
and not very consciously that its antecedent is satisfied. The rule itself, after all, has a 
conditional content […] And it is very hard to see how such a conditional intention could 
guide my action without my coming to have the beliefs that its antecedent is satisfied 
(Boghossian 2008a: 127). 
There are a number of problems with the Intention View so understood. 
First, as Boghossian points out, inference – including a practical inference of the kind Boghossian 
ascribes to the Intention View – is a paradigmatically rule-following practice. Thus, if all instances 
of rule-following involve an inference as to how to follow the rules in question, all instances of 
inference must involve an inference as to how to follow the respective rules of inference. But, 
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Boghossian argues, that way regress beckons. For instance, on the Intention View, even prior to 
discovering her disagreement with Prudence, Fax’s following her norms in coming to believe ‘the 
public don’t trust either of us’ would necessarily involve an inference from her intention to follow 
those norms, her beliefs about the content of those norms, and her beliefs about the circumstances 
she finds herself in. Since inference involves rule-following, however, that inference would 
necessarily involve Fax’s making a further inference from her intentions and beliefs in respect to 
the rules of inference and the circumstances she finds herself in. But, again, that inference would 
necessarily involve a further inference. And so on. As Boghossian puts it, ‘the Intention View 
would look to be hopeless: under its terms following any rule requires embarking upon a vicious 
infinite regress in which we succeed in following no rule.’ (Boghossian 2008a: 128) 
Any defence of the Intention View must grapple with Boghossian’s regress argument. Putting aside 
the question of whether there is a good response to that argument, however, there are also issues 
with how well the Intention View applied specifically to epistemic norms is a realistic account of 
how must of us go about our epistemic business. The issues I have in mind should be familiar,and 
echo points made in the discussion of how best to characterize deep disagreement in Chapter 1 
and the discussion of epistemic practices in the Chapter 5.  
In a nutshell, most of us do not have conscious beliefs about our norms, nor would it seem that 
most of our beliefs (or other epistemic actions) are the product of reasoning from such beliefs. 
But this would seem to be just what the Intention View requires for it to be so that a belief in the 
product of an agent’s following epistemic norms. On the Intention View, then, very few of the 
beliefs that people hold will be the product of their following epistemic norms. On a similar line 
of thought, as I noted in Chapter 1, identifying precisely what one’s epistemic norms are is a 
difficult (if not impossible) theoretical task. The Intention View of rule-following, however, would 
appear to require just that kind of specificity. I.e. I could hardly make a practical inference as to 
how to act in any given circumstance from the belief that ‘I follow and ought to follow some norm 
or other to do with evidence’. To ground the kinds of inference in question, my beliefs about that 
norm would have to offer some specification of the conditions under which I ought to, ought not 
to, or am permitted to take it that I have sufficient evidence to justify belief. Few, if any of us, 
however, can be expected to have such well-specified beliefs about our epistemic norms. Again, 
then, on the Intention View, few of us would have beliefs that are the product of our following 
epistemic norms. Presuming that many of our beliefs and other epistemic actions are formed or 
performed in ways that can be characterised in terms of our following epistemic norms, then, the 
Intention View would appear to be thoroughly off-track as an explanation of our ordinary practices 
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of following epistemic norms. Thus, irrespective of whether there is a good response to 
Boghossian’s regress argument, some other explanation of how we follow norms is required.  
What I would like to suggest is that, for most of us at least, the regulation of beliefs in accordance 
with epistemic norms can be explained by our having been inculcated into normatively loaded 
ways of apprehending features of the world via our exposure to the epistemic practices of the 
communities, and members of the communities, of which we are a part. We might call this an 
‘inculturation’ model of norm-following. Precedent for this can be found in a wide range of 
literature. This includes the aforementioned social practice based responses to Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on rule-following, John McDowell’s (1978, 1979) related work on the moral virtues, 
Miranda Fricker’s (2007) work on testimony and epistemic injustice, and Sripada and Stich’s (2012) 
work on the psychology of social and moral norms. Given the breadth of this literature, I shall not 
endeavour to lay out a systematic account of this understanding of norms and norm acquisition. 
Rather, I draw on some of the aforementioned work to explore the features of norms and norm-
following that I take to have significance when it comes to questions of self-trust in contexts of 
deep disagreement.  
As I conceive it an ‘inculturation’ in norms typically consists of an agent’s exposure to how others 
conduct their epistemic practices. As the agent observes and interacts with others in the 
community to which they belong, they witness how those others attribute authority, who they trust 
and don’t trust, under which conditions people (appear to) form beliefs, make assertions, offer 
testimony, and so on. Immersed in this stream of experience, and later becoming an active 
participant in it, the agent comes to see these practices as the way things are done and, so, develop 
a sensibility about and sensitivity to the epistemically salient features of different situations. Fricker 
offers a useful description of what I have in mind here in her account of how we develop a 
(virtuous) testimonial sensibility: 
[W]e should think of the virtuous hearer’s sensibility as formed by way of participation in, 
and observation of, practices of testimonial exchange. There is, in the first instance, a 
passive social inheritance, and then a sometimes-passive-sometimes-active individual input 
from the hearer’s own experience. Together the individual and collective streams of input 
are what explain how our normal unreflective reception of what people tell us is 
conditioned by a great range of collateral experience—our informal background ‘theory’ 
of socially situated trustworthiness (Fricker 2007: 83). 
A crucial element of this developmental process is that the agent witnesses, not only the patterns 
by which individuals conduct their own epistemic affairs, but also the responses to those activities 
by others – and especially the affective dimensions of those responses. Just as significant, for 
instance, as seeing who and when individuals trust, is seeing the association of reactive attitudes 
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such as resentment and betrayal with failures to make good on that trust, and gratitude when it is 
acted on.73 Similarly for other epistemic actions. If an individual consistently fails to form beliefs 
or make assertions that reflect the available evidence (or whatever else is considered epistemically 
salient in the community in question) they are likely, not only to be corrected, but to be subject to 
criticism. 74  The further their actions stray from the norms, or the greater the practical 
consequences of their doing so, the harsher and more censorious this criticism is likely to become. 
These experiences, I suggest, provide the catalyst for the development of the agent’s sense of the 
way things are into a genuinely normative and genuinely epistemic sensibility. Thus, as we come 
to inhabit these communal practices of praise and blame, so too we come to see compliance with 
the associated patterns of conduct, not just as something that people do, but something that 
people, including the agent, ought to do. Sripada and Stich describe this in the moral context in 
terms of the internalization of norms – where internalization is a term of art from anthropology 
and sociology to describe ‘a characteristic style of motivation in which the individual values 
compliance with moral rules even when there is no possibility of sanction from an external source’ 
(Sripada and Stich 2012: 292). As Sripada and Stich point out, the internalization hypothesis 
explains why, once indoctrinated into a rule, ‘people exhibit a lifelong pattern of highly reliable 
compliance with the rule’ (Sripada and Stich 2012: 292).  
Importantly, the internalization of epistemic norms need not require, nor rule out, a role for more 
deliberate forms of instruction. Instruction, both generally and in specific domains, is undoubtedly 
an important part off both how we learn to reason, inquire and so on, and of how epistemic actions 
come to be coordinated across a community. Paralleling a suggestion from McDowell’s account 
of the moral virtues, however, we might note that much, if not all, of our instruction in the whys 
and wherefores of how to think comes, not in the form of explicit explanation of the relevant 
norms, but a more subtle combination of exhortation, suggestion, and ostension. So, McDowell 
writes: 
[O]ne exploits contrivances similar to those one exploits in other areas where the task is 
to back up the injunction "See it like this": helpful juxtapositions of cases, descriptions 
with carefully chosen terms and carefully placed emphasis, and the like (McDowell 1978). 
Related to the point about instruction, that we are inculcated into normative epistemic practices 
does not preclude the role of explicit beliefs about how others conduct their epistemic practices 
 
73 See Baier (1986), Jones (1996), Holton (1994), and Faulkner (2011) on the reactive attitudes and interpersonal trust. 
74 Sripada and Stich suggest that the evidence from anthropology and experimental economics indicates, not only a 
reliable connection between norm violations and punitive reactions, but that motivations to censure norm violators 
are often ‘truly intrinsic’ (Sripada and Stich 2012: 294) 
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and how they are received in a wider social context – nor indeed explicit consideration of what 
conditions under which one ought to form beliefs, make assertions, ask questions, and so on. 
Indeed, space for reflection, and especially critical reflection, upon the practices we inherit from 
the communities we are embedded within would appear to be essential to the possibility that those 
communities might develop and evolve. Likewise, it is essential to the idea that our practices 
correspond to epistemic norms and not mere patterns of indoctrination. As Fricker makes the point 
in reference to testimonial sensibility, ‘The claim that testimonial sensibility is a capacity of reason 
crucially depends on its capacity to adapt in this way, for otherwise it would be little more than a 
dead-weight social conditioning that looked more  like a threat to the justification of a hearer’s 
responses than a source of that justification’ (Fricker 2007: 84). 
Finally, the model I have suggested of how we come to internalize epistemic norms extends also 
to how we implement those norms when acquired. Once again echoing aspects of McDowell’s 
account of the moral virtues and Fricker’s account of testimony, we might describe this in terms 
of the agent having acquired a normatively loaded way of apprehending75 situations. So, McDowell 
writes: 
In moral upbringing what one learns is not to behave in conformity with rules of conduct, 
but to see situations in a special light, as constituting reasons for acting; this perceptual 
capacity, once acquired can be exercised in complex novel circumstances, not necessarily 
capable of being foreseen and legislated for by a codifier of the conduct required by virtue 
(McDowell 1998: 85). 
And Fricker, 
The virtuous hearer does not arrive at her credibility judgement by applying pre-set 
principles of any kind, for there are none precise or comprehensive enough to do the job. 
She ‘just sees’ her interlocutor in a certain light, and responds to his word accordingly 
(Fricker 2007: 73). 
On this understanding applied to the topic of epistemic norms, just as we might come to subscribe 
to certain norms without explicitly reasoning upon their content, beliefs formed via norm-
following do not necessarily depend upon inference from intentions and beliefs about one’s norms 
and the situations one finds oneself in. The perceptual analogy helps us to see how this might be.76 
For, typically at least, the beliefs we form via perception do not involve reasoning from beliefs 
about the reliability of one’s perception faculties and one’s perceptual experiences. Likewise, on 
 
75 I prefer apprehending to feeling, seeing, or sensing since norm-following is clearly not perceiving in a literal sense. 
76 Arguably, my reliance on my perceptual faculties to form beliefs is also structured by my internalization of relevant 
epistemic norms. I don’t take a stance on this matter here – the comparison between perceptual beliefs and norm-
acquired beliefs in the text should be seen as illustrative, rather than contrastive. 
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this analogy, the beliefs we form via following our epistemic norms, typically at least, come about 
through, to use Fricker’s terms, ‘spontaneous and unreflective’ responses to consideration of the 
circumstances in which one finds oneself. So, for instance, considering the question ‘what is in 
front of me?’, I turn my attention to the object in front of me. I have the visual experience of a 
grey table, in so doing, I come to believe ‘there is a grey table in front of me’. Considering the 
question ‘how many books are on that table?’, I see that there are two books on the right side, two 
on the left, and none in the middle, in so doing, I come to believe ‘there are four books on the 
table in front of me’. In the second instance, my belief is formed, in part, because I have 
internalized epistemic norms (and rules of mathematics) – but I need not consciously consider 
those norms and rules when I form the belief. Just as I don’t consciously reflect upon the reliability 
of my perceptions when I form the belief in the first instance.  Instead, we might say that in 
considering the question ‘how many books are on the table’ I have primed myself to pay attention 
to those features of the situation that may correspond to the application conditions of the relevant 
norms (and mathematical rules). When I see those conditions to apply, I respond as those norms 
prescribe.  This way of apprehending things is so ingrained into my way of thinking, relying on 
myself in respect to it is automatic.  
There are four benefits to this account. 
First, it explains how the majority of people come to follow particular norms. Second, it explains 
how individual followers of norms regulate their actions in accordance with what they take to be 
the prescriptions of that norm. Third, it does so whilst explaining the normativity of that practice. 
Fourth and most significantly, it achieves this without requiring that agent’s realise what norms 
they follow (or even that they do follow norms), or explicitly reason from that realisation when 
determining how they ought to act, epistemically speaking, in different circumstances.  
At this point it is important to reiterate that what this account does not offer are necessary and 
sufficient conditions of what it is for something to be an epistemic norm, or of what is required 
to follow an epistemic norm. This is important, both generally and in respect to the discussion of 
deep disagreement. If it were necessary and sufficient that norms correspond to social practices, 
there would be no facts outside of those social practices by which different norms could be said 
to be defective as ways of acquiring justification.  For a disagreement to be deep, though, it must 
be so that those party to the disagreement have followed their respective norms competently. (I.e. 
If the justificatory structure of one party’s beliefs is explained by some other flaw in their reasoning, 
the disagreement cannot be said to be explained by the difference in norms.) But, if there are no 
facts outside of the relevant social practices by which norms could be said to be defective, and 
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those party to a deep disagreement have followed those norms competently, then, there will be no 
defects in the justificatory structure of any of the parties’ beliefs. Thus, on an account of norms 
such that they just are social practices, deep disagreements would be a kind of epistemically 
faultless disagreement. This I take it runs against intuitions about both the paradigmatic cases of 
disagreement such as POLITICIANS and, perhaps more so, domain-specific cases like 
DOCTORS-2. For, if as was the suggestion, the steadfast response to disagreement is not always 
the appropriate response – and in some cases some parties may have to abstain from their 
respective norms – then, it cannot be so that these are faultless disagreements. Correspondingly, 
were the account given to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for norm-following, there 
would be no normative problem of deep disagreement; 
In response to this line of thought, I return to the point with which I began this discussion. I.e. 
that the explanation given here is only intended to explain how the ordinary human being, despite 
their epistemic limitations, can acquire a sense of how they ought to conduct their epistemic 
affairs.77  As discussed earlier, however, I take it that there are moments in which members of a 
community – even one that is isolated from others – are able, through their own reflections and 
reasoning, to apprehend supposed shortcomings in the practices of their wider community and 
having done so, to come to new and purportedly better ways of doing things. And, for that to be 
the case, we have to deny that norms are always and entirely socially dependent. The consequence 
of this is that this account does not, and indeed cannot, ground any claims about the metaphysical 
nature of norms/norm-following. Once we lower our metaphysical ambitions in this way, 
however, we are able to retain the intuition that there are significant normative issues associated 
with the possibility of deep disagreement. For whilst most of us will depend upon our social 
experiences when it comes to learning how we ought to conduct our epistemic affairs, that is not 
to say that norms just are social practices, or that individuals cannot in exceptional circumstances 
come upon better ways of doing things. Similarly, the possibility of taking a critical stance on one’s 
epistemic norms, despite the unconscious way in which those norms are acquired and 
implemented, allows us to retain the intuition that at times those party to deep disagreement may 
be held to account for their failure to respond to the possibility that their own norms are in some 
 
77 Compare to Kripke’s (2002) discussion of rule-following, in which the metaphysical claims are advanced via 




way defective.78 With that said, let’s finally return to the consider the question of how we ought to 
respond to deep disagreement. 
6.4 Responding to deep disagreement: The 
Higher-Order Trust approach extended 
Now that we have a general account of what it means to follow an epistemic norm, we can return 
to ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. As noted previously, a distinctive feature of 
deep disagreement is that disputants may be effective peers just because they follow different 
epistemic norms, whilst as the same time not having the kind of evidence that would enable them 
to recognise this. The suggestion at the beginning of this thesis, and around which much of this 
discussion has been framed, was that the answer to the question ‘How ought one to respond to 
the realisation of disagreement?’ cannot require the agent to place significance upon facts to which 
the agent does not have access. If, then, one is not evidentially in a position to recognise that one’s 
interlocutors are one’s effective peers, or that one’s interlocutor’s are one’s effective peers because 
they do not share one’s epistemic norms, one cannot and ought not to place significance upon 
those facts in responding to the realisation of disagreement. In other words, in such cases, one 
ought to respond to the realisation of disagreement as if it were an ordinary disagreement. This 
being so, the Higher-Order Trust approach to ordinary disagreement can be straightforwardly 
extended to at least some cases of deep disagreement. 
Let’s say then, that: 
If S1 disagrees with S2 about Q and that disagreement is explained by S1 following norm N1 
and S2 following norm N2, so long as S1 does not have evidence that the disagreement is 
deep, S ought to continue following N1. Thus, on the presumption N1 is good: 
 
78 Compare this point to Fricker’s discussion of how we might ground a feeling of ‘disappointment in resentment’ 
towards the character Herbert Greenleaf, in Anthony Mingella’s ‘The Talented Mr Ripley, in his failure to rise above 
the biases and prejudices of the historical moment in reception of testimony from his daughter-in-law Marge: ‘Any 
such disappointment is grounded in the conviction that it was historically possible, in our newly extended sense, for 
him to have made a better credibility judgement: even Greenleaf could have judged exceptionally. […] By judging 
merely routinely in these heightened circumstances, he does something disappointing that it seems appropriate to hold 
him responsible for in some way; but the sense in which his moral and epistemic character is besmirched by his failure 
to rise above the routine is not enough to warrant anything as strong as blame. One cannot be blamed for making a 
routine moral judgement. But one can none the less be held responsible for making a merely routine judgement in a 
context in which a more exceptional alternative is, as a matter of historical possibility, just around the corner’ (Fricker 
2007: 105).    
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(1) If S2 would not be S1’s effective peer were the disagreement ordinary, S1 ought to 
favour whichever party S1 ought to believe has the relative advantage according to 
N1. 
(2) If S2 would be S1’s effective peer were the disagreement ordinary, S1 will be justified 
in believing Q iff S1 has well-placed affective self-trust. If not, S1 ought to revise 
her belief Q accordingly. 
With this much said, we can cash out the suggestion from 6.2 that in some cases of deep 
disagreement, the ‘mixed response’ to deep disagreement will sometimes be appropriate. For, as 
per (2), if S1 does not have well-placed affective self-trust, S1 will lose whatever justification she 
had for believing Q. Yet, at the same time, since she has no evidence that the disagreement is deep, 
she will retain any entitlement to follow N1. To put it in the terms I suggested earlier, then, in this 
kind of case, the realisation of disagreement places the disputants in a position that requires trust 
in their epistemic practices in general but does not require trust in their norms. In such a position, 
the mixed-response to deep disagreement may be the appropriate response.  
I suggested earlier that the majority of deep disagreements will be cases in which the disputants do 
not realise that their disagreement is deep and do nothing epistemically wrong in failing to realise 
that. Thus, in the majority of deep disagreements the appropriate response to the disagreement at 
the level of belief will be the same as if that disagreement were an ordinary disagreement. At the 
same time, the appropriate response at the level of norms will typically be to stick by one’s norms. 
In other words, for the majority of cases, either the steadfast or mixed-response to deep 
disagreement will be appropriate.  
Whilst we might suppose that the majority of deep disagreements will be ones in which those party 
to the disagreement are not aware of its nature, however, this will not always be the case.  
To illustrate, suppose that in the world described in DOCTORS-2 it is a matter of live controversy 
within the medical domain as to what role – if any – clinical judgement ought to play in the 
deliberations of medical practitioners. As a highly trained doctor, we might expect Quinn to be 
aware of this controversy. Suppose also that Quinn and Zaius continue to confer about the source 
of their disagreement and discover the details about their different training and the different ways 
in which each responded to the (shared) feeling that something was off with the evidence. Given 
this additional evidence – combined with the fact that prior to discovering her disagreement with 
Zaius, Quinn was justified in believing Zaius to be competent – in this situation it will no longer 
be reasonable for Quinn to infer that the disagreement is explained by some contextual or personal 
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failing on her or Zaius’s part. Instead, it would seem more reasonable that Quinn suppose that the 
disagreement is explained by her and Zaius’s differing stances on the wider controversy about the 
relevance of clinical judgement. Thus, we might say that in this situation, unlike DOCTORS-2 and 
POLITICIANS, Quinn would have reason to believe that her disagreement with Zaius is explained 
by the kind of systematic difference in practices that we might characterise in terms of epistemic 
norms. Call this case, DOCTORS-3. In DOCTORS-3, in effect, Quinn ought to recognise that 
her disagreement with Zaius is a deep disagreement.  
In light of cases like this, then, let us say that disputants in this kind of situation are recognized peers 
in respect to deep disagreement. More specifically, disputants will be recognized peers when the 
following conditions are met: 
I. They are engaged in deep disagreement 
II. They are effective peers in respect to that disagreement. 
III. They recognise that it is a deep disagreement 
As per the points about DOCTORS-3, we might expect these conditions to be met more often in 
cases where the relevant norms are domain-specific, or relatively close in content. However, this 
is not to say that it cannot be the case that those engaged in more general and wider deep 
disagreements such as POLITICIANS are recognized peers. Indeed, much of the motivation for 
discussing deep disagreements would appear to stem from the fact that theoreticians at least do 
consider disagreement between scientific and religious communities, conventional and alternative 
medicine, left- and right-wing political groups, and so on, to be well explained by differences in 
epistemic principles, commitments, and norms. If the theoretician is in a position to realise this, 
however, there is no reason in principle that those engaged in such disagreements might not also 
realise this. Indeed, since the theoreticians in question are rarely neutral on such issues, we might 
take it as a given that at least some of those party to such disagreements have already realised this! 
As a consequence of this possibility, and despite the points about the majority of deep 
disagreement, then, we still need an explanation of how recognized peers ought to respond to the 
realisation of disagreements between recognized peers. 
The first thing to consider is the significance that the status of recognized peerhood’has upon the 
kind of defeater one might acquire in case of deep disagreement.  
In this light, note first that, as per the discussion of higher-order evidence in Chapter 4, any 
defeating higher-order evidence disputants might acquire where they are not in a position to 
recognise that their disagreement is deep (e.g. in DOCTORS-2) will typically be in the form of a 
170 
 
contextual undercutting defeater – i.e. the same kind of defeater typically acquired in case of 
ordinary disagreement with an effective peer. This is because, without evidence that the 
disagreement is deep, it will typically be the case that the best available explanation of the 
disagreement will be some localised performance error, or other feature specific to the context. In 
contrast, when disputants are recognized peers, the higher-order evidence they acquire on realising 
the disagreement will be in the form of a general undercutting defeater. This is because evidence 
that gives one reason to doubt the norms one followed in coming to believe Q, is evidence that 
one may have come to believe Q because of a general and non-context specific flaw in one’s epistemic 
practices. Since the evidence that recognized peers have that their disagreement is deep effectively 
rules out other explanations of the disagreement, then, it will constitute a general undercutting 
defeater for whatever justification they had in respect to the disputed beliefs. Moreover, given the 
nature of general undercutting defeaters, that higher-order evidence will be a defeater, not only for 
the justification they have for the beliefs under dispute in the current context, it will be a defeater 
for the justification they have for any other beliefs formed via the contested norms. In other words, 
in lieu of a defeater-defeater, not only does the realisation of deep disagreement with a recognized 
peer mandate the conciliatory response to deep disagreement – but, it will also have the sceptical 
consequences we saw to be associated with the principle of Total Revision. As we saw, these 
consequences are likely to be (at best) extensive if the norms in question are domain specific, near-
global if the norms in question are fully general.  
If recognized peers are not to face the sceptical consequences of Total Revision, then, they must 
have some kind of defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence they acquire on realising the 
disagreement. And here it is crucial that one’s epistemic norms count amongst one’s epistemic 
practices. For that being so, reflecting the discussion in 6.3, we are able to extend the Higher-
Order Trust approach to cases of deep disagreement between recognized peers, just as we were 
able to extend it to other cases of deep disagreement between. Thus, we can say: 
If S1 disagrees with S2 about Q, that disagreement is explained by S1 following norm N1 
and S2 following norm N2, and S2 is S1’s recognized peer, S1 will be justified in believing Q 
iff S1 has well-founded affective self-trust. If not, S1 ought to abstain from N1 and so, in 
lieu of some other source of justification, ought to revise her belief Q accordingly, as well 
any other beliefs she has formed via following N1. 
Why only if S1 has affective self-trust? Because, recognized peerhood entails effective peerhood. 
Thus, S1 will have no independent reason to believe that she has the relative epistemic advantage 
over S2 (and be in a position to recognise this) As such, S1 will have no first-order defeater-defeaters 
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for the higher-order evidence – including any non-circular justification for believing that N1 is true. 
Thus, as per the discussion in Chapter 5, S1 will only have a defeater-defeater if she has well-
founded affective self-trust. More specifically, since the doubts induced by the higher-order 
evidence concern N1, S1’s affective self-trust must pertain to her continued reliance on N1. 
Whether or not, then, the discovery of deep disagreement has the sceptical consequences 
associated with Total Revision will depend on whether the agent in question has well-placed 
affective self-trust. In the previous chapter, we saw that there are two components to this. First, if 
an agent has affective self-trust toward some practice of theirs, that self-trust will be well-placed 
only if that practice is a source of justification.79 Correspondingly, where affective self-trust is 
toward their following some epistemic norm, it will be well-placed only if following that norm 
leads to justified beliefs. Second, and more fundamentally, affective self-trust must be available to 
the agent – if, not, then whatever attitude they have toward the relevant practices, it will not be 
one of affective self-trust. It is in respect to the question of availability that the discussion of the 
nature of epistemic norms in 6.3 becomes relevant. We saw that there is not a principled account 
we can give as to when affective self-trust is available. However, we were able to pick out its key 
determiners. Thus, I suggested that the availability of affective self-trust in cases of ordinary peer 
disagreement will be dependent upon the circumstances of the disagreement and the character of 
the individual epistemic agent. What I would suggest here is that that the social character of one’s 
norm-following practices introduces a third element to the mix. Correspondingly, a further 
determiner of the availability of affective self-trust in case of deep disagreement between 
recognized peers will (at least for the ordinary agent) be the wider social contexts within which the 
disputants were enculturated into their respective norms – as well as each agent’s relationship to 
those social contexts.  What I want to suggest in the concluding paragraphs of this chapter, is that 
the social nature of our norm-following practices can make all the difference to how we ought to 
respond to deep disagreement with a recognized peer. As we with the availability of affective self-
trust in cases of ordinary peer disagreement, I shall endeavour to illustrate this notion by reference 
to examples. POLITICIANS and DINERS-3 will do nicely.  
Take POLITICIANS. In this case, as we saw earlier, the difference between Fax’s and Prudence’s 
norms is both fundamental and wide. For that reason, I argued, we would not expect Fax and 
Prudence to be effective peers even in the ordinary sense. Given this divide, though, I would 
suggest that it would be exceptionally difficult for Fax to see even the idea of Prudence’s way of 
 
79 To refer back to the terms in the previous chapter, we might understand this as a part of what it is for self-trust to 
be well calibrated. Self-trust in practices that are not a source of justification is poorly calibrated self-trust. 
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reasoning as a genuine alternative to her own way of reasoning. To do so, Fax would have to 
overlook the evidence she would otherwise have to view Prudence as incompetent and somehow 
inhabit a radically different way of apprehending the world than her own. Such an exceptional 
imaginative leap, it strikes me, could not be achieved merely by reflecting on any evidence she 
might have that the disagreement is deep. Rather, much as I have suggested we typically come to 
internalize our own norms through exposure to the practices of others, this kind of leap would 
typically require an agent to have a similar stock of experiences with followers of the rival norm 
on which to draw. Given the divide between the pairs’ norms, this seems extremely unlikely. For 
the kinds of experience required are one’s that involve the recognition of epistemic authority, 
relationships of dependence and trust, cooperation and collaboration. In other words, just the kind 
of relationships that depend upon the presumption of competence in others that we would not 
expect to obtain between followers of Fax’s and Prudence’s norms.  
In a case like POLITICIANS, then, my suggestion is that the social dimensions of deep 
disagreement can have a kind of inverted significance in respect to the availability of affective self-
trust. For, where the difference in norms is wide and deep enough, the disputants are unlikely to 
have the stock of social engagements and interactions with followers of the other norms that would 
spur the exceptional leap of imagination needed to see the rival norms as genuinely epistemic 
alternatives to their own. And, if one cannot see the rival norms as a genuine alternative to one’s 
own, it seems that recognition that the disagreement is deep will fail to exert any influence upon 
one’s inclination to trust one’s own norms. Though Fax may be in a context of realisation, we 
might say, she will not be pushed into a context of doubt. Thus, if the agent would be inclined to 
trust their norms in other contexts, so we would expect that trust also to be available in a deep 
disagreement of this kind. And that being so, steadfastness as a response to the realisation of 
disagreement will be a rational and psychological possibility. 
As noted toward the beginning of the chapter, the kinds of deep disagreement which threaten 
global scepticism tend to be of a kind with POLITICIANS. Thus, whilst we might not be able to 
lay down any hard and fast principles as to when trust is appropriate and inappropriate in the face 
of deep disagreement, the thought that affective self-trust will tend to be available (or as available 
as it would be in other circumstances) in these cases allows us to stave off the worries about global 
scepticism that the possibility of these cases might lead to.  
The flip side to this suggestion, of course, is that the possibility that recognized peers might be 
justified in staying steadfast in a narrower, domain-specific case of deep disagreement such as in 
DOCTORS-3 will be comparatively lower. After all, as we noted in discussion of that case earlier, 
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the content of the rival norms is such that we would not expect followers of each to doubt each 
other’s competence as a matter of course. And, that being so, there is no reason to think that they 
would not have the rich stock of social experiences that might either spur the imaginative leap to 
understanding the other’s epistemic sensibilities or even justify believing that the other’s norms do 
indeed represent a genuine epistemic alternative. Once those norms are seen to represent a genuine 
alternative, however, the context of realisation will become a context of doubt. One in which the 
possibility that either disputant might bracket out those doubts – with the kind of rational 
sensitivity that is characteristic of a trusting as opposed to a dogmatic response – will be remote 
to the point of being impossible. And, with affective self-trust unavailable steadfastness will no 
longer be a possibility – neither rationally, nor psychologically. As such, the conciliatory response 
to deep disagreement will be the appropriate one. As noted earlier, such a response will still have 
extensive sceptical consequences – though not the near global one’s associated with a case like 
POLITICIANS. Again, though, this seems to match up well with the intuitions that led us to 
consider such cases to start with and to consider whether the Higher-Order Trust approach – as a 
non-uniform approach – might extend to disagreement.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how the Higher-Order Trust approach to ‘The Problem of Ordinary 
Disagreement’ can be extended to cover also ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’. In 
the brief conclusion to the thesis that follows, I shall bring together the main findings of the past 





In this thesis I have considered two related questions concerning the normative significance of 
disagreement: 
How should I respond to ordinary disagreement with an effective peer? And, how should I 
respond to deep disagreement with an effective peer? 
I labelled these ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ and 'The Normative Problem of Deep 
Disagreement'. In response to which I forwarded a normative theory of disagreement that I call 
the Higher-Order Trust approach to disagreement. In a nutshell, this says that – whether 
disagreement is ordinary or deep – the matter of how one should respond to the realisation of 
disagreement comes down to whether one has available a form of self-trust that I refer to as affective 
self-trust.  
Given the nature of the determinants of the availability of self-trust in general as well as in the 
different kinds of disagreement, I suggested that it is not possible to give a principled account of 
the conditions under which these responses are available, nor, correspondingly under which these 
responses are justified. Nonetheless, it is possible to lay out some of the core claims of the Higher-
Order Trust approach in more schematic fashion. I shall do so in this brief conclusion. 
Effective peerhood, the reader will recall, was defined such that: 
If, S1 and S2 disagree and S1 has no undefeated reason independent of the substance of the 
disagreement to believe specifically that S1 or S2 holds the relative epistemic advantage vis-à-
vis the disputed propositions, then, S2 is S1’s effective peer.  
In case of disagreement with an effective peer, one acquires higher-order evidence that calls into 
question the practices by which one came to hold the disputed beliefs. In calling those practices 
into question, such higher-order evidence functions as a defeater for whatever justification one 
might have had for those beliefs prior to realising the disagreement. What form this defeater takes 
will depend on the kind of disagreement one is engaged in. 
In cases of ordinary peer disagreement where the disputants have based their beliefs on different 
evidence and are unable to share that evidence, the higher-order evidence is a rebutting defeater. 
In such cases, where S believes Q, S acquires higher-order evidence of evidence that justifies her 
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believing ~Q and in light of which, in lieu of a defeater-defeater, S cannot rely upon her 
appreciation of the evidence she has to provide a reliable guide to the truth about Q. 
In cases of ordinary peer disagreement where disputants share the same evidence, the higher-order 
evidence is a non-contextual undercutting defeater. In such cases S’s realisation that her effective 
peer has come to believe ~Q on the basis of the same evidence as she came to believe Q puts her 
in a position where, in lieu of a defeater-defeater, she cannot rely upon the practices by which she 
came to that conclusion. Since, typically, the best explanation of such cases will be that one party 
or other was subject to some kind of performance error specific to that context these doubts do 
not call into question S’s justification for her un-disputed beliefs. 
In cases of deep disagreement with an effective peer, things are slightly more complicated. In the 
majority of cases disputants will not be in a position to realise that their disagreement is deep. 
When this is so, the fact that a disagreement is deep will not play a role in determining the 
appropriate response to the disagreement. Instead, in such a situation S ought to respond to that 
disagreement as if it is an ordinary disagreement. However, we saw that it is possible that those 
party to deep disagreement could realise both that the disagreement is deep and that they are 
effective peers because of that. In such cases, the higher-order evidence will come in the form of 
a general undercutting defeater. In this situation, S’s realisation of the disagreement and its nature 
puts her in a position where, in lieu of a defeater-defeater, she cannot rely on the norms that she 
followed in coming to believe Q. In so far as norms correspond to general features of our epistemic 
practices, S acquires a defeater – not only for her justification for believing Q, but, other things 
being equal, any and all other beliefs she formed via the relevant norm. 
Where the forms of defeater in the different cases differ, what is common to all three is that 
defeating higher-order evidence works by placing an agent in a position where, in lieu of a defeater-
defeater, they are not permitted to rely upon the practices by which they came to hold the disputed 
beliefs. We can call these ‘contexts of doubt’. Following the discussion in Chapter 5, we can 
schematically lay out the nature of defeat from higher-order evidence as follows: 
(1) If S comes to believe Q on the basis of P via K, S will be justified in believing Q, iff P is a 
reason for S to believe Q and S is rationally permitted to rely on K.  
(2) If S acquires higher-order evidence impugning K, in lieu of a first-order defeater-defeater 
for R, S will be placed in a context of doubt vis-à-vis K. 
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As we saw in Chapter 6, to say that S follows epistemic norm N is to say that following N is 
amongst S’s epistemic practices. That being so, this schema of defeat applies also to realised deep 
disagreement. 
First-order defeat-defeaters are reasons that are not themselves impugned by the putative defeater. 
In the case of disagreement this amounts to the requirement that they be independent of the 
substance of the disagreement. Thus, by definition those party to disagreement with an effective 
peer will not have available any kind of first-order defeater. It follows, then, that either the 
appropriate response to disagreement will always be the conciliatory response; or there must be 
some other form of higher-order defeater-defeater that one might have available in such cases and that 
can underwrite one’s continued reliance on the practices called into question by the higher-order 
evidence.   
The Higher-Order Trust approach to disagreement says that one can have such a higher-order 
defeater-defeater – in the form of and by way of affective self-trust. Thus, we can complete the 
schema by adding that: 
(3) If S is in a context of doubt vis-à-vis K, S will be rationally permitted to rely on K iff S has 
some form of epistemic self-trust. 
Affective self-trust as I conceived it can be characterised in terms of an agents having an attitude 
of optimism about relying on their own epistemic practices. To be optimistic in this way is to 
manifest a willingness to rely on one's practices under the presumptions that (i) if K is reliable I will be 
more likely to achieve my epistemic aims if I rely on K, and that (ii) by relying upon K I will accrue 
those benefits, just because (iii) K is reliable.  
Importantly, these presumptions are not made in the form of belief. Rather they are the 
background commitments that constitute what it is to have affective self-trust. And in that, they 
provide the underlying rational structure of a normatively loaded way of perceiving situations of 
reliance as ‘cognitively safe’. These presumptions together imbue affective self-trust with its own 
internal structure of reason, in light of which, affective self-trust is in itself sufficient explanation 
of why an agent would continue to rely. Thus, if self-trust is available to an agent that agent will 
thereby have reason to rely upon the practices in question. Whether that reason is good is merely 
a question of whether that trust is well-placed. 
What this means, though, is that were S to have available affective self-trust vis-a-vis K, that would 
also give S access to a defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence acquired on realising 
disagreement with an affective peer. This is because, in underwriting the rational permissibility of 
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her relying on the deliverances of K, S’s affective self-trust would allow S to rely upon her original 
reasons for holding those beliefs to reason as follows: 
(i) In coming to believe Q on the basis of P, I judged that P establishes Q 
(ii) My interlocutor disagrees with me about Q 
(iii) But P establishes Q (via the presumptions of justified affective self-trust) 
(iv) Thus, I did not err in judging that P establishes Q 
(v) Therefore, Q and ‘my interlocutor must have erred in someway in coming to believe 
~Q’ 
Where the disagreement is deep, S could argue additionally: 
(vi) My interlocutor came to believe Q by competently following a norm other than mine 
(vii) Therefore, Q must have erred because her norm is somehow defective 
In other words, affective self-trust is a response to a context of doubt. When it is available it opens 
the possibility of being rationally steadfast. But without it the only option is conciliation. 
Thus, if we recognise the possibility of affective self-trust, we can recognise the following two 
principles of disagreement: 
If S1 is justified in believing Q but comes to realise that S2 disagrees with her about Q, and 
S2 is S1’s effective peer, then: 
I. If S1 does not trust, in the affective sense, the practices by which she came to 
believe Q, S1 will have no defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence acquired 
on realising the disagreement, thus, S1 ought to revise her belief Q 
II. If S1 does trust, in the affective sense, the practices by which she came to believe 
Q, S1 will have a higher-order defeater-defeater for the higher-order evidence acquired 
on realising the disagreement, thus, S1 ought to stay steadfast in her belief Q 
The Higher-Order Trust approach to disagreement is, as such, a non-uniform account of 
disagreement. What will determine which response to any particular disagreement is appropriate 
is largely a matter of whether affective self-trust is available. Here, though, we hit bedrock, so to 
speak. As discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, the determinants of self-trust include the character of the 
agent in question, the circumstances in which the need for self-trust arises, and in case of realised 
deep disagreement the social context and background of the disagreement. All three of these 
determining features, however, are varied enough and the ways that they interact in particular cases 
complex enough that we can expect any attempt to produce a principled account of the availability 
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(and so appropriateness) of affective self-trust to run aground. Thus, we might say, as far as the 
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